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“In Him We Live and Move and Have Our Being”  Acts 17:28 
 
“… let us believe with Saint Paul, that He is not far from any of us, and that in Him 
we live and move and have our being.”  Nicolas Malebranche1
 
  
“I entirely agree with what the Holy Scripture saith, that in God we live, and move, 
and have our being.”  George Berkeley2
 
    
 
 Nicolas Malebranche and George Berkeley cite this passage from the New 
Testament multiple times.3
 The philosophical theology of Nicolas Malebranche and George Berkeley has 
been largely neglected.  This neglect is not due to a lack of textual evidence that these 
philosophers held doctrines of philosophical theology.  We shall see that such textual 
evidence is plentiful.  It is also not due to the lack of importance these doctrines play in 
the thought of these philosophers.  We will see that these doctrines are important in their 
  As philosophers who held Christian doctrines, these 
philosophers were likely drawn to this text because it is one of the few places in the Bible 
that mentions the philosophical systems of the day.  This passage is from a sermon 
preached by St. Paul on Mars Hill to the Epicurean and Stoic philosophers in Athens.  I 
have taken this passage as the title of this project because it summarizes the philosophical 
theology of both philosophers: we are dependent upon God for all things.        
                                                 
1 Search (LO 230).  See “Appendix: Abbreviations”, page 230.    Unless otherwise noted, I will use this 
translation for all citations from The Search after Truth. 
 
2 Dialogues (DHP 214).   
 
3 Malebranche quotes this passage at least twice in the Search (LO 235 & 629) and once in the Dialogues 
(DM 131).  Berkeley quotes from Acts 17 at least four times in his published works; three times in the 
Principles (PHK 66, 149, & 150) once in the Dialogues (DHP 214) and once in Alciphron (4.14).  Daniel 
says that Berkeley cites this passage “On at least nine occasions”.  Stephen H. Daniel, “Berkeley's 
Pantheistic Discourse,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 49 (2001): 179-80.  Bracken 
suggests that Berkeley’s citing of this passages shows that he was following Malebranche as “a reservoir of 
suggestiveness”.  Harry M. Bracken, “Berkeley and Malebranche on Ideas,” The Modern Schoolman 41 
(1963).    
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overall philosophical and theological systems.  Nonetheless commentators have not paid 
much attention to the doctrines of philosophical theology held by both philosophers.   
 The philosophical theology of Malebranche and Berkeley can be seen by their 
shared acceptance of the doctrines of divine revelation and the Trinity.  Recovering this 
aspect of their thought allows interpreters to appreciate the richness of their overall 
philosophical systems.  Likewise, ignoring their philosophical theology robs interpreters 
of a deeper understanding of some of their more important philosophical doctrines.     
 My chief argument is that Malebranche and Berkeley hold similar theories of 
philosophical theology and that in each case understanding their philosophical theology 
helps us to understand their philosophical system.  Both accept the traditional doctrines of 
divine revelation and the Trinity from Christian theology.  Not only do they accept these 
doctrines, but the doctrines are philosophically relevant to the philosophical systems of 
both philosophers.  In other words, some of the philosophical similarities between the 
two philosophers can be explained in light of their similar theories of philosophical 
theology.   
 Since the modern period, interpreters have noticed that these philosophers hold 
similar philosophical positions.  Commentators have argued that these two philosophers 
hold similar views across many different branches of philosophy:  philosophical method, 
theories of knowledge and perception, theories of causation, and philosophical 
motivation.4
                                                 
4 All of these suggested similarities are pointed out in section 1.4.   
  The similarities most often pointed out fall into the categories of 
epistemology and metaphysics.  This literature has established that there are 
epistemological and metaphysical similarities in the philosophical systems of 
Malebranche and Berkeley.      
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 However, the fact that they hold similar theories of philosophical theology has not 
been mentioned in the secondary literature.  Commentators have missed obvious 
similarities concerning doctrines from Christian theology that both philosophers embrace.  
They accept the doctrines of divine revelation and the Trinity.  They merge these 
doctrines into their overall philosophical systems and generate their own theories from 
these doctrines.  As I will show, these theories are remarkably similar.  Malebranche’s 
theory of divine revelation is similar to Berkeley’s.  The same is true of their theories of 
the Trinity.  Malebranche and Berkeley’s philosophical theology consists in their 
embracing these doctrines from Christian theology and applying them to their 
philosophical projects in similar ways.   
 Not only do they hold similar theories of divine revelation and the Trinity, these 
theories are philosophically relevant for understanding their similar positions of 
metaphysics and epistemology.5
  Neglecting the philosophical theology of Malebranche and Berkeley has 
consequences.  A proper understanding of their commitments in philosophical theology 
sheds light into various puzzles and disputes concerning their metaphysics and 
epistemology.  In many cases, interpretive puzzles discussed in the secondary literature 
concerning the philosophical relationship between the two philosophers can be resolved 
when considered in light of their similar views of philosophical theology.  For example, 
  That is to say that Malebranche and Berkeley construct 
their positions in metaphysics and epistemology to be held consistently alongside their 
commitments to philosophical theology.  Since this is the case, we can look at one set of 
doctrines for help understanding the other.  Some of their similarities can be explained by 
a proper appreciation of their similar theories of philosophical theology.   
                                                 
5I explain what I mean by ‘philosophically relevant’ in section 1.1. 
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many commentators have pointed out that they hold similar theories of causation.  In this 
work, I show that understanding these philosophers’ positions on the Trinity helps us 
understand why their theories of causation are similar.   
 I present this argument in three chapters and apply the findings of this study in the 
fourth chapter.  The first three chapters work together to form my chief argument.  The 
fourth chapter is different.  Here I apply one feature from the earlier chapters, the 
doctrine of the Trinity in Malebranche, and look at it more closely showing how a proper 
understanding of this doctrine provides insight into some of the current discussions and 
disputes in the literature.     
 In chapter one, “Malebranche, Berkeley, and Philosophical Theology”, I begin by 
introducing some necessary methodology and background.  In section 1.1, I introduce 
some important methodological considerations.  I define the discipline of philosophical 
theology and introduce a distinction between influence and similarity.  I explain why I 
argue that the theological doctrines of divine revelation and the Trinity are only 
philosophically relevant for these philosophers rather than argue that the theological 
doctrines influenced their philosophical positions.  My position is that these philosophers 
consistently hold the doctrines of divine revelation and the Trinity alongside their 
epistemological and metaphysical doctrines.    
 In section 1.2, I give background information as well as a philosophical overview 
of each of the philosophers in question.  I also point out features of their religious 
positions and theological education since these are important in understanding their 
philosophical theology.  I start with Malebranche, explaining his philosophical doctrines 
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of occasionalism and vision in God since these are important for my project.  I follow suit 
with Berkeley, introducing his idealism, language of vision, and his theory of causation.     
 In 1.3, I introduce background information concerning the philosophical 
relationship of Malebranche and Berkeley.  Even early in Berkeley’s career, 
commentators suggested that he followed Malebranche on many points.  Berkeley 
rejected this claim in both his published works as well as personal correspondences.  I 
point out that a charitable interpretation will take Berkeley at his word and seek out other 
explanations for the similarities between his thought and Malebranche’s.   
 In 1.4 I introduce several different movements, debates, and disagreements in the 
secondary literature to which this study contributes.  Of these, the most important is the 
literature that points out philosophical similarities between Malebranche and Berkeley 
since many of these similarities can be explained by their shared acceptance of divine 
revelation and the Trinity.   
 After introducing these introductory matters, I continue my chief argument in 
chapters 2 and 3: Malebranche and Berkeley hold similar theories of philosophical 
theology which are philosophically relevant in their metaphysics and epistemology.  In 
chapter two, “Divine Revelation in the Epistemology of Malebranche and Berkeley”, I 
argue that Malebranche and Berkeley accept traditional accounts of divine revelation 
from Christian theology and that their shared acceptance of this doctrine helps explain 
their epistemological similarities.  In Christian theology, the doctrine of divine revelation 
explains how God reveals to humans.     
 I begin in 2.1 with an account of divine revelation: divine revelation occurs when 
the veiled is unveiled and ignorance is dispelled with God acting as the revealer.  Then, I 
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explain the distinction between general and special revelation from traditional Christian 
theology since this is a distinction found in Malebranche and Berkeley.  I introduce a 
contemporary account of divine revelation from George Mavrodes—the causation theory 
of divine revelation—since Malebranche and Berkeley’s accounts are very similar.  I end 
this first section by examining quickly the relationship between divine revelation and 
knowledge.   
 Then in section 2.2, I present Malebranche’s theory of divine revelation.  I show 
that it is an example of Mavrodes’ causation theory of divine revelation.  Next I show 
that Malebranche accepts and applies the traditional distinction between general and 
special revelation from Christian theology.  I show Malebranche’s acceptance of the 
doctrine of divine revelation is philosophically relevant in his vision in God.  
Malebranche’s vision in God is his theory of general revelation.  I end by arguing that for 
Malebranche, all knowledge is derived from divine revelation.   
 In section 2.3, I present Berkeley’s theory of divine revelation.  I argue that 
Berkeley’s theory is also an example of Mavrodes’ causation model.  Then I show that 
Berkeley utilizes the traditional distinction between general and special revelation, even 
though he does not use this terminology.  Like Malebranche’s, Berkeley’s theory of 
divine revelation is philosophically relevant in his epistemology.  Berkeley’s language of 
vision is his account of general revelation.  This section closes when I argue that 
Berkeley holds that the vast majority of human knowledge is derived from divine 
revelation.   
 I conclude this chapter in 2.4 by summarizing Malebranche and Berkeley’s 
similar theories of divine revelation.  I also summarize some of their epistemological 
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similarities.  Then I present the payoff of studying Malebranche and Berkeley’s 
philosophical theology.  I argue that Malebranche and Berkeley’s similar theories of 
divine revelation explain their epistemology similarities, something that has not been 
properly explained in the secondary literature.   
 I turn to metaphysics in chapter 3, “The Trinity in the Metaphysics of 
Malebranche and Berkeley”.  I argue here that Malebranche and Berkeley hold similar 
doctrines of the Trinity and that understanding these similar theories sheds light on their 
similar metaphysical positions.  The Trinity is the doctrine from Christian theology that 
God is one substance and three persons: God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy 
Spirit.   
 In 3.1 I give the historical development of the doctrine of the Trinity from 
Christian theology.  I introduce the Nicene Creed—which pronounced that God is one 
substance in three persons—since Malebranche and Berkeley accept a Nicene 
formulation of the Trinity.  I highlight Augustine’s developments of the doctrine of the 
Trinity.  These include the differentiation between the persons of the Trinity and 
Augustine’s analogy of being, mind, and will.  I also introduce what I call the “amplified 
analogy” from a contemporary of Malebranche and Berkeley, Jonathan Edwards.6
 I argue that Malebranche accepts a traditional formulation of the doctrine of the 
Trinity in 3.2.  Malebranche accepts the Nicene formulation of the Trinity as well as the 
  The 
amplified analogy takes Augustine’s analogy of being, mind, and will and connects each 
of the parts of the analogy with one of the persons of the Trinity: God the Father is being, 
God the Son is mind, and God the Holy Spirit is will.     
                                                 
6 While Edwards wrote somewhat later than both Malebranche and Berkeley, I am referring to him as a 
“contemporary” because he lived and wrote in the same basic intellectual era.  I explain this in more detail 
in section 3.1.   
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Augustinian distinctions.  He also shows that he holds the amplified analogy when he 
says that God the Father is being, the Son (or the Word) is mind or Reason, and the Holy 
Spirit is the will.  The Trinity is philosophically relevant for Malebranche.  A proper 
understanding of Malebranche’s theory of the Trinity helps explain passages what would 
be puzzling otherwise.  Plus this doctrine serves as the motivation for his occasionalism 
or theory of causation. 
 We see that Berkeley also accepts the doctrine of the Trinity in 3.3.  The Nicene 
formulation, Augustinian differentiation between the persons of the Trinity, as well as the 
amplified analogy are all found in Berkeley.  The doctrine of the Trinity is 
philosophically relevant in Berkeley’s metaphysics.  It helps us understand Berkeley’s 
argument in the Siris; a work that is considered puzzling.  Berkeley’s theory of the 
Trinity is also philosophically relevant to his theory of causation.  This theory is 
structured so that it can be held consistently with the Trinity.   
 Finally, I end this chapter in 3.4 by summarizing the similarities of Malebranche 
and Berkeley concerning their Trinitarian metaphysics.  I show how appreciating 
Malebranche and Berkeley’s similar theories of the Trinity sheds light on some of the 
issues and disputes from the secondary literature introduced in section 1.4.  With their 
theories of the Trinity in mind, we can give a better explanation of why Berkeley’s theory 
of causation is similar to that of Malebranche than has been given to this point.        
 These first three chapters constitute my chief argument.  Chapter 4 is a 
supplemental chapter where I apply some of the findings from the earlier three chapters.  
It does not add anything to the argument concerning the philosophical similarities 
between Malebranche and Berkeley.  Instead, I point out in this chapter that Malebranche 
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and Berkeley’s theories of philosophical theology are not only helpful for understanding 
the philosophical similarities between the two philosophers, they are also helpful in 
interpreting the philosophers on their own.  In this chapter, I give one example of how to 
apply the results of this study into some puzzles in the literature on Malebranche.        
 I classify four different ways that we could apply the findings of the earlier 
chapters to the literature on either Malebranche or Berkeley:   
[1] An application of Malebranche’s theory of the Trinity  
[2] An application of Malebranche’s theory of divine revelation 
[3] An application of Berkeley’s theory of the Trinity 
[4]  An application of Berkeley’s theory of divine revelation 
Rather than attempt all four, I focus on [1].  My hope and expectation is that my work 
here will provide an example for how to apply the other three.  I show how 
Malebranche’s theory of the Trinity provides solutions to two different puzzles from the 
secondary literature.  I apply this doctrine to the ontological status of Malebranche’s 
ideas in 4.1 and then to his theory of efficacious ideas in 4.2.  In both cases, I present the 
puzzle, highlight various solutions from the secondary literature, and then show how a 
proper understanding of Malebranche’s theory of the Trinity provides a solution to the 
puzzle.   
 Finally, in the conclusion I restate my findings concerning the philosophical 
similarities between Malebranche and Berkeley’s philosophical theology.  I show that 
they hold similar positions of divine revelation and the Trinity that are relevant for 





Malebranche, Berkeley, and Philosophical Theology 
 
 Malebranche and Berkeley hold similar positions of philosophical theology.  Both 
accept divine revelation and the Trinity from Christian theology and structure their 
respective philosophical systems to be held consistently alongside these doctrines.  
Neglecting the philosophical theology of Malebranche and Berkeley robs the interpreter 
of appreciating the fullness of their epistemological and metaphysical systems.          
 In this first chapter I prepare the ground for arguing that Malebranche and 
Berkeley hold theological positions that are philosophically relevant to their metaphysics 
and epistemology.  Before I build that argument, I need to set the stage with some 
necessary background information.  I start in 1.1 by introducing two related 
methodological considerations.  I give an account of what I mean by “philosophical 
theology” and I explain why I claim that certain theological doctrines are 
“philosophically relevant”.  Next in 1.2, I present some relevant background information 
concerning Malebranche and Berkeley.  This is necessary since some knowledge of these 
philosophers is required to properly understand the relationship between their 
philosophical theology and philosophy.  In section 1.3 I examine the philosophical 
connections between Malebranche and Berkeley.  This examination places my claim that 
the two philosophers hold similar views of philosophical theology into proper context.  In 
the final section, 1.4, I introduce how my research contributes to different movements, 
disputes, and puzzles found in the secondary literature.  I highlight the literature that 








 In recent literature, philosophical theology is often defined as the application of 
philosophical techniques and analysis into theological matters such as doctrines of the 
Christian faith.  In a book published in 2005, Brian Hebblethwaite defines philosophical 
theology in this way.  
But at the same time a third major development has been the huge increase in the 
application of the techniques of philosophical analysis to the central doctrines of the 




Another recent book by Stephen T. Davis advances the same notion.  According to Davis 
philosophical theology is “the kind of approach that a believing philosopher would make 
to Christian theological topics”2
 These definitions from Hebblethwaite and Davis can be combined to form what I 
will call the Hebblethwaite/Davis account of philosophical theology.  This account holds 
three features.  The first concerns the activity of this field of study.  Philosophical 
theology applies philosophical analysis to theological subjects.  The second concerns the 
object of that analysis.  On this account the object of the philosophical analysis is the 
Christian faith.  The third feature concerns the agent: the philosophical theologian.  
According to the Hebblethwaite/Davis account the agent will be someone within the 
Christian faith.  It is the approach that a “believing philosopher” would take.  Accounts 
such as the Hebblethwaite/Davis account are not unusual in Christian theological circles.  
.   
                                                 
1 Brian Hebblethwaite, Philosophical Theology and Christian Doctrine (Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2005), 2.  
 
2 “‘Philosophical theology’ is sometimes used as a synonym for ‘philosophy of religion’, but, as noted, I 
will use it simply to mean the kind of approach that a believing philosopher would make to Christian 
theological topics.”  Stephen T. Davis, Christian Philosophical Theology (New York, NY: Oxford 




Accounts of philosophical theology that share all three of these features can also be found 
in systematic theologies of the Christian faith.3
 A literal reading of the Hebblethwaite/Davis account of philosophical theology 
suggests two things.  Philosophical theology must have the Christian faith as its object 
and the philosophical theologian must be a Christian.  This reading excludes other 
possibilities, such as a Jewish philosophical theologian applying philosophical analysis to 
Jewish theology.  Charity suggests that the Hebblethwaite/Davis account does not restrict 
the field of philosophical theology to Christians working within Christian theology.  I 
suggest that this account could also be practiced by a person of another theological 
tradition and still fit into the account presented by Hebblethwaite and Davis.   
      
 While adherents to other theological traditions can also do philosophical theology, 
the salient feature of this account is that it is done from within the theological tradition in 
question.  The Christian philosophical theologian applies philosophical tools to Christian 
theology and the Jewish philosophical theologian does the same concerning Jewish 
theology.  Philosophical theology, according to this account, occurs when a thinker from 
a certain theological tradition applies philosophical tools to that tradition.  In other words, 
there are certain beliefs or presuppositions one must have in order to do philosophical 
theology according to this account.  That person must be a member of a theological 
tradition and they must be interested in considering, and often times defending, doctrines 
from that theological tradition.  This is an account of philosophical theology from within 
a certain tradition.  In light of this, philosophical theology is treated as a subset of 
theology according to the Hebblethwaite/Davis account.  The theological tradition 
serving as the object of the inquiry determines how and who can take part in that inquiry.  
                                                 
3 One example is Millard J. Erickson, Christian Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Publishing, 1983).   
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This account also restricts the activity of the philosophical theologian to only theological 
matters.  When the writer delves into more philosophical matters such as epistemology 
and metaphysics, she is no longer doing philosophical theology according to this account.  
In other words there is a priority relationship in the Hebblethwaite/Davis account; 
philosophy serves or supports theology. 
 A different account of philosophical theology is given in New Essays in 
Philosophical Theology, an important work on philosophical theology from the middle of 
the twentieth century by Antony Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre.4  Most agree that 
philosophical theology has been done for centuries by thinkers such as Augustine and 
Aquinas, but this work edited by Flew and MacIntyre is the first example of a 
contemporary work of philosophical theology.5
 In the preface to this work, Flew and MacIntyre give some background 
concerning why they chose to title the work New Essays in Philosophical Theology.  
They explain that they adopted the expression “philosophical theology” rather than 
“philosophy of religion” because they feared that the latter has become connected to 
attempts to prove the truth of theism: “But this expression has become, and seems likely 
for some time to remain, associated with Idealist attempts to present philosophical  
  The account of philosophical theology 
presented in this work is an older account than the Hebblethwaite/Davis account.    
 
                                                 
4 Antony Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre, eds., New Essays in Philosophical Theology (New York, NY: 
Macmillian, 1955). 
 
5 It is hard to find any titles mentioning philosophical theology before this work.  I also say this because the 
explanation they give of their choosing the terminology ‘philosophical theology’ over ‘philosophy of 




prolegomena to theistic theology.”6
 Flew and MacIntyre’s account of philosophical theology shares one important 
feature in common with the Hebblethwaite/Davis account.  It agrees that philosophical 
theology is an application of philosophical analysis to theological subjects.  But the 
Flew/MacIntyre account disagrees with the other two features from the 
Hebblethwaite/Davis account.  It does not limit the agents to those who are within in a 
theological tradition.  In fact, Flew and MacIntyre deliberately chose the terminology 
“philosophical theology” because they wanted their collection of essays to represent a 
discipline where both theist and atheist philosophers could explore issues related to 
theology even if they come with different starting points and arrive at different 
conclusions.
  In other words, in the 1950’s Flew and MacIntyre 
feared that philosophy of religion was a discipline reserved for those who were theists 
working on issues related to preserving theism.  What they feared concerning the term 
‘philosophy of religion’ fifty years ago is true today of their preferred term, 
“philosophical theology”, at least according to the Hebblethwaite/Davis account. 
7
                                                 
6 “… it is only in the last few years that attempts have been made to apply these latest philosophical 
techniques and insights to theological issues, while this is probably the first time that a whole book has 
been devoted to this enormous job.  We should like to have used the expression ‘Philosophy of Religion” 
for its analogy with ‘Philosophy of History’, ‘Philosophy of Science’, and so on: since the questions 
discussed here are philosophical and bear the same sort of relation to religious thought and practice as the 
questions of the philosophy of history and science bear to the thought and practice of working scientists and 
historians; the relation, that is, of arising out of or being posed by these empirical disciplines, while being 
themselves philosophical and not factual questions (see Chapter III).  But this expression has become, and 
seems likely for some time to remain, associated with Idealist attempts to present philosophical 
prolegomena to theistic theology.  So we have adapted as an alternative the expression ‘Philosophical 
Theology’; which has a welcome analogy to ‘Philosophical Ethics’ and ‘Philosophical Aesthetics’, 
occasionally used to cover the parallel philosophical inquiries which arise out of the moral and critical 
thought and practice.”  Flew and MacIntyre, eds., New Essays in Philosophical Theology, viii.  
  In contrast with the Hebblethwaite/Davis account, the Flew/MacIntyre 
 
7 “We realize that many will be startled to find the word ‘theology’ so used that: the expression ‘theistic 
theologian’ is not tautological; and the expression ‘atheist theologian’ is not self-contradictory.  But unless 
this unusual usage of ours is adopted we have to accept the paradox that those who reach opposite 
conclusions about certain questions must be regarded as having thereby shown themselves to have been 
engaged in different disciplines: the paradox that whereas St. Thomas’s presentation of the quinque via is a 
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account does not require any beliefs or presuppositions of the philosophical theologian.  
While the first approach places philosophical theology as a subset of theology, the 
Flew/MacIntyre approach places it as a subset of philosophy.   
 According to the Flew/MacIntyre account, philosophical theology is the discipline 
where philosophical insights and techniques are applied to issues in theology, regardless 
of the theological tradition in question or the beliefs of the philosophical theologian.  
Philosophical theology is indeed interested in theological issues, but defined broad 
enough to include Hume’s Dialogues concerning Natural Religion.  The Flew/MacIntyre 
account of philosophical theology also does not restrict the activity of the philosophical 
theologian in the same way that the Hebblethwaite/Davis account does.  The 
Flew/MacIntyre account does not hold a priority relationship between theology and 
philosophy.     
 For my purposes, I prefer the Flew/MacIntyre account of philosophical theology 
over the Hebblethwaite/Davis account.  The earlier, more theologically motivated 
account has a hard time categorizing historical thinkers.  According to the 
Hebblethwaite/Davis account, Augustine’s On the Trinity is philosophical theology, but 
those works where Augustine is interested in more general philosophical questions—such 
as substance or knowledge— are not philosophical theology.  Epistemology is not a 
theological doctrine, yet Augustine’s theory of divine illumination— where all 
knowledge is illuminated by God— should be considered a matter of philosophical 
                                                                                                                                                 
piece of (Natural or Philosophical) Theology, Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion must also 




theology according to all accounts.8  Or, to use a contemporary of both Malebranche and 
Berkeley as an example, Jonathan Edwards was interested in doing philosophy as well as 
theology, but even his more philosophical works are greatly informed by his theology.9
 It is according to the Flew/MacIntyre account that Malebranche and Berkeley are 
doing philosophical theology.  They apply philosophical analysis to theological subjects, 
but they do so in a more philosophical way than theological.  That is, they do not 
embrace the priority relationship that philosophy serves theology.  Malebranche and 
Berkeley are interested in doing philosophy.  They present arguments concerning what 
they take to be truth in all matters of philosophy.  Their chief concern is not limited to the 
theological.  Neither are they concerned with doing systematic Christian theology.  In the 
process of seeking the philosophical truth, they are also interested in theological matters.  
Malebranche and Berkeley are noted for placing God at the centers of their philosophical 
theories. Nicholas Jolley writes: “In general terms, Berkeley and Malebranche both offer 
  
The Hebblethwaite/Davis account has a hard time classifying historical writers whose 
work is often times both theological and philosophical such as Malebranche and 
Berkeley.  The Flew/MacIntyre account, on the other hand, does not have any problem 
identifying these historical thinkers as doing philosophical theology.     
                                                 
8 The same is true for some of the contemporary accounts of epistemology such as Nicholas Wolterstorff, 
Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflections on the Claim That God Speaks (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), Nicholas Wolterstorff, Reason within the Bounds of Religion (Grand Rapids, MI: 
W. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1976). And Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
 
9 In fact Lee, in his book on the philosophical theology of Jonathan Edwards, assumes a definition similar 
to the Flew/MacIntryre account in his book.  He considers many of Edwards more metaphysical and 
epistemological doctrines to all fall under the category of philosophical theology.  Sang Hyun Lee, The 




examples of theocentric metaphysics of fundamentally Cartesian inspiration.”10  Since 
they were not a part of the modern academy, they were not concerned to separate their 
theology from their philosophy into two distinct realms.  They are doing philosophy 
alongside their theology, allowing one to inform the other.  As I show in chapters 2 and 3, 
Malebranche and Berkeley hold Christian doctrines such as the Trinity and divine 
revelation and these doctrines are philosophically relevant.  So, while they are interested 
in theological matters, they are not doing theology.  In those instances where they are 
concerned with theological matters, Malebranche and Berkeley are doing philosophical 
theology according to the account given by Flew and MacIntyre.11
 An argument could be made that Berkeley and Malebranche are doing 
philosophical theology according to the Hebblethwaite/Davis account since they are both 
members of the Christian theological tradition.  Malebranche was a Catholic Priest and 
Berkeley was an Anglican Bishop.  They also restrict their theological concerns to their 
tradition.  Neither wrote concerning the positions of other theological traditions.  There is 
no doubt that Malebranche and Berkeley were happy to use their philosophical systems to 
defend their theological positions, and this is permissible on the Flew/MacIntyre account.  
But Malebranche and Berkeley did not use their philosophy to serve their theology.  The 
priority relationship that categorizes the Hebblethwaite/Davis account cannot be found in 
 
                                                 
10Nicholas Jolley, “Berkeley, Malebranche, and Vision in God,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 34 
(1996): 536.  See also A. A. Luce, Berkeley and Malebranche: A Study in the Origins of Berkeley's 
Thought (London, UK: Oxford University Press, 1934).  Copleston makes similar remarks at Frederick 
Charles Copleston, A History of Philosophy (Westminster, Md.,: Newman Bookshop, 1946), Vol 4, Pgs 
202-03.    
 
11 It is not my position that everything from Malebranche and Berkeley fits into the category of 
philosophical theology.  Since they both speak of God often, it might be interesting to distinguish where 
philosophy stops and philosophical theology begins.  But that is not my goal here, I am only concerned 
with their views on divine revelation and the Trinity, which both fall into the category of philosophical 




Malebranche or Berkeley and this is why they are doing philosophical theology according 
to the Flew/MacIntyre account.  
 Malebranche supports my claim that he is doing philosophical theology according 
to the Flew/MacIntyre account.  He says that he should never be considered as only a 
philosopher or as only a theologian, but always as both.  “One must not say that I act 
sometimes as a philosopher and sometimes as a theologian: for I always speak, or claim 
to speak, as a rational theologian.”12  I interpret Malebranche here to be saying that he is 
doing philosophical theology in the spirit of the Flew and MacIntyre account.  He does 
not use philosophy to support his theological positions.  He does both philosophy and 
theology together in an intertwined manner.  I suggest that Berkeley would agree that he 
does philosophical theology according to the Flew/MacIntyre account.  In fact, in light of 
Berkeley’s more theologically motivated works, which are introduced in section 1.2, it 
looks as if the claim that Berkeley is doing philosophical theology is even stronger than 
Malebranche.  Berkeley writes some works where he highlights his philosophy13 and 
others where he highlights his theology14
 Since Malebranche and Berkeley are doing philosophical theology, I suggest that 
there is a payoff to recognizing this fact.  Understanding their philosophical theology is 
helpful in interpreting them both.  For an example of how a proper understanding of 
.   
                                                 
12 This is from OCM VIII, 632.  I am citing Pyle’s translation of this passage from Andrew Pyle, 
Malebranche (London ; New York: Routledge, 2002).  In a similar vein, Copleston remarks that “… 
Malebranche’s outlook was definitely that of a Christian philosopher who made no rigid separation 
between theology and philosophy and who was intent on interpreting the world and human experience in 
the light of his Christian faith… he was definitely a Christian thinker rather than a philosopher who 
happened to be a Christian.”  Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol 4, pg 181.   
 
13 These works would be An Essay Towards a  New Theory of Vision, Introduction to the Principles of 
Human Knowledge, Three Dialogs Between Hylas and Philonous, and The Theory of Vision Vindicated and 
Explained. 
 




philosophical theology can aid a philosophical interpretation consider Malebranche’s 
epistemology.  As I will show in chapter 2, it has been common for interpreters to point 
out that Malebranche’s epistemology is related to his view of God.  But a more 
comprehensive view of philosophical theology can advance this position.  The general 
strategy in these sources is to point out that Malebranche accepts some form of divine 
revelation in his epistemology.  This has its merits, but it fails to explain the depth of the 
dependence Malebranche’s epistemology has on divine revelation.   
 This general strategy concerning Malebranche’s epistemology starts with some 
issue directly related to epistemology and evokes Malebranche’s view of revelation as a 
way at understanding that particular issue.  While considering the epistemological 
problem at hand, Malebranche’s view of the role of God in the process is consulted.  A 
conclusion is then made and applied back into the original problem.  This general 
strategy recognizes Malebranche’s theory of illumination, but it places it in a position of 
secondary interest.  It recognizes what Malebranche says about revelation only in relation 
to his broader epistemological concerns.   
 A good example of this general strategy is the literature concerning efficacious 
ideas in Malebranche.  Since I will talk in detail about Malebranche’s efficacious ideas in 
chapter 4, I only introduce some of the principal players in this literature and how they 
illustrate this strategy here.  Many commentators interpret Malebranche’s theory of 
efficacious ideas as some form of divine illumination or revelation including Nicholas 
Jolley and Tad Schmaltz.15
                                                 
15 Jolley argues that Malebranche abandons a Cartesian doctrine of pure intellect for a more Augustinian 
doctrine of divine illumination.  Nicholas Jolley, “Intellect and Illumination in Malebranche,” Journal of 
the History of Philosophy 32 (1994).  See also Tad M. Schmaltz, Malebranche's Theory of the Soul: A 
Cartesian Interpretation (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
  The general strategy considers Malebranche’s view of 
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revelation only as it is related to other epistemological issues.  Jolley and Schmaltz start 
with a Cartesian epistemological doctrine and then try to make sense of Malebranche’s 
adaptation or rejection of that doctrine.  Jolley is concerned with Malebranche’s rejection 
of the theory of pure intellect and Schmaltz is concerned with Malebranche’s 
understanding of the role of the soul in understanding sentiments.  Both of these authors 
then present Malebranche’s commitment to illumination or revelation as the means of 
explaining his departure from Descartes.  In these two instances an epistemological 
question has been raised and Malebranche’s theory of revelation is given as the 
explanation.   
 Another way of stating this general strategy is that Malebranche’s view of 
revelation is only considered as it complements or supports his epistemological project.  
The same could be said generally about any of the theological nuances of Malebranche’s 
positions or doctrines.  While Malebranche has caught the attention of many English 
speaking philosophers in the past decades he is still basically unknown to English 
speaking theologians.16
                                                 
16 Stephen Nadler in his Introduction to the Cambridge Companion to Malebranche, published in 2000, 
says that Malebranche “is only now finding his place in the pantheon of early modern figures – along with 
Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and the others—deemed worthy of study by contemporary philosophers of the 
Anglo-American tradition.”  Steven Nadler, The Cambridge Companion to Malebranche (New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 1.  My claim that Malebranche seems relatively unknown to English 
speaking theologians is derived from the general lack of any Malebranche scholarship among English 
speaking theologians as well as from conversations about Malebranche at various theological conferences.    
  This means that the importance of Malebranche’s philosophical 
theology has not been investigated by either philosophers or theologians.  The result is 
that Malebranche’s philosophy has largely been studied in terms of what is interesting or 
important to philosophers who are uninterested in his theology.  This has led to important 
misunderstandings concerning Malebranche’s philosophical theology that results in a 
lack of awareness of how Malebranche’s philosophical theology is relevant to his wider 
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philosophical system.  Malebranche’s philosophical positions have been harvested and 
separated away from his theological or religious commitments in a way that would be 
foreign to Malebranche.17
 Approaching the subject of revelation in Malebranche in this fashion where the 
theological and religious doctrines are looked at primarily as support for his 
epistemological program no doubt has some merits.  It gives epistemologists the ability to 
mine from Malebranche what is of interest to them while at the same time recognizing 
that he holds certain commitments that inform his theory.
   
18
 Recognizing these merits, this general strategy should not be the only way that 
Malebranche is studied.  It leaves open the possibility that we are missing an important 
part of Malebranche’s project since we are constructing a hierarchy that does not exist in 
Malebranche.  The hierarchy in question is one that suggests that epistemological 
concerns are more fundamental to Malebranche than those of philosophical theology.  
This weakness can be overcome with a proper understanding of the role of philosophical 
theology in Malebranche.  Putting Malebranche’s use of revelation in this secondary 
position does not allow us to see the full picture of what Malebranche says concerning 
how he thinks that God reveals truths to humans.  There is no reason to think that 
Malebranche’s philosophical theology should take a back seat to his epistemology.  
   
                                                 
17  Nadler seems to recognize this.  “While Malebranche’s thought is deeply rooted in his theological 
agenda and, more broadly, in the particular intellectual and religious environment of early modern France, 
much of it is of perennial philosophical value, and plenty of his ideas and arguments continue to be of 
interest to philosophers today.”  Ibid., 1. 
 
18 It also highlights where his Augustinianism leads him to depart from Descartes.  In the next section, 1.2, 




Following this strategy thereby misses some important aspects of Malebranche’s thought 
and is in opposition his Malebranche’s goal of creating a “Christian Philosophy”.19
   I have made the complaint that commentators miss an important aspect of 
Malebranche’s philosophical theology by looking at revelation only through the lens of 
epistemology.  Jasper Reid makes a similar observation concerning the literature on 
Malebranche’s view of intelligible extension.  He suggests that one of the reasons that the 
ontological status of intelligible extension for Malebranche is not clearly understood is 
that it has been examined primarily from an epistemological point of view. 
      
20
 I have gone into some detail explaining Malebranche literature to make my point 
that understanding his philosophical theology aids our understanding of his philosophy.  
The same is true for the Berkeley literature, and I could have chosen an example from 
that literature to make the same point.   
  Reid’s own 
approach is to look at this doctrine from a different point of view, one that starts with 
ontology.  He argues that by looking at Malebranche’s view of intelligible extension from 
the viewpoint of ontology, important insights are gained.  Reid is focusing on different 
subjects in Malebranche that I am here, but I take Reid to be making a similar claim.  We 
are both encouraging interpreters to look at Malebranche from a different viewpoint.  
Reid is encouraging a viewpoint from ontology and I am encouraging a viewpoint from 
philosophical theology.  We both suggest that important insights can be gained from 
these shifts in viewpoints.   
                                                 
19 Pyle, Malebranche, 2. 
  
20 “Most of the secondary literature on intelligible extension has approached it primarily from an 
epistemological point of view which is why many of the still-outstanding difficulties pertain more to its 
ontology”.  Jasper Reid, “Malebranche on Intelligible Extension,” British Journal for the History of 




 Finally, while I hold that both Berkeley and Malebranche are doing philosophical 
theology, I am not.  Malebranche and Berkeley’s attempt at arriving at the truth of some 
matter concerning epistemology or metaphysics causes them to enter into philosophical 
theology.  Unlike Malebranche and Berkeley, I am not interested here to discern the truth 
concerning any of the doctrines that I introduce.  My intent here is merely to give an 
interpretation of Malebranche and Berkeley.  In the process, I do not attempt to argue that 
their theories concerning divine revelation or the Trinity are correct.  Rather than 
philosophical theology, this project falls into the classification of the history of 
philosophy.   
 Another area of methodology that I need to discuss is what I mean by 
‘philosophically relevant’.  I claim that the theories of divine revelation and the Trinity 
are philosophically relevant for Malebranche and Berkeley.  Without explanation, this is 
unclear.      
 The claim that these doctrines are philosophically relevant could be understood in 
at least two ways.  First, I could be making a strong claim concerning the influence these 
two theological doctrines held over the philosophical positions of Malebranche and 
Berkeley.  It is possible that Berkeley and Malebranche’s theological commitments could 
have influenced their philosophical conclusions in a causal relationship.21
                                                 
21 Of course, I could also be arguing that Malebranche and Berkeley’s philosophical positions influenced 
their theological doctrines.   
  In this case I 
would be arguing that these philosophers actually derived some aspects of their 
philosophy from their theology in some direct and deliberate manner.  But I am not 
attempting to claim any such influence here.  
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 The primary reason that I am not arguing that Malebranche and Berkeley’s 
philosophical theology influenced their philosophy is that there is a lack of historical 
support for such a position.  I think that it is possible, even likely, that Malebranche or 
Berkeley’s philosophical conclusions may have been influenced by their theological 
doctrines, but there is not adequate historical support for such a claim.  There are no 
private journals indicating such an influence.  There is no reason to think that the 
progression of their chronological works support the notion that their theology influenced 
the philosophy of Malebranche or Berkeley.  In fact, the progression in the works of both 
philosophers might indicate the opposite; that their philosophical views influenced the 
theological.  Both wrote their more philosophical works early in their career.  They did 
not write their more theologically motivated works till later.  In section 1.2, I introduce 
these works by both philosophers in more detail.      
 By saying that the doctrines of divine revelation and the Trinity are 
philosophically relevant I am not saying that there was a causal influence of the 
theological doctrines over the philosophical.  Instead, I am making a weaker claim.  
Malebranche and Berkeley consciously hold these theological doctrines alongside their 
philosophical positions.  It is my position that Malebranche and Berkeley deliberately and 
consciously accepted the doctrines of divine revelation and the Trinity from Christian 
theology.  They also deliberately and consciously accepted certain philosophical 
doctrines derived from their innovative epistemological and metaphysical systems.  My 
claim is that they attempted to hold both sets of doctrines together in a consistent whole.  
Malebranche and Berkeley were good philosophers who would not consciously hold 
inconsistencies.  I think that the philosophers tested both sets of doctrines against each 
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other seeking consistency and unity.  From their works, there is no reason to think that 
they placed priority upon either set of doctrines over the other.  This is particularly true 
when we realize that there was not the clear cut distinction between theology and 
philosophy as exists today.   
 Also, when I say that Malebranche and Berkeley’s philosophical theology is 
relevant in their philosophy, I am pointing out that this relationship between the 
theological and philosophical doctrines is reciprocal.  That is to say, an understanding of 
one set of doctrines will provide a better understanding of the other.  We can gain 
information about the philosophical doctrines by looking about the theological doctrines 
and vice versa.  Philosophers are well aware of Malebranche and Berkeley’s 
philosophical doctrines, but they are not familiar with their theological doctrines.  Since 
this is the case, an understanding of certain doctrines of philosophical theology will shed 
light on the better known philosophical positions of Malebranche and Berkeley.  In short, 
my claim is that the doctrines of divine revelation and the Trinity are philosophically 
relevant for Malebranche and Berkeley because both philosophers are consciously 
striving to hold both sets of doctrines and taking this into account sheds light on their 
philosophical positions.                
 A second methodological issue concerns the tone of the project as a whole.  Some 
philosophers might criticize it as too theological.  They might say that philosophers 
should not care about theology or the theological commitments held by past thinkers.  
After all, they might say, philosophers are not looking at Berkeley and Malebranche for 
their insights into theology but for the role their unique philosophical systems played in 
the advancement of certain themes and for the influence they had on later philosophers. 
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 Such a criticism of this project, or any other similar project, is wrongheaded.  
First of all, to truly understand a philosopher from the past we need to have some 
understanding of their cultural setting.  Throughout history, most philosophers lived and 
worked in cultures that were much more saturated with religious and theological 
sentiments than ours.  This is particularly true of the early modern period when the 
majority of philosophers were trained in theology and held positions of leadership in their 
respective religious communities.  We should not divorce the philosophical truths from 
the religious setting where this philosophy was formed.  John Cottingham warns that we 
should be careful to not secularize these thinkers from the early modern period.  He says, 
in the context of studies on Descartes, that there is a tendency to look only for those 
insights that current analytic specialists find interesting thereby filtering out any theistic 
claims.  This kind of filtering can lead to a view of Descartes that distorts his 
achievement, misunderstands his stated goals, and “destroys much of the point of 
studying his ideas.”  We should, Cottingham suggests, realize that his system was a 
cohesive whole.22
 Secondly, it would be foolish to ignore the theological or religious aspects of 
philosophers since it is possible that these things lead to a better understanding of the 
philosophical positions.  Some philosophical puzzles are resolved by understanding the 
theological commitments of the thinker in question.  This relationship is all the more 
likely to be found in the works of thinkers such as Father Malebranche and Bishop 
  Cottingham’s point can be extended to Malebranche and Berkeley as 
well.    
                                                 
22 John Cottingham, Cartesian Reflections: Essays on Descartes's Philosophy (New York, NY: Oxford 




Berkeley who are interested in matters of theology as well as philosophy.23
 So, theological or religious issues should not be out of bounds for philosophical 
inquiry concerning a historical figure.  But there is also the fear of making the opposite 
mistake.  While I want to avoid the tendency to secularize Malebranche and Berkeley, I 
want to be careful not to theologize them either.  To look at the theological doctrines of 
these thinkers as an end in itself would classify this work as doing historical theology.  
While some of the conclusions from this project may be of interest to historical 
theologians, my aim is to look at the doctrines of divine revelation and the Trinity in 
Malebranche and Berkeley as a means to properly understanding their wider 
philosophical projects.  I am also looking at them to gain a better understanding of the 
philosophical similarities between the two thinkers.  I am not interested in their doctrines 
of divine revelation and the Trinity in isolation, but only in so far as these two theological 
doctrines are related to their philosophical positions.    
  The above 
objection that philosophers should not care about theology is wrong; we must understand 




 Since this work focuses on Malebranche and Berkeley, I begin with a summary of 
each of these philosophers.  These summaries prepare the soil for what will follow later 
in sections 1.3 and 1.4 where I will introduce the philosophical relationship between 
Malebranche and Berkeley as well as some of the relevant secondary literature.  Most of 
                                                 
23 Malebranche does not see a division between theology and philosophy.  “One must not say that I act 
sometimes as a philosopher and sometimes as a theologian: for I always speak, or claim to speak, as a 
rational theologian.”  Pyle cites and translates this passage from (OCM VIII 632).  Pyle, Malebranche, 10. 
For the role that Malebranche saw his religion playing in his philosophy see Henri Gouthier, La 
Philosophie De Malebranche Et Son Expèrience Religieuse (Paris, FR: Vrin, 1948).  I think that Berkeley 
would also think of himself as both a theologian and a philosopher since he wrote on both subjects.   
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that literature assumes an understanding of the general picture of the philosophical 
systems of both.  I begin each summary with a brief overview of each philosopher’s life 
and general philosophy.  I, in the process, point out salient features of their religious or 
theological commitments.  The biographical information is important for understanding 
the theological and religious influences on both philosophers.  Both Malebranche and 
Berkeley shared extensive theological training.  While these brief biographies are 
important, the primary reason for these summaries is to focus on those philosophical 
positions that become relevant later.  When I advance my main argument in chapters 2 
and 3, I will pick back up on these summaries.  Malebranche and Berkeley’s doctrines of 
perception and causation are the most relevant to their philosophical theology.  Since this 
is the case, I focus on these doctrines and exclude some of the other philosophical 
positions held by Malebranche or Berkeley.       
 Nicolas Malebranche was a French Catholic priest from Paris during the early 
modern period.  He began his studies at the age of sixteen at the College de la Marche 
where he was tutored in Aristotelianism.  Then he attended the Sorbonne in Paris where 
he studied scholastic philosophy and theology.  He found neither Aristotelianism nor 
scholasticism to his liking.24
                                                 
24 Thomas M. Lennon states this in the introduction to Malebranche’s Search after Truth.  Nicolas 
Malebranche, The Search after Truth, ed. Thomas M. Lennon and Paul J. Olscamp, trans. Thomas M. 
Lennon and Paul J. Olscamp, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), Viii.  See also Nadler, The Cambridge Companion to Malebranche, 2. 
  After three years he left the Sorbonne to join the Oratory 
where he studied for four years.  The Oratory was founded with a deep veneration for St. 
Augustine.  Brandon Watson points out that Malebranche’s background formed by his 
time at the Oratory is crucial for a proper understanding of Malebranche’s mature 




secondary literature.25  The Oratory was founded in 1611 by Pierre de Berulle and it 
consisted entirely of priests who did not share any particular vows, doctrines or religious 
orders.  Berulle, and the Oratory itself, became particularly associated with an approach 
of spirituality known as the French School of Spiritually.26  The French school was 
characterized by an intense emphasis on venerating Jesus as the Word of God and a 
corollary emphasis on the emptying or nothingness of creatures.27
 While at the Oratory, Malebranche was immersed in the writings of Augustine.
  As I point out in 
chapters 2 and 3, these themes show up in one form or another in the philosophy of 
Malebranche.      
28  
As Malebranche matured as a philosopher, Augustine would continue to exert a strong 
influence on him.  But commentators suggest that the most important year in 
Malebranche’s development was 1664 when he graduated from the Oratory, became 
ordained, and converted to a Cartesian philosophical perspective.  It was during this year 
that a bookseller sold him Descartes’ Treatise on Man.29
                                                 
25 Watson was generous to send me a copy of this unpublished manuscript where he highlights this 
background.  Brandon Watson, “Malebranche, Nicolas: Religion,”  (Unpublished Manuscript, 2008).  He 
explores the influence of the Oratory on Malebranche in more detail in his PhD dissertation, Brandon 
Watson, “The External World and the Fall from Reason: Malebranche's Account of Our Knowledge of the 
Existence and Nature of Bodies” (PhD diss., University of Toronto, 2005).     
  Malebranche became deeply 
influenced by the works of Descartes and his followers.  He merged his newfound 
 
26 Watson, “Malebranche, Nicolas: Religion,” section 1. 
 
27 This emphasis on the Jesus as the Word of God is by no means in and of itself a noteworthy aspect of this 
school, many schools or religious sects would have done this.  But the particular way that the French school 
venerated the Word is.  “The idea is that our attitude toward the Word should be one of such abject and 
humble reverence that we may be said to have become as nothing, so that the Word may become all… 
Likewise, the reasoning goes, our attitude toward God should be one of continual and adoring self-sacrifice 
and abnegation, and recognition of our nothingness apart from God.”  Ibid., section 1. 
 
28Nadler, The Cambridge Companion to Malebranche, 3.   
 
29  Pyle, Malebranche, 1., Malebranche, The Search after Truth, viii.,Nadler, The Cambridge Companion to 




Cartesian philosophy with his Augustinianism into his own unique philosophical 
position.  Andrew Pyle described this combination as a “… distinctive philosophical 
position where a Cartesian, i.e. mechanistic, natural philosophy is incorporated into a 
spiritualistic metaphysics derived largely from Augustine.”30
 One way to introduce Malebranche’s general philosophical framework is as an 
attempt to synthesize the two influences of Augustine and Descartes.
   
31
  Malebranche is perhaps best known for his commitment to occasionalism.  This 
is a doctrine that is often misunderstood.  There has been a tendency to misrepresent this 
doctrine as if it were nothing but an ad hoc solution by rationalists to the Cartesian mind-
body problem.
  This synthesis led 
to Malebranche’s most original contributions to philosophy: occasionalism and his theory 
of ideas.   
32
 
  But, this doctrine, at least as used by Malebranche, is largely the result 
of his commitment to create a philosophical system that is entirely centered on God.  
Steven Nadler, one of the foremost Malebranche scholars summarizes this doctrine in 
Malebranche’s philosophy: “Occasionalism is the doctrine that all creatures, finite  
                                                 
30 Pyle, Malebranche, 2.  
 
31 For very good treatments of Malebranche’s attempt to synthesize Augustine and Descartes, see Steven 
Nadler, Malebranche and Ideas (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1992).  Pyle, Malebranche. Tad 
M. Schmaltz, “Malebranche on Ideas and the Vision in God,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Malebranche, ed. Steven Nadler (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
 
32 Both Nadler and Pyle suggest this is a misrepresentation since it does not do justice to the importance of 
the doctrine itself and the role it plays in the philosophy of Malebranche.  Both Nadler and Pyle comment 
that this doctrine is not simply an ad hoc solution to the mind-body problem.  Steven Nadler, “Malebranche 
on Causation,” in The Cambridge Companion to Malebranche, ed. Steven Nadler (New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), , 116.  Pyle adds that it may have historical roots on the basis of a 
superficial reading of a remark in Leibniz’s New System.   Pyle, Malebranche, 96-98.  
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entities that they are, are absolutely devoid of any causal efficacy, and that God is the 
only true causal agent.”33
 In the Search, Malebranche states the force of his occasionalism:  
   
But whatever effort of mind I make, I can find force, efficacy, or power, only in the 
will of the infinitely perfect Being.  (LO 658) 
 
Malebranche speaks of two kinds of causes: true causes and occasional causes.  A true 
cause, for Malebranche, is necessarily connected to its effect.  Malebranche holds that 
God is the only true cause because all causality is connected to God’s will.34
occasional causes.   
  Any other 
causes – what we might call natural causes – are merely what Malebranche calls  
But natural causes are not true causes; they are only occasional causes that act only 
through the force and efficacy of the will of God, as I have just explained.  (LO 449)   
 
An occasional cause is not a true cause, but only the occasion for God to act causally.  
Malebranche explains this by means of an example of one ball striking and moving 
another ball.35
… and when a ball that is moved collides with and moves another, it communicates to 
it nothing of its own, for it does not itself have the force it communicates to it.  
  On Malebranche’s account, the first ball is the “natural cause” of the 
motion of the second ball.  The latter is merely an occasional cause, not a true cause.  
                                                 
33 Nadler, “Malebranche on Causation,” 115.  In this same section, Nadler quotes Malebranche from his 
Meditations Cheretiennes, “God alone is the true cause of all that occurs in the world.  He acts regularly 
according to all that occurs in the world.  He acts regularly according to certain laws, in consequence of 
which it can be said that secondary causes have the power to do that which God does by means of them.” 
 
34 “There is therefore only one single true God and one single cause that is truly a cause, and one should not 
imagine that what precedes an effect is its true cause.”  (LO 451)  In section 3.2, I talk in more detail about 
the claim that all causation is rooted in the will of God for Malebranche.     
 
35 It is possible, if not likely, that Malebranche could be the source material for Hume’s billiard ball 
example of causation that he made famous.  “There can be no question that Hume, when composing the 
account of causality in the Treatise, had Malebranche’s treatment of that topic in his thoughts.  Almost at 
the outset of the chapter on necessary connection Hume refers his readers to the Search VI02.3 and the 
Fifteenth Elucidation where Malebranche had presented his analysis of causality; in addition, Hume 
devoted an early part of this chapter to refuting Occasionalism.”  Charles J. McCracken, Malebranche and 
British Philosophy (New York: Clarendon Press, 1983), 257. 
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Nevertheless, a ball is the natural cause of the motion it communicates.  A natural 
cause is therefore not a real and true but only an occasional cause, which determines 
the Author of nature to act in such and such a manner in such and such a situation.  
(LO 448) 
 
In short, occasionalism is the theory that God is the only true cause.  All other apparent 
causes are only occasional causes for God to act.36  For Malebranche there can be no 
other true cause apart from God.  God is the only true cause.37
                                                 
36 As a historical example of occasionalism, there is a rumor that George Berkeley visited the elder 
Malebranche in Paris.  The story suggests that the two men had a philosophical dispute which got 
Malebranche so excited that his condition got worse and he died not long after.  The punch line of the story 
is that Berkeley was the occasional cause of Malebranche’s death.  Luce, Berkeley and Malebranche: A 
Study in the Origins of Berkeley's Thought, appendix 2. The Problem of Berkeley’s Visits to Malebranche.  
Here are some other passages from the Search where Malebranche endorses occasionalism.   
  Malebranche’s theories of 
divine revelation and the Trinity are both philosophically relevant to his theory of 
“Surely, only God, only His always efficacious substance, can affect, enlighten and nourish our minds, 
as St. Augustine says.”  (LO 626) 
“We do not consider that bodies can act on the mind only as occasional causes, that the mind cannot 
immediately or by itself possess anything corporeal and cannot unite itself to an object except through 
its knowledge and love, that only God is above it and can reward or punish it through sensations of 
pleasure or pain, can enlighten or move it—in a word, only He can act on it.”  (LO 365) 
“But is seems to me that the principle that only God enlightens us, and that He enlightens us only 
through the manifestation of an immutable and necessary wisdom or reason so conforms to religion, 
and furthermore, that this principle is so absolutely necessary if a sound and unshakable foundations it 
to be given any truth whatsoever, …”  (LO 613) 
“True, our soul is what it is by its nature and necessarily perceives what affects it, but God alone can 
act on it, He alone can illuminate it, affect it, or modify it through the efficacy of His ideas.”  (LO 622) 
  
37 Continuous creation is a doctrine related to occasionalism where God conserves the world by creating it 
over and over again in succession.  According to continuous creation, all things and events are dependent 
on God for their metaphysical reality.  Malebranche summarizes this position in Dialogue 7 of his 
Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion. 
“God wills that a certain kind of world exist.  His will is omnipotent, and this world is thus created.  
Let God no longer will there to be a world, and it is thereby annihilated.  For the world assuredly 
depends on the will of the creator.  If the world subsists, it is because God continues to will its 
existence.  Thus, the conservation of creatures is, on the part of God, nothing but their continued 
creation… But in essence the act of creation does not cease, because in God creation and conservation 
are but a single volition which, consequently, is necessarily followed by the same effects.”  (DM 112)   
For a good, concise overview of Malebranche’s doctrines of occasionalism and continuous creation see the 
introduction to Nicolas Malebranche, Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion, ed. Nicholas Jolley, 
trans. David Scott, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), xxi-xxvi.   
 There is some disagreement concerning the best way to understand Malebranche’s doctrine of 
continuous creation.  For two different views concerning how to best understand Malebranche’s doctrine of 
continuous creation, see Pyle, Malebranche. and Andrew Pessin, “Does Continuous Creation Entail 
Occasionalism?  Malebranche (and Descartes),” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (2000).  For a good 
study that separates these two doctrines philosophically, see Timothy D. Miller, “Continuous Creation, 




occasionalism.  In chapters 2 and 3, I show how recognizing Malebranche’s commitment 
to these two theological doctrines sheds light on his theory of occasionalism.      
 Like many philosophers from the early modern period, Malebranche’s theory of 
ideas is very important for understanding his entire philosophical system.  Here is how 
Malebranche defines “idea” as he uses it in the Search.     
Thus, by the word idea, I mean nothing other than the immediate object, or the object 
closest to the mind, when it perceives something, i.e., that which affects and modifies 
the mind with the perception it has of an object.  (LO 217)   
 
The mind directly perceives ideas.38
are not contained in the mind of humans but rather in God.
  The most controversial aspect of Malebranche’s 
theory of ideas in his own day had to do with his locating ideas in God.  Malebranche 
broke with his fellow rationalists, including Descartes, by arguing that ideas  
39
To understand this fifth way, we must remember what was just said in the preceding 
chapter—that God must have within Himself the ideas of all the beings He has 
created (since otherwise He could not have created them), and thus He sees all these 
beings by considering the perfections He contains to which they are related. (LO 230) 
  God must contain the ideas 
of everything that he has created, or He would not have been able to create them. 
 
Since all ideas are in God, humans perceive everything through a connection with God, 
or as Malebranche puts it, we see all things in God.40
                                                 
38 I believe that Malebranche holds a representational or indirect realist theory of ideas.  There is some 
debate concerning the nature of ideas for Malebranche.  For example, Nadler argues that Malebranche is a 
direct realist.  See the following on the debate concerning Malebranche and his ideas: Monte Cook, 
“Malebranche Versus Arnauld,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 29, no. 2 (1991), Nicholas Jolley, The 
Light of the Soul: Theories of Ideas in Leibniz, Malebranche, and Descartes (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 
1990), Nadler, Malebranche and Ideas, Richard A. Watson, “Malebranche and Arnauld on Ideas,” The 
Modern Schoolman 71 (1994). 
  This theory is known as the vision 
in God.  In section 2.2, I introduce Malebranche’s vision in God in more detail.  I argue 
 
39 This break from the Cartesians, where Malebranche located ideas in the mind of God, is one of the sparks 
for the disagreement and lifetime debate between Malebranche and Arnauld.      
 
40 “These are some of the reasons that might lead one to believe that minds perceive everything through the 




that this epistemological doctrine of perception is an indispensable part of Malebranche’s 
theory of divine revelation.       
 George Berkeley was an Irish Bishop in the Anglican Church.  Berkeley was 
nearly 50 years younger than Malebranche and there was a brief time when both were 
philosophically active.41  Berkeley began his studies at Kilkenny College and then moved 
to Dublin where he studied at Trinity College until he was awarded a Fellowship.  He 
remained at Trinity for a total of 24 years.42  There is general agreement that the two 
greatest influences on Berkeley were John Locke and Malebranche.43
 After his earliest years, Berkeley’s life and thought can be separated into three 
periods.
   
44
                                                 
41 Berkeley’s early works were published around 1710.  Even though Malebranche was 72 at the time, he 
was editing his sixth and last edition of the Search which was published in 1712.    
  The first period spans Berkeley’s time spent as a Fellow at Trinity College.  It 
was during this time that he wrote what many consider his most important philosophical 
works supporting the theory of idealism or immaterialism: A New Theory of Vision, A 
Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues Between 
Hylas and Philonous.  The second period was not marked by any new philosophical 
work.  Instead Berkeley traveled Europe, meeting with many of the intellectuals and 
social luminaries of his time.  During this time he also took up a new cause.  He desired 
to found a college in the New World, on the island of Bermuda.  As he made plans for the 
college, he moved to Rhode Island where he lived in Newport for nearly three years in a 
 
42 David Berman, George Berkeley: Idealism and the Man (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 
1994), 1-2. 
 
43 Malebranche’s influence has not always been recognized.  Below, in section 1.3, I will trace this 
relationship between Berkeley and Malebranche in more detail.   
 
44 These 3 periods are from Berman, George Berkeley: Idealism and the Man, 71.  He calls them, in order, 
the period of philosophical idealism, the period of social idealism, and finally the period of medical 




house that still stands called Whitehall.45  In the third period, Berkeley returned to Britain 
and once again began writing on matters such as economics, mathematics, and politics.  It 
was during this time that he wrote his two most theological works.  The first was 
Alciphron or the Minute Philosopher where he presents arguments against atheists and 
deists.  The second was called Siris: a Chain of Philosophical Reflections and Inquiries 
concerning the Virtues of Tar-Water where he gives information concerning health 
remedies alongside theological and philosophical arguments.46
 Berkeley’s principle philosophical innovation came during his early period of 
philosophical activity.  This is the claim that the only existing entities are minds (also 
called spirits) and ideas.  Matter or corporeal substance does not exist.  The entire world 
is mental or spiritual in nature.  A proper understanding of the philosophical climate of 
Berkeley’s day places this view into the correct context.  In Berkeley’s estimation, the 
dominant theory of knowledge during the early Modern period was indirect or 
representative realism.  According to this theory, the only things that humans directly 
perceive are ideas which resemble objects that exist in the real world.  Thus, we know 
   While largely unread 
today, Siris was by far his most widely read book during his lifetime.  While Berkeley’s 
earliest works are studied more often by philosophers today, for the purposes of this 
paper I will be looking at these two later works as well to examine the connections 
between his philosophy and his theology.    
                                                 
45 Ibid., 100-04.   
 
46 Siris is a curious work recommending the benefits of drinking water that had been filtered with tar.  It is 
thought that Berkeley learned this remedy while living in the American colonies.  The book starts with tar 
water and ends with a defense of the Christian Trinity, with many unrelated steps along the way, such as 
the claim that gold can be made from combining mercury and sunlight.  But the general structure is that 
there is a chain of reasoning which starts with tar water and ends with God.  See Timo Airaksinen, “The 
Path of Fire: The Meaning and Interpretation of Berkeley's Siris,” in New Interpretations of Berkeley's 




ideas directly, not objects.  We know of objects only as they are represented through 
ideas, or we know them indirectly.  Berkeley rejected this epistemological picture; one of 
the reasons being that it leads to skepticism.47
Upon the whole, I am inclined to think that the far greater part, if not all, of those 
difficulties which have hitherto amused philosophers, and blocked up the way to 
knowledge, are entirely owing to ourselves.  That we have first raise a dust, and then 
complain, we cannot see.  (PHK intro, 3) 
  
 
So, Berkeley’s response is to remove the philosophers’ dust.  He does this by rejecting 
the existence of matter, leaving only minds and ideas.  But, ideas cannot exist alone; they 
only exist within a mind or when being perceived.  This leads to Berkeley’s famous 
doctrine: for sensible things to exist is for them to to be perceived.   
It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, 
rivers, and in a word all sensible objects have an existence natural or real, distinct 
from their being perceived by the understanding…. For what are the forementioned 
objects but the things we perceive by sense, and what do we perceive besides our own 
ideas or sensations;  (PHK 4)  
 
Nothing exists outside of a mind.  For example, when I perceive Berkeley’s house, 
Whitehall, the thing that I perceive is the idea of the house, not a mind-independent 
physical object.  The house is the thing that I perceive in my mind, namely the idea; not 
some bit of physical matter sitting in Newport.  This captures the essence of Berkeley’s 
immaterialist or idealist theory.48
                                                 
47 Berkeley thought that indirect realism led to skepticism because according to that theory there is no way 
to ensure that our ideas actually do represent the objects.  Humans can never know what really exists apart 
from ideas.  Berkeley thought that philosophers like Locke and Descartes were guilty of a sort of self-
fulfilling prophecy.  In an attempt to respond to skeptics, they posed new theories of knowledge.  But these 
theories actually lead to skepticism (in Berkeley’s view), and then the philosophers complain about the 
skeptics. 
    
 
48 On this account, Berkeley argues that matter simply does not exist.  But, at times it seems that Berkeley 
gives a separate argument against matter in the Principles.  The second argument suggests that even if 
matter did exist, it would be impossible to know it, presupposing a representalist theory of ideas.   
“In short, if there were external bodies, it is impossible we should ever come to know it; and if there 
were not, we might have the very same reasons to think there were that we have now.”  (PHK 20) 
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  While his Idealism captures his general theory of ideas, Berkeley also has much 
more to say about ideas.  I do not need to introduce everything he says, but I do need to 
introduce one related epistemological theory in more detail since there is a connection 
between it and Berkeley’s theory of divine revelation.  This is his theory of perception, or 
what he calls the language of vision.  Berkeley’s doctrine of the language of vision is 
found in his first published work, the Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, and it is 
also presented in a particularly strong way in the later work Alciphron.49
Upon the whole, I think we may fairly conclude that the proper objects of vision 
constitute an universal language of the Author of nature, whereby we are instructed 
how to regulate our actions in order to attain those things that are necessary to the 
preservation and well-being of our bodies, as also to avoid whatever may be hurtful 
and destructive of them.  (NTV 147)  
  According to 
Berkeley, the language of vision is how God presents ideas of sense to our minds.   
   
This language is explained more fully in Alciphron where Euphranor, Berkeley’s 
spokesman in the dialogue, says that God constantly speaks to humans in the ‘language 
of vision’.   
Alciphron:  But, to cut short this chicane, I propound it fairly to your own conscience, 
whether you really think, that God Himself speaks every day and in every place to the 
eyes of all man.   
Euphranor: That is really and in truth my opinion; and it should be yours too, if you 
are consistent with yourself, and abide by your own definition of language.  Since you 
cannot deny that the Author of Nature constantly explaineth Himself to the eyes of 
men by the sensible intervention of arbitrary signs... In consequence, I say, of your 
own sentiments and concessions, you have as much reason to think the Universal 
Agent or God speaks to your eyes, as you can have for thinking any particular person 
speaks to your ears.  (Alc. 4.12) 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
But on either account, Berkeley rejects matter and in its place we are left with only ideas and minds which 
perceive those ideas. 
    
49 The fact that this doctrine is presented in both his earliest works as well as one of his latest works shows 
that Berkeley held the language of vision doctrine throughout his life.   
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Berkeley’s language of vision is a language whereby God, the Author of Nature, 
communicates to all men by constantly impressing ideas into their minds.  I point out in 
chapter 2 that Berkeley’s language of vision is an aspect of his theory of divine 
revelation.   
 Berkeley’s theory of causation is the other philosophical position that is relevant 
to his philosophical theology.  As we will see in chapter 3, Berkeley’s doctrine of the 
Trinity is philosophically relevant to his theory of causation.  According to his idealism, 
the only existing entities are minds and ideas.  But ideas are inert and unable to cause or 
produce anything. 
All our ideas, sensations, or the things which we perceive, by whatsoever names they 
may be distinguished, are visibly inactive, there is nothing of power or agency 
included in them.  So that one idea or object of thought cannot produce, or make any 
alteration in another.  (PHK 25) 
 
Berkeley holds that ideas are completely passive and inert.   
I do not understand how our ideas, which are things altogether passive and inert, can 
be the essence, or any part (or like any part) of the essence or substance of God, who 
is an impassive, indivisible, purely active being.  (DHP 213-214)  
 
Hence there can be no idea formed of a soul or spirit: for all ideas whatever, being 
passive and inert, vide Sect. 25, they cannot represent unto us, by way of image or 
likeness, that which acts.  (PHK 27) 
 
Therefore, all causation is mental.  Everything that is caused is caused by a mind.  Next, 
according to his language of vision, God is the cause of all the ideas we have by sense 
perception.  But there are other ideas which we have that are not caused by God, ideas of 
memory and imagination.   
I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary and shift the scene as oft as 
I think fit.  It is no more than willing, and straightway this or that idea arises in my 




So, the mind of God is the cause of all ideas of sensation while the mind of man is the 
cause of all our ideas of memory and imagination.50
But though there be some things which convince us, human agents are concerned in 
producing them; yet it is evident to everyone, that those things which are called the 
works of nature, that is, the far greater part of the ideas or sensations perceived by us, 
are not produced by, or determined on the wills of men.   (PHK 146)  
  Of these two mental causes, God is 
the one doing most of the work; God produces more ideas than human minds. 
 
This last aspect becomes important in chapter 2 where I argue that most of the ideas we 
have come from divine revelation.   
 Berkeley’s theory of causality can be summarized as follows.  Mind-independent 
physical objects have no causal powers since they do not exist.  Ideas have no causal 
powers since they are inert and powerless.  Physical objects do exist as Berkeley 
understands them; as collections of ideas, but they do not have any causal powers since 
they are made of ideas.  Only minds are causally active, both God’s mind as well as 
human minds.  To apply Berkeley’s theory into the billiard ball example from earlier, the 
first ball does not cause the motion of the second ball, a collection of ideas that constitute 
a physical object cannot produce motion.  When we perceive that one ball has moved 
another ball, what is actually occurring is that God is producing those particular 
sensations to our minds through the language of vision.  In a similar way, we can produce 
                                                 
50 There is a puzzle concerning Berkeley’s theory of causation concerning the movement of our own limbs.  
In his Philosophical Commentaries Berkeley states that we move our own limbs. 
“We move our Legs our selves.  ‘tis we that will their movement.  Herein I differ from Malbranch.”  
(PC 548) 
The puzzle here concerns how the legs are moved.  Berkeley holds that all our ideas from perception are 
generated by God.  This would mean that God causes the idea that we have when we sense our legs 
moving.  But, in this passage from the Philosophical Commentaries, Berkeley rejects that God causes our 
legs to move.  We move them ourselves.  Berman suggests there is another puzzle in this passage.  If 
Berkeley means by “legs” physical things, then how can we move them since they do not exist?  Berman, 
George Berkeley: Idealism and the Man, 42.  
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ideas of a similar situation whenever we remember or imagine one ball hitting another 
ball.  I classify this causal activity by God as divine revelation in chapter 2.     
 I have summarized some philosophical positions from Malebranche and Berkeley.  
I will later show how these positions are relevant to the philosophical theology of both 
philosophers.  Up to now, I have been examining each philosopher in isolation.  I have 
not yet attempted to point out any similarities between the two philosophers.  That is the 




 Commentators have compared Berkeley’s philosophy with that of Malebranche 
since the modern period and contemporary commentators continue to make the same 
comparison.  Some claim that Malebranche held great influence over Berkeley51 while 
others suggest that Berkeley’s philosophy is vastly different from the positions of 
Malebranche.52  Historical evidence does in fact suggest that Berkeley studied 
Malebranche while he was at Trinity College.  A letter written by a contemporary of 
Berkeley’s stated that the students at Trinity studied Aristotle, Descartes, Colbert, 
Epicurus, Pierre Gassendi, Malebranche, and Locke.53  It is even possible that the two 
philosophers met.54
                                                 
51 The best example of such a position is Luce, Berkeley and Malebranche: A Study in the Origins of 
Berkeley's Thought. 
  The philosophical connections between Malebranche and Berkeley 
 
52 A good example of such a position is T. E. Jessop, “Malebranche and Berkeley,” Revue Internationale de 
Philosophie 1 (1938). 
 
53 Berman cites this letter.  Malebranche’s early influence was great enough that it is likely that universities 
in Britain and Ireland would have been reading him at the time that Berkeley was a student.  Berman, 
George Berkeley: Idealism and the Man, 7. 
 




are important to examine to prepare for my discussion of their similarities in 
philosophical theology.    
 The comparison of Berkeley to Malebranche started early.  Soon after Berkeley 
published his earliest works, his philosophy was compared to that of Malebranche, as 
well as Locke.  Many of Berkeley’s contemporaries made this connection soon after 
Berkeley published his Principles of Human Knowledge in 1710.55  Henry Bolingbrok 
commented in a letter written in 1725 that Berkeley could “espouse in good earnest the 
system of Father Malebranche.”56  John Percival communicated to Berkeley that Samuel 
Clarke and William Whiston considered his views similar to those of Malebranche and 
Norris, the leading English appreciator of Malebranche.57  In short, soon after the 
publication of the Principles and Three Dialogues it was common to connect Berkeley 
with Malebranche.58
 Berkeley was not pleased with this comparison.  He distanced himself from 
Malebranche in his published works as well as unpublished manuscripts.  In his early 
journals, later published as his Philosophical Commentaries, Berkeley pointed out 
differences between his philosophy and that of Malebranche.  
 
                                                 
55 For a more comprehensive list of quotes from thinkers during the early modern period concerning 
Berkeley’s similarities to Malebranche see Luce, Ibid., 9-10. 
 
56 This letter is cited in both Ibid., 9. and McCracken, Malebranche and British Philosophy, 205.   
 
57  “They look upon you as an extraordinary genius… ranking you with Father Malebranche, Norris and 
another…”  McCracken, Malebranche and British Philosophy.  This letter is also cited by Fritz.  Anita D. 
Fritz, “Malebranche and the Immaterialism of Berkeley,” Review of Metaphysics 3 (1949): 59. 
 
58 Berkeley’s philosophy was considered by one contemporary to be “wrapped up in Malebranche’s” This 
quote from Hamilton is cited in Luce.  Luce, Berkeley and Malebranche: A Study in the Origins of 
Berkeley's Thought, 9.  C. R. Teape said that Berkeley’s master was Malebranche.  Luce cites this 
comment, 10.  This connection between Malebranche and Berkley continued for a time.  A generation or so 
later Thomas Reid wrote “Berkeley’s arguments are founded upon the principles which were formerly laid 
down by Descartes, Malebranche, and Locke.” Inquiry into the Human Mind.  c.i, section 5. 
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We move our Legs our selves.  ‘tis we that will their movement.  Herein I differ from 
Malbranch.  (PC 548) 
 
Malbranch in his Illustration differs widely from me  He doubts the existence of 
Bodies I doubt not the least of this.  (PC 800) 
 
He also explicitly mentions Malebranche in the Three Dialogues between Hylas and 
Philonous, summarizing the points on which he feels his philosophy differs from 
Malebranche’s.   
“I shall not therefore be surprised, if some men imagine that I run into the enthusiasm 
of Malebranche, though in truth I am very remote from it.  He builds on the most 
abstract general ideas, which I entirely disclaim.  He asserts an absolute external 
world, which I deny.  He maintains that we are deceived by our senses, and know not 
the real natures or the true forms and figures of extended beings; all of which I hold 
the direct contrary.  So that upon the whole there are no principles more 
fundamentally opposite than his and mine.” (DHP 214)    
 
While he did not refer to Malebranche by name, Berkeley implicitly distanced himself 
from Malebranche in the Principles. 
But alas we need only open our eyes to see the sovereign Lord of all things with a 
more full and clear view, than we do any one of our fellow-creatures.  Not that I 
imagine we see God (as some will have it) by a direct and immediate view, or see 
corporeal things, not by themselves, but by seeing that which represents them in the 
essence of God, which doctrine is I must confess to me incomprehensible.  (PHK 
148)      
 
Berkeley was still distancing himself from Malebranche late in his career.  In the 
Alciphron published in 1752, 40 years after the Principles, Berkeley once again went out 
of his way to say this his theory of optic language was not similar to Malebranche’s 
vision in God. 
Alciphron:  … I was aware, indeed, of a certain metaphysical hypothesis of our 
seeing all things in God by the union of the human soul with the intelligible substance 
of the Deity, which neither I, nor any one else could make sense of… 
Crito:  As for that metaphysical hypothesis, I can make no more of it than you.”  




In private letters, Berkeley repudiated his philosophical connection to Malebranche even 
more strongly. 
As to what is said of ranking me with Father Malebranche and Mr. Norris… I have 
this to answer: that I think the notions I embrace are not in the least coincident with, 
or agree with, theirs, but indeed plainly inconsistent with them in the main points, 




From these statements it is clear that Berkeley did not want his philosophy to be 
connected with Malebranche.   
 Given these statements from Berkeley, how should we understand the claim made 
by many interpreters that his philosophy is similar to that of Malebranche?  To put this 
question into context, how can I argue that Berkeley and Malebranche share similar 
theories of philosophical theology in light Berkeley’s rejection of any philosophical 
similarity?  Before I can advance my position, I must respond to the objection raised by 
Berkeley himself that his philosophy is opposed to the views of Malebranche.    
 One attempt to justify the claim that there is philosophical connection in spite of 
Berkeley’s objection is to claim that Berkeley was indeed indebted to Malebranche, but 
chose to hide it for prudential reasons.  This seems to be Luce’s position. 
Malebranche’s influence on Berkeley extended beyond the technique of the subject, 
and was therefore profound.  It is curious that while obscure writers are named in the 
Theory of Vision, Malebranche receives neither acknowledgement nor mention.  
Possibly Berkeley was so conscious of the points of difference that he did not realize 
his debt.  More probably his silence was prudence.  In some quarters ‘Malebranche’ 
spelled enthusiasm, and enthusiasm was literally a sin… It seems certain that 
Berkeley deliberately avoided mentioning Malebranche.60
 
   
                                                 
59 Benjamin Rand, Berkeley and Percival (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1914), 89.  
 




While this is one possible explanation, it is not a charitable interpretation.  It presents 
Berkeley as someone who knowingly borrows material and then hides it for personal 
gain.  Such an interpretation should be resisted unless every other option has been 
exhausted.  Making a similar point concerning the relationship between Berkeley and 
Malebranche’s vision in God theory, Jolley writes:  
“Of course it is possible to argue that Berkeley simply protests too much because the 
accusation that his philosophy is derivative touches a raw nerve.  But we should resist 
this suggestion if we can; it is best to begin by assuming that Berkeley was justified in 
disclaiming any real similarity between his idealism and the doctrine of the vision in 
God.”61
 
   
 Another option is to suggest that Berkeley is correct to point out those differences 
between his philosophy and that of Malebranche because there really are significant  
differences between the two.62  Berkeley rejects abstract ideas, an external world 
consisting of matter, and the deception of the senses.  These are all theories that 
Malebranche held.  So, Berkeley is correct to point out these differences.  However, he 
was not so quick to recognize the connections from his own philosophy to that of 
Malebranche.  Still, this is to be expected.  The areas of disagreement are exactly those 
where Berkeley’s originality is its strongest.63
                                                 
61  Jolley, The Light of the Soul: Theories of Ideas in Leibniz, Malebranche, and Descartes, 196.    
  In Berkeley’s mind, his philosophy was 
vastly different from Malebranche since these differences were so central to his overall 
theory.  These differences could have been so strong that Berkeley was unable to 
recognize any similarities that may have existed.  In this explanation, it is possible that 
 
62 McCracken suggests a solution that is somewhat close to this.  McCracken, Malebranche and British 
Philosophy, 208-10.  McCracken also suggests that the reason that the two philosophers were considered 
similar was due to their shared motivation to make all things dependent upon God.  McCracken, 
Malebranche and British Philosophy, 215.  
 
63 Both McCracken and Luce make this same general point.  Luce, Berkeley and Malebranche: A Study in 
the Origins of Berkeley's Thought, 81.  McCracken, Malebranche and British Philosophy, 209.     
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there are similarities of which Berkeley either was either not aware or considered of such 
little importance that there was no need to mention.64
 In presenting my response to Berkeley’s claim that his philosophy is opposed to 
Malebranche, it will prove helpful to point out an important distinction between influence 
and similarity.  This is a methodological distinction that is often not clear in the literature.  
There are two different, although related, possibilities concerning the philosophical 
relationship between Malebranche and Berkeley (indeed between any two philosophers).  
The first is to argue that Malebranche, the earlier figure of the two, in fact influenced 
Berkeley.
 
65  This is the claim that one of the philosophers served as a direct, positive 
influence.  In this case, this would mean that Malebranche influenced Berkeley to accept 
a similar doctrine or position.66
                                                 
64 Copleston suggests that the fact that Berkeley felt the need to distance himself from Malebranche 
justifies in some way the comparison.  Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol 5, pgs 249-50.  
  This claim of influence, according to the account I am 
presenting here, requires that Berkeley was aware of Malebranche’s position and 
responded to it as a result of that awareness.  For a commentator to argue that 
Malebranche influenced Berkeley, she must support that claim with both textual and 
    
65 It is possible for someone to argue that Berkeley influenced Malebranche since he was still alive when 
Berkeley published his earliest works.  However it is unlikely that that Berkeley could have been much of 
an influence on Malebranche.  Berkeley published his Theory of Vision on 1709 and the Principles in 1710 
when Malebranche was 72 and 73 years old.  Malebranche published his 6th and final edition of the Search 
in 1712 so it is possible that Malebranche could have been influenced by Berkeley and modified his 
position in that final edition, but this is much less likely than Malebranche influencing Berkeley.  
Malebranche died in 1715 at the age of 77.  But, every case that I am aware of claims that the influence 
goes the other way: Malebranche in some way or another influenced Berkeley.  Since this is the case, I will 
treat influence only as Malebranche’s influence over Berkeley.   
 
66 According to my use here, influence could be either positive or negative.  By positive I mean that 
Berkeley could have been influenced to accept one of Malebranche’s positions.  The result of a positive 
influence would be that both Malebranche and Berkeley end up holding a similar position.  A negative 
influence would be a situation where Berkeley is influenced by Malebranche and thereby rejects some 
position.  The result of what I am calling a negative influence is that Berkeley and Malebranche end up 
holding different positions.  This is because Berkeley intentionally found some reason to not follow 
Malebranche’s position.  But, by in large, the literature focuses on the positive influence of Malebranche on 




historical evidence.  She must show that Berkeley was familiar with Malebranche’s 
position and show how we can know that he opted to follow Malebranche.   
 The second possibility concerning this relationship is to argue that Malebranche 
and Berkeley merely hold similar philosophical positions, whether or not one influenced 
the other.  This is the claim of similarity.  To show this we need only point out a common 
philosophical position shared by both.  We need not explain how both Malebranche and 
Berkeley came to this common position.  The similar position could have been original to 
both thinkers or could be attributed to a common influence on both.  To argue that these 
two philosophers hold similar positions is a less robust claim than to argue that 
Malebranche influenced Berkeley.   
 I point out this distinction between influence and similarity for two reasons.  First, 
many interpreters who write on the philosophical relationship between Malebranche and 
Berkeley argue that Malebranche influenced Berkeley, but only support their claim by 
pointing out similarities.67
 The second reason that I point out this distinction is because it is helpful for 
explaining my purpose in this project.  My aim here is to argue for similarity.  I show that 
there are philosophical similarities between the way that Berkeley and Malebranche make 
use of certain theological doctrines.  I do not argue that Malebranche influenced 
Berkeley.  Philosophical similarities are both more interesting and more instructive than 
  Of course, if Berkeley was influenced by Malebranche, than 
his philosophy is likely to be similar at those points.  But, similarity between Berkeley 
and Malebranche is not enough to support the claim that Malebranche influenced 
Berkeley.   
                                                 
67 Of course, I am not here pointing out a weakness of their position since they may be working with 
different accounts of both influence and similarity than I have explained here.   
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textual or historical arguments concerning the influence of Malebranche on Berkeley.  I 
agree with T. E. Jessop when he says “similarities and differences of spirit, method, and 
doctrine are more important than external, merely historical relations”.68
 The third and final reason that I point out this distinction between similarity and 
influence is because it helps me respond to Berkeley’s objection that his philosophy 
should not be compared to Malebranche.  I interpret Berkeley to be saying that he has not 
been influenced by Malebranche and I take this claim at face value.  If Berkeley says that 
he has not been influenced by Malebranche, the charitable interpretation is that he was 
not influenced by Malebranche, at least in any way that he was conscious.
   
69
 While this distinction between influence and similarity helps me give a response 
to Berkeley, it does not get me off hook entirely.  Concerning Malebranche, Berkeley is 
rejecting influence as well as similarity.  It is on this account that I accept the second 
response from above.  Berkeley is justified in pointing out the dissimilarities between his 
philosophy and Malebranche.  There are many and some of them are substantial.  These 
differences were so great in Berkeley’s mind that he failed to notice the similarities.  
  I am not 
arguing that Malebranche influenced Berkeley, but I am arguing that there are 
philosophical similarities between the two philosophers.  These similarities concern 
doctrines in their philosophical theology as well as certain philosophical doctrines.  
Berkeley and Malebranche hold similar theories of divine revelation and the Trinity, and 
they also hold similar theories of epistemology and causation.  I point out these 
similarities in detail in chapters 2 and 3.   
                                                 
68 Jessop, “Malebranche and Berkeley,” 124.  
 




After all, Berkeley claimed that his system is inconsistent with Malebranche “in the main 
points” and they were different “at bottom”.70
 While some of these similarities have been mentioned in the secondary literature, 
I am introducing a connection between Malebranche and Berkeley that has been largely 
ignored.  Both philosophers hold similar doctrines in their philosophical theology.  On a 
superficial level, my contribution along these lines is not unique.  It has been common to 
point that both Malebranche and Berkeley construct overall philosophical systems that 
emphasize the role of God.
  This language from Berkeley can be 
interpreted to support the position I am advancing.            
71
 
  But there has been very little work done to flesh out what 
this means in terms of a philosophical similarity between the two philosophers, and there 
has been no work done on the similarities in philosophical theology between 
Malebranche and Berkeley.  I show that the similarities in doctrines of divine revelation 
and the Trinity have not been mentioned.  The contribution of this project is greater than 
simply pointing out these two doctrines which are similar to both Malebranche and 
Berkeley, this project also is able to give more satisfactory solutions to some of the 




                                                 
70 Here is the passage again where Berkeley makes these claims: 
“As to what is said of ranking me with Father Malebranche and Mr. Norris… I have this to answer: 
that I think the notions I embrace are not in the least coincident with, or agree with, theirs, but indeed 
plainly inconsistent with them in the main points, insomuch that I know few writers whom I take 
myself at bottom to differ more from than them.”  
Rand, Berkeley and Percival, 89.  
 
71 Jolley, “Berkeley, Malebranche, and Vision in God,” 536.  Copleston makes similar remarks at 
Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol 4, pgs 202-03.  See also Luce, Berkeley and Malebranche: A 






 This study of Malebranche and Berkeley’s philosophical theology contributes to 
several different movements, debates, and disagreements in the secondary literature.  
These contributions are direct at times and indirect at others.  By “direct contribution”, I 
mean that this research picks up an existing debate, movement, or unresolved puzzle 
from the secondary literature and adds to that literature by advancing the debate, 
supporting the movement, or proposing a solution to a puzzle.  By “indirect 
contribution”, I mean that this study of Berkeley and Malebranche loosely fits into a 
larger movement or debate in the secondary literature.  An indirect contribution to the 
secondary literature means that this research applies to the movement or debate more 
loosely than a direct contribution.             
  During the past few decades, scholars have discussed the value of the traditional 
distinction between Rationalism and Empiricism.  On the one hand, scholars like Louis 
Loeb have argued that this distinction fails and should be abandoned.  In From 
Descartes’ to Hume Loeb argues that the standard distinction between Continental 
Rationalism and British Empiricism fails because it does not do justice to the 
philosophical nuances found in many of the Philosophers, including Malebranche and 
Berkeley.72
                                                 
72 Louis E. Loeb, From Descartes to Hume (Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981). While this 
distinction has been challenged in many forms, one of the other attacks is Hide Ishiguro, “Pre-Established 
Harmony Verses Constant Conjunction: A Reconsideration of the Distinction between Rationalism and 
Empiricism,” in Rationalsim, Empiricism, and Idealism: British Academy Lectures on the History of 
Philosophy, ed. Anthony Kenny (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1986).    
  On the other hand, scholars like Michael Ayers argue that this distinction 




Empiricism is helpful and is grounded in true differences.73  Falling within this literature 
are works that consider the placement of individual philosophers from the early modern 
period within this distinction.  For example, some scholars challenge the traditional 
classification of Berkeley as an Empiricist and considered whether he should be classified 
as a Rationalist instead.74
 In recent literature there is also a current movement to understand the theological 
principles and positions of the philosophers of the early modern period.  Contemporary 
philosophers are seeking to understand the theology held by the thinkers of this period.  
There have been a number of books and articles written with this goal in mind.  One of 
the better examples is a recent book published in 2008 by John Cottingham called 
Cartesian Reflections.
  I contribute to this debate by pointing out similarities between 
Malebranche, who is traditionally classified a Rationalist, and Berkeley, who is 
traditionally classified an Empiricist.  My argument that these philosophers hold similar 
positions could be held up as support for the rejection of the traditional distinction 
between the Rationalists and Empiricists.  It could also support the claim that Berkeley 
should not be classified as an Empiricist since his philosophy holds so many similarities 
to Malebranche the Rationalist.   
75
                                                 
73 See the introduction to Michael Ayers, “Was Berkeley an Empiricist or a Rationalist?,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Berkeley, ed. Kenneth P. Winkler (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 
2005). 
  Cottingham recommends in the overview that scholars should 
 
74 While Malebranche has been typically classified as a Rationalist, there has been some debate concerning 
the classification of Berkeley.  Ayers argues that while Berkeley is not the standard empiricist, he should be 
included into that group nonetheless.  Ibid.  See also Ayers’ introduction to Michael Ayers, ed., 
Rationalism, Platonism, and the Good, Proceedings of the British Academy (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2008). 
 
75 Many of these works contain statements whereby the authors state that their goals are to explore the role 
of theology on the philosophy of historical thinkers.  Here are a few examples of this kind of research.  
Derk Pereboom, “Early Modern Philosophical Theology,” in A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, ed. 
Philip L.  Quinn and Charles Taliaferro, Blackwell Companions to Philosophy (Malden, MA: Blackwell 
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take Descartes’ views on God and theology more seriously than they have done in the 
past.76  This interest in the theology of the early modern period can also be seen in the 
establishment of the Center for the History of Philosophical Theology at King’s College 
in London in 2005, as well as in recent conferences such as the Workshop on Theology 
and Early Modern Philosophy held in Helsinki in February of 2008.77  By arguing that 
Malebranche and Berkeley hold similar positions of philosophical theology, I am 
advancing the same agenda as the authors involved in this movement.  While a few of the 
theological commitments of Malebranche and Berkeley have been discussed in isolation, 
I am the first to concentrate on the views of divine revelation and the Trinity as they are 
found together in each of these philosophers.78
                                                                                                                                                 
Publishers Ltd, 1997).  Chris L. Firestone and Stephen R. Palmquist, eds., Kant and the New Philosophy of 
Religion (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006).    
     
 
76 Cottingham, Cartesian Reflections: Essays on Descartes's Philosophy. 
 
77 These two are related.  On the website for the Center for the History of Philosophical Theology, the 
following note can be found concerning their European research project:  
“The impact of early modern philosophy on early modern theology; The CHPT is developing a major 
research project on ‘The impact of early modern philosophy on early modern theology’ in 
collaboration with scholars based in Helsinki, Leuven, and Copenhagen. An application to the 
European Science Foundation for an exploratory workshop is currently under consideration.” 
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/schools/humanities/hrc/chpt/intres.html 
 
78  Here are some sources that have attempted to consider the theology of Malebranche:   Watson, “The 
External World and the Fall from Reason: Malebranche's Account of Our Knowledge of the Existence and 
Nature of Bodies”.  Reid, “Malebranche on Intelligible Extension.”, Jasper Reid, “The Trinitarian 
Metaphysics of Jonathan Edwards and Nicolas Malebranche,” The Heythrop Journal 43, no. 2 (2002).  And 
likewise, here are some sources that have attempted to consider Berkeley’s theology:  Stephen H. Daniel, 
“Berkeley's Christian Neoplatonism, Archetypes, and Divine Ideas,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 
39 (2001).  Douglas Jesseph, “Faith and Fluxions: Berkeley on Theology and Mathematics,” in New 
Interpretations of Berkeley's Thought, ed. Stephen H. Daniel (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2008).  
Robert R. Hurlbutt, “Berkeley's Theology,” in George Berkeley: Lectures Delivered before the 
Philosophical Union of the University of California, ed. S. C. Pepper, Karl Aschenbrenner, and Benson 
Mates, University of California Publications in Philosophy (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
1957).  But, to my surprise, these works tended to focus on issues that fall into the category of Philosophy 
of Religion.  For example, many of these works do nothing but examine the arguments for the existence of 
God from the works of either Malebranche or Berkeley.  None of these works attempt to construct anything 




 In section 1.3, I showed that Berkeley’s philosophy was compared to that of 
Malebranche early after his first publications and I also introduced some preliminary 
considerations to these kinds of comparisons.  Since that time a debate concerning the 
relationship between Malebranche and Berkeley can be traced through the secondary 
literature.  Now I can introduce some of the relevant secondary literature.  The 
similarities that are mentioned in these works will become important later in chapter 2 
and 3 since I find some of these same similarities.  The one important difference is that 
these authors fail to mention, and thereby it is likely that they failed to notice, the 
importance of Malebranche and Berkeley’s similar philosophical theology.  I will point 
out these omissions as I introduce the literature.     
 In time the initial tendency to find similarities between the philosophical systems 
of Berkeley and Malebranche was abandoned.  Berkeley became more associated with 
Locke by English speaking philosophers and less compared to Malebranche.79  By the 
nineteenth-century Malebranche was no longer considered an important influence on 
Berkeley at all.  Likewise, similarities between Berkeley and Malebranche were no 
longer mentioned in the literature.  G. A. Johnston published a study into the 
development and origins of Berkeley’s philosophy in 1923 where he summarizes the 
general attitude of the day: “from Locke only did he really derive anything of first 
importance.”80
                                                 
79 McCracken states that some nineteenth-century French scholars such as Francisque Bouillier, Georges 
Lyon, and Francois Pillon continued to recognize Malebranche as an influence over Berkeley, but English 
philosphers did not.  McCracken, Malebranche and British Philosophy, 208.  
  Johnston suggests that Malebranche contributed only as a formative 
 
80 Italics in the original.  G. A. Johnston, The Development of Berkeley's Philosophy (London: MacMillan 




influence.81  Many interpreters agreed with Johnston’s view that Berkeley was not 
influenced by Malebranche and that their philosophies were not similar.82
 This deemphasizing of the similarity or influence between Malebranche and 
Berkeley could be explained in a few ways.  First, perhaps as people read Berkeley more, 
they took him at this word.  When he stated that he is not to be compared with 
Malebranche, his readers believed him.  Another possibility is that Berkeley’s star began 
to shine more brightly than Malebranche’s.  Over time, Berkeley’s work began to stand 
on its own.  Soon he was read more in the English world than was Malebranche.  This 
meant that fewer and fewer readers were reading Berkeley with Malebranche already in 
mind.  Malebranche was not as well known to English readers as was Locke.   
    
Berkeley, in his lifetime, was regarded as a disciple of Malebranche.  Subsequently he 
came to be regarded as a Lockian.  The new opinion was a natural growth.  In the 
course of time British acquaintance with Malebranche sank and the fame of Berkeley 




As later readers encountered Berkeley’s works, they caught the influence from Locke but 
missed the influence from Malebranche.  Regardless of the explanation, the opinion 
expressed by Johnston continued for years, Malebranche and Berkeley were not thought 
to be connected philosophically by English speaking interpreters.     
 But the general attitude changed when Luce published Berkeley and 
Malebranche: A study in the Origins of Berkeley’s Thought in 1934.84
                                                 
81 Ibid., 32.   
  Luce’s work has 
become the seminal study concerning the influence of Malebranche on Berkeley.  His 
 
82 Luce gives many similar quotes from the literature from this time period.  Luce, Berkeley and 
Malebranche: A Study in the Origins of Berkeley's Thought, 3-10. 
 





general thesis is that Berkeley read and studied Malebranche’s Search After Truth and 
that Malebranche’s influence can be found in Berkeley.  Luce says about Berkeley that 
Malebranche was “one of his two primary sources, comparable in importance to Locke, 
and in some ways, of higher importance”85.  He argues that Malebranche’s influence can 
be found throughout Berkeley’s two notebooks, what have become known as the 
Philosophical Commentaries.86
 First, Luce argues that Berkeley’s philosophical method was influenced by 
Malebranche. 
  He shows how Malebranche’s ideas can be traced 
through Berkeley’s thought on matters such as methodology and epistemology including 
his theories of ideas and vision.   
From his earliest days of authorship Berkeley was conscious of method and critical of 
method … in his method of setting and solving problems, in his actual writing, and in 
the spirit of his approach to philosophical questions he was directly influenced by 
what Malebranche had said on Methodology.87
 
   
Luce recognizes that Berkeley following Malebranche’s philosophical method is no 
evidence that he also followed his philosophical conclusions, so he argues further that 
Berkeley did follow Malebranche’s conclusions as well.88
The comparison of the sense-datum to language, the arbitrary connexion between sign 
and thing signified, and the contrast between man-made connexions and the universal 
  Of these, Luce claims that 
Berkeley’s theory of vision holds important similarities to Malebranche’s theory of sense 
perception.   
                                                 
85Ibid., 5.   
 
86 Luce calls these notebooks the Commonplace Book.  Ibid., 1-12. 
 
87 Ibid., 13. 
 




connexions established by the Will of God, these Berkeleian principles may all be 
found in the Search.89
 
  
Luce points out two separate similarities in this passage that are discussed later.  In 
chapter 2, I show that Malebranche and Berkeley’s similar theories of perception are best 
explained in light of their similar doctrines of general revelation.  I also show in chapter 3 
that both philosophers accept the Christian doctrine of the Trinity and that helps us 
understand why Malebranche and Berkeley stress the causal activity of the will of God.     
 Luce also argues that Berkeley’s theory of ideas follows Malebranche’s in some 
important ways.  Concerning Berkeley on ideas, Luce concludes boldly that Berkeley 
“seems to have gone as near to the doctrine of seeing all things in God as one who was 
not an occasionalist could go.”90  By this he means that Berkeley followed Malebranche’s 
theocentric emphasis on ideas rather than what Luce calls Locke’s human path.91  
Ultimately, both Malebranche and Berkeley agree that the ideas we conceive are not our 
ideas, but are God’s ideas which are excited in our minds.92  Luce admits that there is one 
important difference between Malebranche and Berkeley concerning the cause of ideas.  
Malebranche, the occasionalist, held that God causes all ideas while Berkeley forged a 
middle ground between that position and Locke’s by saying that God causes the majority 
of our ideas.  Humans also cause ideas.93
                                                 
89 Ibid., 43. 
  Luce also suggests that Berkeley follows 
 
90 Ibid., 82. 
 
91 Ibid., 83. 
 
92 “Real things, then, for Berkeley, are in God and are ideas.  I have real ideas; therefore some of my ideas 
are also God’s ideas… Ideas of sense are ‘our ideas’ (Prin. § 25 &c), because we perceive them; yet clearly 
they are not creatures of my will (Prin. § 29).  They are produced by the will of God and excited into my 
mind.  So that they are God’s ideas, just as our world is also God’s world.  Ibid., 84. 
 
93 Ibid., 90. 
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Malebranche concerning what Luce calls the “knowing of knowing”.94
 Luce is correct to point out these epistemological similarities between 
Malebranche and Berkeley concerning perception and ideas, but he fails to mention any 
similarity between their theological or religious positions.  He does not notice that 
Berkeley and Malebranche hold similar doctrines of divine revelation and these doctrines 
are philosophically relevant for their epistemological views.  Malebranche and Berkeley 
agree that the things we perceive and many, or all in Malebranche’s case, of our ideas are 
generated by God as well.  In chapter 2, I argue that both of these claims are related to the 
doctrine of divine revelation that Malebranche and Berkeley accept.      
  By this he 
suggests that Berkeley follows Malebranche concerning the nature of knowledge of all 
things; those that require ideas as well as those that do not such as God, the soul, and 
other people or finite spirits.  
    Luce argues that Berkeley follows Malebranche for significant contributions to 
his philosophical system: philosophical method, vision, ideas, and epistemology in 
general.  However, Luce is careful to not overstate his case.  He does not want to be 
interpreted as if he is arguing that Berkeley owes all of his philosophical debt to 
Malebranche.  He recognizes the importance of Locke in the formulation of Berkeley’s 
theories.  He simply wants to remind readers that Malebranche was also an important 
influence on Berkeley.  Luce sums up his primary motivation.  “My aim is to show that 
the way to the heart of Berkeleianism is through Malebranche.”95
                                                 
94 Ibid., 92. 
  Luce is a very good 
example of arguing that Malebranche influenced Berkeley’s philosophy.  He gives 
 




careful textual arguments from the Philosophical Commentaries where he compares 
certain language and strategies of the two philosophers.    
 A sweeping thesis like Luce’s is likely to be met with resistance and indeed this 
was the case.  In a paper published in 1938, T. E. Jessop argues that Berkeley is right to 
distance himself from Malebranche.  He concludes that Berkeley differs significantly 
from Malebranche concerning the senses, materialism, and ideas.96
To summarize.  When system is compared with system, both contents and principles 
are deeply different.  Berkeley was certainly right in repudiating any genuine 
similarity between his doctrine and Malebranche’s.
   
97
   
 
He does mention one similarity concerning their relation of knowledge to God.   
Regarded in this very broad way, in the light of his general motive, Berkeley comes 
together with Malebranche at a level where the differences between them are 
evidently technical ones.  Both desire to show that whatever knowledge we have of 
the corporeal world is the unmediated gift of God and therefore an ever-present 
witness to His presence and to our dependence on Him.98
 
    
Jessop calls this connection a “reservoir of suggestiveness” since this religious similarity  
merely suggested a line of thought that Berkeley followed on his own99  Along these 
same lines, Jessop also points out that both Berkeley and Malebranche recite often the 
words of St. Paul, “In Him we live and move and have our being.”100
                                                 
96 It is worth pointing out that these are some of the same issues that Luce pointed out as similar.      
  Jessop recognizes 
 
97 Jessop, “Malebranche and Berkeley,” 138-39.   
 
98 Ibid., 137  
 
99 Ibid., 139   
 
100 Acts 17:28.  These are the words of Paul while in Athens, as recorded by Luke, the author of the book of 




the historical connections between Malebranche and Berkeley, but this does not translate 
into a philosophical connection, “the latter has no positive debt to the earlier”.101
 In addition, Jessop gives two objections to the kind of reasoning that Luce 
advances concerning Malebranche’s influence on Berkeley.  First, Luce seems to 
attribute everything in Berkeley that is not found in Locke to Malebranche.  This denies 
the genius of Berkeley’s originality.  Secondly, and more importantly in Jessop’s view, if 
Berkeley was so indebted to Malebranche he would have acknowledged the debt.  He 
points out that the only times that Berkeley mentions Malebranche in print is to distance 
himself from the French priest.
 
102
 Like Luce, Jessop also misses the force of the theological similarity between 
Malebranche and Berkeley.  He recognizes that there are some similarities in this respect, 
but does not find them worth mentioning in any detail.  Jessop’s failure to notice these 
similarities between the two thinkers’ philosophical theology does not allow him to see 
any of the corresponding similarities in philosophical doctrine.  Perhaps if Jessop had 
noticed the similarities in philosophical theology between Malebranche and Berkeley, he 
would not have been so quick to reject Luce’s claim that there are similarities in their 
philosophical systems.       
  
 The next author in the discussion takes Luce’s side over Jessop.  In two articles 
from the early 1950’s, Anita Dunlevy Fritz argues that Berkeley’s immaterialism and his 
view of the self were both natural outgrowths from Malebranche.103
                                                 
101 Jessop, “Malebranche and Berkeley,” 139.   
  First, concerning 
 
102 Ibid., 140.  
 
103 Fritz, “Malebranche and the Immaterialism of Berkeley.” And Anita D. Fritz, “Berkeley's Self-- Its 
Origin in Malebranche,” Journal of the History of Ideas 15 (1954). 
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immaterialism, Fritz argues that matter is not necessary for Malebranche as a cause or 
occasion of perception since God reveals ideas directly to the human mind.  Malebranche 
did not need matter on his system.  He held that matter exists but it is superfluous to his 
theory.104  Fritz points out that Malebranche and Berkeley hold that ideas could be 
generated without any external bodies.105  Therefore, Berkeley simply advanced 
Malebranche’s theory to its logical conclusion.  Recognizing that it is unnecessary, 
Berkeley removed matter from his system entirely.  Fritz also argues that while there are 
apparent dissimilarities between Malebranche and Berkeley concerning the self, 
Berkeley’s view is actually closer to Malebranche’s than he thinks.  She makes two 
conclusions concerning the views of the self held by Malebranche and Berkeley.  The 
first is that they both hold that the self is passive concerning sensation.106  The second is 
that God directly or immediately causes all sensations upon the self.107
 Fritz is correct to point out that Berkeley and Malebranche share metaphysical 
similarities as well as epistemological.  But Fritz fails to mention that there are 
theological similarities as well as metaphysical.  Fritz also does not mention that some of 
  Fritz argues from 
these similarities to the claim that Malebranche’s theory of the self must have influenced 
Berkeley.   While Luce’s primary goal was to argue that Malebranche shaped and 
influenced Berkeley’s epistemology, Fritz advances her general argument by arguing that 
this is also the case concerning Berkeley’s metaphysics. 
                                                 
104 Fritz, “Malebranche and the Immaterialism of Berkeley,” 64-66. 
 
105 Ibid., 71.   
 
106 “Central to both theories is the passivity of the self in relation to the cause of sensation.”  Fritz, 
“Berkeley's Self-- Its Origin in Malebranche,” 571.  
 
107 Speaking of the cause of sensation: “For both this cause is immediately and directly God, and God is 
held to be the origin not only of the existence and character of sensation, but of the order of sensations as 
well.”  Ibid., 571.    
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these theological doctrines held metaphysical ramifications.  Both Malebranche and 
Berkeley accept the doctrine of the Trinity.  This doctrine holds that God is one substance 
with three persons.  Fritz does not seem to notice that the metaphysical doctrines that are 
similar in Malebranche and Berkeley are related to a shared acceptance of this doctrine of 
the Trinity.  In chapter 3, I show that Malebranche and Berkeley both accept a traditional 
formulation of the Trinity and that this doctrine is philosophically relevant in the 
metaphysical systems of both philosophers.  Fritz’s project is enhanced by my claim that 
Berkeley and Malebranche hold similar accounts of philosophical theology.      
 In 1959 Frederick Copleston comments on the relationship between Malebranche 
and Berkeley in his History of Philosophy.108
Both men developed theocentric metaphysical systems, and these systems bear 
marked resemblances in some points, though there are also notable differences, due at 
least in part to the association of the one system with Cartesianism and the other with 
British empiricism.
  While he did not contribute to this 
literature in any significant way, Copleston did point out a similarity between the role of 
God in the philosophical systems of Berkeley and Malebranche.  Copleston claimed that 
the two philosophers had little in common aside from both propounding to what he calls 




He says that Berkeley took the reigning Empiricism of the day from Locke and used it in 
the service of his theocentric system.  In the same way, Malebranche took Descartes’ 
Rationalism and did the same thing.  Aside from both placing God at the center of their 
philosophy, Copleston does not see any other philosophical similarities between these 
two thinkers.  At first glance it appears that Copleston is in better shape than the 
                                                 
108 He makes comments concerning the two philosophers and their relationship in Volume 4, in the 
Malebranche entry, as well as in Volume 5, in the Berkeley entry.  Copleston, A History of Philosophy.  
 
109 Ibid., Vol 4, pg 203.  
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commentators mentioned thus far since he at least notices some theological similarity 
between Malebranche and Berkeley.  But he also fails to give this theological similarity 
its due.  He mentions it as if it is philosophically uninteresting.  He does not recognize 
either the depth of these theological similarities or their relevance and importance to the 
philosophical systems of both philosophers.     
 In 1963 Harry Bracken added to this literature.  Bracken’s paper concerning the 
theories of ideas shared by both Malebranche and Berkeley makes a different claim 
concerning how these philosophers are similar.110  He argues that both philosophers 
accept two claims concerning ideas.  These are the claims of immediacy and 
independence.  According to Bracken, immediacy is the position that we must be 
immediately aware of the things that we know and independence is the position that the 
things we know must be ontologically independent of our knowing them.111  Bracken 
adds that these shared commitments concerning ideas lead Malebranche and Berkeley to 
other similar positions, including some “important parallels between Berkeley’s Divine 
Language account and Malebranche’s Intelligible Extension.”112  Berkeley joined 
Malebranche’s notions of Ideas and Sensations to create his ideas of sense.113
                                                 
110 Harry M. Bracken, “Berkeley and Malebranche on Ideas,” The Modern Schoolman 41 (1963).  
  Bracken 
follows Luce in claiming that Malebranche and Berkeley share similar accounts of 
epistemology.   
 
111 It seems that Malebranche is a better example of holding these positions than Berkeley, but Bracken 
explains how Berkeley accepts them as well.   
 
112 Bracken, “Berkeley and Malebranche on Ideas,” 13.  
 
113 “As I have hinted, Berkeley’s ideas of sense are the product of combining Malebranchian Ideas and 
Sentiments to the obvious detriment of the thesis of immediacy and independence.”  Brackin also hints at 
the position that both Malebranche and Berkeley are direct or common sense realists.  Ibid., 9, 11.     
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 Bracken points out some of the same similarities that I do when I discuss 
Malebranche and Berkeley’s epistemological theories.  In section 2.4 I show that 
Berkeley’s divine language argument is similar to Malebranche’s vision in God.  But 
Bracken fails to notice that Malebranche and Berkeley share a similar theory of divine 
revelation.  Understanding their shared doctrine of divine revelation sheds light on the 
similarities between Malebranche’s vision in God and Berkeley’s Divine Language 
argument.  My work in chapter 2 supports many of Bracken’s points and strengthens his 
overall project. 
 Another article concerning the relationship between Malebranche and Berkeley is 
by John Immerwahr in 1974.114  Immerwahr argues that Berkeley alters Malebranche’s 
position on causation to create his own causal thesis.  Malebranche’s causal thesis is 
captured by his occasionalism: God is the only true cause.  Berkeley agrees with 
Malebranche that only minds are causes, but Berkeley abandons Malebranche’s full 
occasionalism.  While Malebranche rejects that human wills have causal power, Berkeley 
thinks that humans cause ideas of sense and imagination.  Immerwahr carefully dissects 
both these theories of causation and shows why Malebranche and Berkeley hold similar 
positions.  He argues that Berkeley’s causal thesis is derived from Malebranche, with 
certain modifications.  In short, Malebranche held that there must be a necessary 
connection between a true cause and its effect.115
                                                 
114 John Immerwahr, “Berkeley's Causal Thesis,” New Scholasticism 68 (1974). 
  Immerwahr then points out that 
Berkeley held that true causality holds when the cause is a necessary condition for its 
 





 I agree with Immerwahr that Berkeley and Malebranche hold similar accounts of 
causation.  But I go beyond his claim when I suggest that the doctrine of the Trinity that 
both philosophers accept is philosophically relevant for their theories of causation.  As I 
show in chapter 3, Malebranche and Berkeley were committed to the amplified analogy 
of the Trinity, and their shared acceptance of this theological doctrine is relevant for their 
metaphysical theories of causation.  Immerwahr does not mention the Trinity in 
Malebranche and Berkeley, or its relevance to their theories of causation.       
  While Fritz pointed out that there were metaphysical similarities between 
Malebranche and Berkeley, Immerwahr is the first to point out that there is a 
metaphysical similarity between their theories of causation.   
 In 1982 Louis Loeb published a book where he argued against what he called the 
“standard theory” of modern philosophy, which includes the traditional distinction  
between Rationalism and Empiricism.117
The introduction of three modifications into Malebranche’s metaphysics yields the 
basic structure of the metaphysics of Berkeley.  First, eliminate material substances 
(in the sense of objects which exist independently of any perceiver).  Second, allow 
that some volitions of created minds are casually efficacious (in particular, volitions 
of created minds can cause the movement of their own limbs, that is, can cause 
changes in those ideas which constitute their limbs).  Third, deny that created minds 
are directly acquainted with anything except their own ideas and mental operations 
  Along the way he also adds to the literature 
concerning the philosophical relationship between Malebranche and Berkeley.  Loeb 
follows Fritz and Immerwahr in suggesting that Berkeley followed Malebranche’s 
metaphysics.  He summarizes Berkeley’s use of Malebranche in a few short lines. 
                                                 
116 He states Berkeley’s causal thesis this way to account for the role that humans play.  “Berkeley’s point 
here is just that although volitions are not sufficient conditions for true causality, they are necessary 
conditions.”  Ibid., 164.   
 
117 He considers the standard theory to hold that certain philosophers before Kant are more important than 
others (in alphabetical order: Berkeley, Descartes, Hume, Leibniz, Locke, and Spinoza).  The second 
feature of the standard theory is the distinction between Rationalism and Empiricism.  Loeb, From 
Descartes to Hume.    
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(thus, they are not directly acquainted with ideas in God).  The system that results is 
Berkeley’s metaphysics—a “trivial variant” of Malebranche’s in the sense that the 
required modifications are so simple.118
 
       
 Loeb claims that in creating his own system of metaphysics, Berkeley accepts 
Malebranche’s system along with two “trivial” variations.  The first variation or 
modification is to eliminate matter, as Fritz has pointed out.  The second is to allow 
human minds some causal powers, which was pointed out by Immerwahr.  Loeb 
concludes that Berkeley’s metaphysics are derived from Malebranche in a “simple and 
straightforward way”.119  Neither of these suggestions are unique to Loeb, but Loeb adds 
that Malebranche and Berkeley shared a common motivation that can describe these 
similarities.  In short, both philosophers shared the same two goals.  The first is a shared 
desire to undermine the belief that created entities are casually efficacious.  Both 
Malebranche and Berkeley referred to such a view as “paganism” or “idolatry”.120  The 
second is to establish that there is an immediate union between human minds and God.121
 Loeb also mentions that Berkeley’s language of vision argument is similar to 
Malebranche’s vision in God.  He calls Berkeley’s divine language argument a  
   
“transmuted version of Malebranche’s vision in God”.122
                                                 
118 Ibid., 229.  
  Loeb argues for the closest 
relationship between the metaphysics of Berkeley and Malebranche yet.  He has also 
 
119 Ibid., 241.   
 
120 Loeb cites many passages where these philosophers state that such views of causation are pagan or the 
result of idolatry.  For Malebranche, see Ibid., 223-225 for Berkeley see 241-243.   
 
121 “I have suggested that Malebranche accepted occasionalism in order to achieve two principal objectives: 
to undermine a presupposition of pagan religion or idolatry, the belief that created entities are casually 
efficacious; and, more important, to establish that there is an immediate union between minds and God 
(sect. 25).  Berkeley was interested in both these objectives.”  Ibid., 241.    
 
122 Loeb mentions this connection quickly, but only as a solution to a problem for his argument.  The 
problem is that Berkeley does not mention his divine language, or what Loeb calls his “visual-language” 
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pointed out an important similarity between Malebranche’s vision in God and Berkeley’s 
divine language argument.   
 Loeb recognizes the importance of the metaphysical similarities between 
Malebranche and Berkeley, but he misses the similarity concerning their philosophical 
theology.  He does not mention that both Berkeley and Malebranche accept an account of 
the Trinity which is philosophically relevant for their metaphysics.  He also is the first to 
point out the epistemological similarities between Malebranche’s vision in God and 
Berkeley’s divine language argument.  He does not show that these doctrines are similar 
because Malebranche and Berkeley share a similar view of natural revelation.  The 
pattern continues; commentators notice various similarities between Malebranche and 
Berkeley but continue to miss the relevant similarities in their systems of philosophical 
theology.            
 Second to Luce, the most comprehensive work on Malebranche and Berkeley is 
by Charles McCracken.123
                                                                                                                                                 
argument in the Dialogues.  This is a problem for Loeb since he is arguing that this argument plays an 
important role in Berkeley and its absence from the dialogues weakness that argument.  He solves this 
problem by suggesting that Berkeley’s divine vision argument is a transmuted version of Malebranche’s 
vision in God argument and that Berkeley wanted to downplay his connection to Malebranche’s 
enthusiasm.  Here is the full passage:  
  In Malebranche and British Philosophy published 1983, 
“It is curious that the visual-language argument does not appear in the Dialogues.  There well may be a 
prudential explanation here, if one is willing to think of Berkeley’s Divine visual language as a 
transmuted version of Malebranche’s vision in God.  For Malebranche, sensory awareness requires 
vision of ideas or archetypes in God; for Berkeley, in sensory experience we are acquainted with a 
visual language of God.  Of course, these doctrines are not identical in content.  On the other hand, the 
terminological similarities are not just coincidental, and both doctrines would invite the charge of 
enthusiasm.  The prudential considerations by Luce (26) might well have led Berkeley to downplay the 
visual-language argument in his early works; and since by the time of the Dialogues he was already 
defending himself against the suggestion that his views “run into the enthusiasm of Malebranche,” the 
argument could not sagely appear in that work at all.”  Ibid., 254.  
Of course Loeb’s solution to his problem brings in a different problem concerning Berkeley: Berkeley 
would not only downplay his indebtedness to Malebranche but forcefully reject it while at the same time 
embracing doctrines from Malebranche.           
  




McCracken traces the influence of Malebranche over many British philosophers 
including John Norris, Thomas Taylor, and Berkeley.124
For Berkeley, as for Malebranche, nature, in the truest sense, is nothing but a series of 
effects that occur ‘according to certain fixed and general laws’.  And those laws of 
nature are themselves nothing more in reality than the will of God.
  The first similarity that 
McCracken points out concerns Malebranche and Berkeley’s views of nature and the 
divine.  They both desired to destroy what they considered a pagan view of nature and 
replace it with an absolute dependence of all things on God.  This point is similar to the 
one made by Loeb, but McCracken expands upon Loeb’s formulation.  Both 
Malebranche and Berkeley agree that nature is the general law of God.  
125
     
 
According to McCracken, Berkeley is so often linked to Malebranche because they both 
place all things in a state of immediate dependence on God.  Berkeley learned the spirit 
of this move from Malebranche, but he advanced it to a new level when he dismissed 
matter entirely.126  McCracken then points out that there is a “particularly noteworthy 
similarity” in the theories of vision between both Malebranche and Berkeley.127
For both Malebranche and Berkeley, visual sensa are signs by which God directly 
communicates to us something we need to know.  As such, vision is for them a 
‘divine language’ or, as Malebranche liked to call it, a ‘natural revelation’ by which 
God speaks to man.
   
128
 
     
                                                 
124 “Berkeley’s thoughts thus seem to have returned repeatedly to Malebranche throughout the most 
productive period (1707-13) of his authorship.”  Ibid., 210.  
 
125Ibid., 211.  
 
126Ibid., 215.    
 
127 Ibid., 224.  
 




In this passage, McCracken points out two things that I point out in greater detail in 
chapter 2.  He mentions that Malebranche and Berkeley hold similar theories of vision.  
And he also states that both philosophers accept a form of natural revelation.   
 McCracken is the first and only commentator to hint at what I make explicit in 
chapter 2 concerning natural revelation.  Both Malebranche and Berkeley hold theories of 
natural revelation that get worked out into their epistemologies.  But even McCracken 
misses the importance of the doctrine of natural revelation for Malebranche and 
Berkeley.  He mentions it in an aside; as if this similarity concerning natural theology is 
nothing more than an interesting footnote to their theories.  He fails to see the relevance 
of the doctrine of natural revelation to the epistemological systems of Malebranche and 
Berkeley.      
 McCracken also restates some of what we have already seen from other 
commentators.  He points out that Berkeley follows Malebranche’s theory of causation, 
but stops short of full occasionalism.  McCracken then asks why Berkeley chose to not 
follow Malebranche’s full occasionalism.  He suggests that full occasionalism is 
incompatible with human freewill and that it supposes matter—an unthinking, 
unperceived substance – to occasion our ideas.129
 Despite these many similarities McCracken concludes: 
  Berkeley rejected full occasionalism 
because he was committed to human freewill.  McCracken also points out that Berkeley 
rejected occasionalism because it presumes the existence of matter, which he denied.  But 
these objections aside, McCracken says that Berkeley is a partial occasionalist.   
But Berkeley was not a Malebranchist.  As he insisted, his philosophy was opposed to 
Malebranche’s over crucial topics—matter, universals, the reliability of the senses, 
and so on.  Yet, many are the places where their notions touch—about the direct 
                                                 
129 Ibid., 245-247.    
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dependence of nature on God, the indemonstrability of a material world, the 
externality of ideas, the identification of causal power with voluntary action, the 
certainty with which we know of spirits though we have no idea of them, and so 
forth; and when we remember that Berkeley read the Search in an early period, when 
he was first exploring these ideas, we can only suppose, it seems to me, that it was 
one of his principal guidebooks, though his own ingenuity and daring led him to 
follow new pathways that went well beyond the terrain charted in the Search After 
Truth.130
 
        
McCracken does an excellent job of taking seriously Berkeley’s disavowal of following 
Malebranche’s philosophy while at the same time appreciating those areas where the two 
philosophers are similar.      
 In the nineties, Nicholas Jolley published two papers and a portion of a book 
contributing to this literature.  For the purposes of this project, Jolley’s work is very 
important because he introduces two separate connections between Malebranche and 
Berkeley which are related to the similarities that I point out later in the work.    
 In a paper written in 1990, Jolley considers the similarities between Malebranche 
and Berkeley’s theories of causality.131  He points out that Berkeley was attracted to 
occasionalism early in his writing.  But in his later published works he rejects full 
occasionalism for a theory that humans are also causal agents.  He first introduces 
Malebranche’s theory of occasionalism and causation and then Berkeley’s rejection of 
Malebranche’s position.  Jolley points out that Berkeley’s rejection of full occasionalism 
is a puzzle, since it seems that occasionalism fits well with his immaterialism.132
                                                 
130 Ibid., 253.  
  Up 
until this point, Jolley’s paper is not too different from what has come before.  But, for an 
 
131 Nicholas Jolley, “Berkeley and Malebranche on Causality and Volition,” in Central Themes in Early 
Modern Philosophy, ed. J. A. Cover and Mark Kulstad (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 
1990). 
 
132 This is the same puzzle that McCracken points out.  Jolley calls this departure from full occasionalism a 
“change for the worse”.   Ibid., 227. 
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explanation of why Berkeley changed positions concerning causation, Jolley suggests a 
theological rather than a philosophical explanation.133  Berkeley deviates from 
Malebranche’s occasionalism due to yet another theological commitment: what Jolley 
calls the Genesis doctrine.  This is the commitment to the Christian doctrine that humans 
are made in the image of God.  Berkeley rejects occasionalism because of his 
commitment to this other theological doctrine that humans are made in the image of 
God.134
 This work by Jolley is important for my project not only because of a similar 
subject matter, but also because of a similar methodology.  Jolley introduces a puzzle, 
and then explains it in light of one of Berkeley’s theological commitments.  This is 
similar to what I will claim in the body of this work, that Berkeley and Malebranche hold 
theological commitments that are relevant for their philosophical doctrines.  This is 
important to notice since understanding these commitments sheds light on their 
philosophical systems as a whole, as well as particular aspects of those systems.  But, 
even though Jolley comes closest to what I say here concerning theology, he nowhere 
  God is causally active.  Since humans are made in the image of God, human 
minds are also causally active in the same way.  In essence, Jolley argues that Berkeley 
criticizes Malebranche for not paying enough attention to the Genesis doctrine.  Jolley is 
unique among the commentators we have looked at so far in that he seems to recognize 
the importance of theology to Berkeley.   
                                                 
 
133 “In the second part of the paper I shall try to explain why Berkeley felt it necessary to depart from 
Malebranche’s teaching concerning causality by insisting that finite spirits are true causes.  This will 
require us to look beyond purely philosophical arguments to the theological concerns which underpin his 
metaphysics.”  Ibid., 228.   
 
134 “From Berkeley’s perspective, then, Malebranche had mounted a powerful attack on idolatrous attitudes 
towards physical nature, but he had paid too high a price for his success: he had undermined idolatry at the 
cost of compromising the Genesis doctrine that the mind is made in the image of God.”  Ibid., 238.    
 
 70 
mentions the shared doctrine of the Trinity in Malebranche and Berkeley nor its 
relevance to their theories of causation.       
 Jolley also considers the theories of ideas of these two philosophers.  He does this 
in two separate works.  First, in The Light of the Soul, published in 1990, Jolley briefly 
mentions the relationship between Malebranche and Berkeley.135  Other than Berkeley 
following Malebranche’s notion that ideas are the immediate objects of perception, “their 
theories of ideas are really very different.”136
 But Jolley again compares Malebranche’s vision in God to Berkeley in a paper 
published six years later in 1996.
   
137  In this later paper, his position has changed.  Rather 
than saying that Berkeley is justified in distancing himself from Malebranche’s vision in 
God, Jolley argues that Malebranche, in his later works, moved toward a version of the 
vision in God doctrine which anticipates Berkeley’s theory of vision.138
                                                 
135 Jolley, The Light of the Soul: Theories of Ideas in Leibniz, Malebranche, and Descartes. 
  This new 
development is Malebranche’s theory of efficacious ideas.  This is Malebranche’s causal 
 
136 Ibid., 197.  
 
137 Jolley, “Berkeley, Malebranche, and Vision in God.”    
 
138 “It is tempting, then, to conclude with Genevieve Brykman that, at least on the issue of perception, the 
similarities between Malebranche and Berkeley are altogether superficial.  Or, in other words, it seems that 
Berkeley is entirely right to insist on his distance from the doctrine of vision in God.  In this paper I shall 
argue that this view is mistaken.  I shall show (in section 1) that, in his later philosophy, Malebranche was 
moving towards a version of the vision in God doctrine which in some degree anticipates Berkeley’s 
account of perception… I assume that if this kind of dialectical relationship between the two philosophers 
could be established, it would be sufficient to refute Philonous’s claim that there are no principles more 
fundamentally opposite than Berkeley’s and Malebranche’s; for presumably not even Philonous would 
wish to make this claim about the relationship between Berkeley and Locke.”  Ibid., 536-37.   
 Jolley is a very good example of arguing for a philosophical similarity between Malebranche and 
Berkeley; not influence.  He does not attempt to give a historical explanation for the similarities between 
Berkeley and Malebranche.  Instead, he points out that the developments in Malebranche’s later philosophy 
most likely were not available to Berkeley, probably because Berkeley was reading an English translation 
of the Search by Taylor in 1700. “There is no direct evidence that Berkeley was familiar with 
Malebranche’s later version of the vision in God, according to which ideas in God have the power to cause 
perceptions in human minds;”  Jolley, “Berkeley, Malebranche, and Vision in God,” 541. 
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theory of perception, which makes it similar to Berkeley’s own causal theory of 
perception.139
 Following some of the French interpreters of Malebranche, Jolley suggests that 
Malebranche moves away from his earlier position on the vision in God.  This change is 
so great that the early theory is rightly called a vision in God, vision en Dieu, and the later 
theory would be better called vision by God, vision par Dieu.
   
140  Jolley makes this 
distinction to point out how the later doctrine stresses God’s causal action whereby ideas 
affect the human mind directly.141  Jolley concludes that when we look at Malebranche’s 
later version of the vision in God, we see that he and Berkeley adopt “a theological 
version of the causal theory of perception”.142
In general terms, Berkeley and Malebranche both offer examples of theocentric 
metaphysics of fundamentally Cartesian inspiration.  Moreover, on a more specific 
level, it is clear that even in his published works, Berkeley is to some extent an 
occasionalist; he argues for the quasi-occasionalist thesis that there are no genuine 
causal relationships between physical phenomena from the Malebranchian premise 
that there is an absolutely necessary connection between a cause and its effect.
  Aside from his main argument, Jolley 
briefly mentions other areas in which Malebranche and Berkeley are similar.   
143
    
 
                                                 
 
139 Jolley, “Berkeley, Malebranche, and Vision in God,” 540.   
 
140 Ibid., 537.  See also Andrè Robinet, Système Et Existence Dans L'oeuvre De Malebranche (Paris, FR: J. 
Vrin, 1965), 262-63.   
 
141 This later development has to do with Malebranche’s theory of efficacious ideas, the doctrine that God 
uses ideas to affect the human mind, which I talk about in section 4.3.  Unlike Jolley, I am not interested in 
the historical development of Malebranche’s theory, I am only interested in what Malebranche thought in 
his most mature work.  Because of this, I take the latest version of the Search, which had been edited many 
times by Malebranche, as his most mature work.  It is interesting to note that, if Jolley is correct, many of 
the disagreements concerning the active or passive nature of the mind could be simply disagreements 
concerning early Malebranche verses later Malebranche.  One example of an argument for the active nature 
of the mind in Malebranche is Susan Peppers-Bates, “Does Malebranche Need Efficacious Ideas? The 
Cognitive Faculties, the Ontological Status of Ideas, and Human Attention,” Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 43 (2005). 
 
142 Jolley, “Berkeley, Malebranche, and Vision in God,” 539.  
143 Ibid., 536.  
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 Jolley notices the similarities between Malebranche’s vision in God and 
Berkeley’s theory of vision.  But I expand upon his work in chapter two when I show that 
Malebranche and Berkeley both accept similar theories of divine revelation which are 
philosophically relevant for these epistemological doctrines.   
   In 2005, Lisa Downing compares the metaphysics and philosophy of science of 
Malebranche and Berkeley.144  She begins her paper by examining the similarities 
between Malebranche and Berkeley on causation.  While Malebranche holds to full 
occasionalism, Downing suggests that Berkeley is not as far from Malebranche’s 
occasionalism as he might have intended.  She calls Berkeley’s position, 
“semioccasionalism”.145  While Berkeley’s occasionalism differs from Malebranche’s in 
that finite minds or spirits are also causes, it is essentially the same as Malebranche when 
it comes to the physical realm.146  Both agree that God works according to his general 
laws.147  She concludes that while Malebranche and Berkeley have similar metaphysical 
doctrines of occasionalism and causation, their philosophy of science differs in that 
Malebranche accepts strict mechanism while Berkeley denies it.148
                                                 
 
  We find in Downing 
144 Lisa Downing, “Occasionalism and Strict Mechanism: Malebranche, Berkeley, Fontenelle,” in Early 
Modern Philosophy: Mind, Matter, and Metaphysics, ed. Christia Mercer (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2005). 
 
145 Ibid., 209.  
 
146 “Berkeley allows that human minds are active, causing their own ideas of imagination and even, it 
seems, the movements of bodies.  Nevertheless, if we restrict our attention to the physical realm, and 
discount the modest causal input of finite spirits, Berkeley emerges as a Malbranchiste de bonne foi, as one 
of his early critics put it.  Berkeley argues, as had Malebranche, that the causes of physical change cannot 
be found in the realm of bodies.  Berkeley’s view, then, amounts to occasionalism for the physical realm, 
but not the spiritual; I will label this position ‘semioccasionalism’.”  Ibid., 208. 
 
147 Downing does not give much detail concerning the theories of causality between Malebranche and 
Berkeley.  Ibid. 
 
148 Downing’s article is primarily interested in this issue of strict mechanism, which is the view that bodies 
interact only through impact.  Strict mechanism is contrasted with what she calls “attractionism”, which are 
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another example of a commentator who considers the similarities between Malebranche 
and Berkeley on causation but fails to notice their doctrine of the Trinity.     
 McCrackin and Tipton published a book whose aim is to explain Berkeley’s 
philosophical background and source materials titled Berkeley’s Principles and 
Dialogues: Background Source Materials.149  McCrackin and Tipton suggest that it is 
open for debate whether the young Berkeley was directly influenced by Malebranche, but 
“it is widely accepted both that Berkeley came on it at an early stage and that it had a 
profound effect on him.”150
 A recent article, published in a collection of essays in 2008, by Godfrey Vesey is 
titled “Malebranche, Arnauld, and Berkeley on the Imperceptibility of Outer Objects.”
  They suggest that Malebranche’s Search gave focus or 
direction to Berkeley’s thinking on matters such as the existence of bodies, causation, and 
errors from the senses.  Nowhere do they make any connections between these 
similarities and the philosophical theology of Malebranche or Berkeley.     
151
                                                                                                                                                 
theories which suggest that bodies may have non-impact causal powers.  Newton’s theory of gravity is such 
a theory.  Ibid., 206.    
  
Vesey considers the question concerning the source of Berkeley’s notion of idea.  He 
concludes that Berkeley got this notion from Malebranche rather than Lock.  He says that 
there are many similarities between Malebranche and Berkeley.  He concludes that 
“Berkeley’s immaterialism is Malebranche’s philosophy minus the external world and 
 
149 Charles J. McCracken and I. C. Tipton, eds., Berkeley's Principles and Dialogues: Background and 
Source Materials (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
 
150 Ibid., 29.   
 
151 Godfrey Vesey, “Malebranche, Arnauld and Berkeley on the Imperceptibility of Outer Objects,” in New 
Interpretations of Berkeley's Thought, ed. Stephen H. Daniel (New York, NY: Humanity Books, 2008). 
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minus our ‘seeing all things in God’.152
 Finally, Marc Hight notices yet another similarity between Malebranche and 
Berkeley in his book, Idea and Ontology, published in 2008.
  Vesey does not mention the religious or 
theological similarities between Malebranche and Berkeley.   
153  Hight’s thesis is that the 
philosophers of the Early Modern period did not abandon the traditional ontological 
distinction between substance and mode.  Hight does not directly consider the similarities 
between Malebranche and Berkeley since that is not a part of his agenda, but his 
conclusion of each philosopher shows that he takes both to hold a similar theory of ideas 
in regard to the substance/mode distinction.  He concludes that Malebranche and 
Berkeley both accept, but stretch, the traditional ontological distinction concerning their 
ideas.  Malebranche’s ideas are “unambiguously rather like substances”, they are 
“second-rate” substances but not substances per se.154  Hight says similar things 
concerning Berkeley’s ideas.  Berkeley’s ideas are “quasi substances”:  “they behave like 
substances except for the fact that they are ontologically dependent upon minds.”155
                                                 
152 Ibid., 115.   
  
Hight points out a similarity between the notion of substance for both Malebranche and 
Berkeley, but he does not mention their shared acceptance of the Trinity.  As I show in 
chapter 3, the doctrine of the Trinity accepted by Malebranche and Berkeley is 
philosophically relevant for their theories of substance.  Because of their acceptance of 
 
153 Marc A. Hight, Idea and Ontology: An Essay in Early Modern Metaphysics of Ideas (University Park, 
PA: The Pennsylvania State University, 2008).   
 
154 Ibid., 59.  
 




that theory, they are motivated to produce an account of substance that makes sense of 
the Trinitarian claim that God is one substance and three persons. 
  This project makes a direct contribution to this secondary literature that compares 
the philosophical systems of Malebranche and Berkeley.  My work here supports many of 
the similarities already mentioned by these commentators.  In most cases, their 
conclusions could be made stronger with a realization of the additional similarities 
between the philosophical theology of Malebranche and Berkeley.  But more than just 
supporting this literature, I point out that there are important similarities in the doctrines 
of divine revelation and the Trinity held by both philosophers that have not been 
mentioned.  Throughout the discussion of the literature I showed that the religious or 
theological similarities between Malebranche and Berkeley have been hinted at, but they 
have not been fully recognized or developed.  I expand on these themes which are merely 
mentioned in this literature and contribute original material that has not been mentioned 
in the literature.  This is the first work to argue that these two philosophers hold similar 




















Divine Revelation in the Epistemology of Malebranche and Berkeley 
 
 This chapter is the first of two in which I give my primary argument that 
Malebranche and Berkeley hold similar theories of philosophical theology and those 
theories are philosophically relevant to their philosophical systems.  This chapter focuses 
on Malebranche and Berkeley’s similar theories of divine revelation.  Both hold the 
position that God directly causes certain psychological states in humans.  Both also 
accept the traditional distinction from Christian theology between special and general 
revelation.1
 To show that Berkeley and Malebranche accept similar theories of divine 
revelation, I must first introduce this doctrine from Christian theology and some of the 
facets of it that are found in both philosophers.  I do this in 2.1.  Then, in section 2.2, I 
focus on Malebranche and his theory of divine revelation.  Malebranche’s vision in God 
is his doctrine of general revelation.  In 2.3, I show that Berkeley accepts a theory of 
divine revelation and that his language of vision, an important feature of his 
epistemology, is his account of general revelation.  Finally in 2.4, I summarize in detail 
the similarities between Malebranche and Berkeley’s theories of divine revelation.  I 
show how these doctrines of divine revelation from their philosophical theology shed 
light on some of the interpretive issues and disputes in the secondary literature 
concerning the philosophical relationship between Malebranche and Berkeley.    
  Once we see these two similarities in philosophical theology, we can see 
relevant epistemological similarities in their philosophy.  Malebranche and Berkeley 
construct theories of epistemology that emphasize God’s general revelation.  Both also 
agree that God’s revelation accounts for the majority of human knowledge.           
                                                 




2.1   
 
 I begin by giving an account of what I mean by ‘revelation’ and in particular 
‘divine revelation’.  I need to do this because these terms are used differently in different 
contexts.  Moreover, it is possible for someone to hold a theory of divine revelation but 
never call it such.  Indeed, this is the case with Berkeley.  As I point out in sections 2.2 
and 2.3, Malebranche and Berkeley differ concerning how they talk about divine 
revelation.  Malebranche uses the terms ‘divine revelation’ at times while Berkeley does 
not.  But, despite the terms they adopt, both embrace divine revelation.  This section is 
necessary so that we can locate the doctrine of divine revelation even if the author does 
not choose to use this theologically motivated language.  So, to be able to recognize a 
theory of revelation in these philosophers, we must first introduce what we are seeking.   
 It is necessary to define ‘revelation’ first, and then define what it means for a 
revelation to be divine.  We use “reveal” as a predicate with many different entities filling 
the role of subject.  There are at least four different categories of things that are said to 
reveal.  God reveals.  This is known as divine revelation.2  But humans can also reveal.3  
Perhaps more surprisingly, even animals and inanimate objects are sometimes said to 
reveal.4
                                                 
2 For example: “God revealed to Moses that he would lead the children of Israel.”  
  When all these purported claims of revelation are grouped together, I call that 
category ‘generic revelation’.  This sort of revelation is generic in the sense that is not 
restricted by attaching any of the qualifiers.  Divine, human, and the other kinds of 
 
3 We could call this Human revelation.  For example: “Billy Roe revealed his psychological state when he 
decorated the headstones of his diseased family members with gold spray paint.” 
 
4 We could call the first Non-human creature revelation.  For example: “My dog in High School, Sanders, 
revealed his love for peanut butter by eating it enthusiastically.”  We could call the second Inanimate 
revelation.  For example: “The ice on my Toyota Matrix revealed that there was a freeze during the night.”   
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revelation mentioned all fit into the category of generic revelation.  It is revelation in the 
broadest sense possible.  Within generic revelation, a distinction can be made between 
agent and non-agent revelation.  Agent revelation is revelation between agents.  Both the 
revealer and the one being revealed to, the revealee, are agents.5  Both human and divine 
revelation are categories of agent revelation since agents are involved in both cases.6
 Revelation is typically defined as ‘to unveil’ or ‘to disclose something that was 
formerly hidden’.
   
7  Nicholas Wolterstorff gives a nice treatment of what I am calling 
generic revelation in Divine Discourse.8  Put simply, revelation is making the unknown 
known.9  Revelation occurs when ignorance is dispelled, or at least when ignorance 
should be dispelled if proper attention and interpretation skills are present.10  However, 
revelation is not dispelling just any sort of ignorance.  Wolterstorff says that there is an 
additional requirement which he calls “unveiling the veiled” or “disclosing the hidden”11
                                                 
5 Applying this distinction to the categories in note 1, it follows that of the four categories, only divine and 
human revelation are examples of agent revelation.  Agent and non-agent revelation is a common 
distinction.  See Bruce Reichenbach, “Divine Revelation,” in For Faith and Clarity: Philosophical 
Contributions to Christian Theology, ed. James K. Beilby (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Publishing 2006).  
And Nicholas Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflections on the Claim That God Speaks 
(New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
.  
 
6 In both human and divine revelation there are two agents.  In human revelation humans fill both slots of 
revealer and revealee.  In divine revelation, God fills one slot and a human or group of humans fill the other 
slot.   
 
7 This is the typical definition given for revelation in the secondary literature such as:  Reichenbach, 
“Divine Revelation,”, 86.  See also John Baillie, The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought (New York, 
NY: Columbia University Press, 1956).  The Compact Oxford English Dictionary has these three entries.  
1. the revealing of something previously unknown. 2.  a surprising or remarkable thing.  3. the disclosure of 
knowledge to humans by divine or supernatural means.   
 
8Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflections on the Claim That God Speaks.  Another good 
treatment of generic revelation is Reichenbach, “Divine Revelation.” 
 
9 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflections on the Claim That God Speaks, 19. 
 
10 Ibid., 23. 
 
11 “Dispelling ignorance becomes revelation when it has, to some degree and in some way, the character of 
unveiling the veiled, of uncovering the covered, of exposing the character of the unveiling view.  The 
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This requirement points out that something must be formerly hidden before it can be 
revealed.  So, generic revelation occurs when the veiled is unveiled and ignorance is 
dispelled.   
 Divine revelation is a subset of generic agent revelation.  In divine revelation, 
God is serving as one of the agents with a human, or a group of humans, serving as the 
other.  This is most typically understood as God serving as the revealer and humans as 
the revealee.  But, according to the definition so far, it would also include accounts of 
humans revealing things to God, as through prayers or other such petitions.12
 Many different varieties or forms of divine revelation fit the definition I have 
given.  Divine revelation can refer to God directly speaking in an audible voice.  It can 
also refer to some form of mystical experience from meditation.  It is perhaps most 
common to limit divine revelation to some set of religious scriptures such as the Bible or 
the Koran.  Any of these forms of divine revelation could be a means by which God 
makes the unknown known or dispels ignorance.   
  However, 
for the remainder of this chapter, I will use divine revelation as agent revelation where 
God acts as the revealer.  Applied to the definition given above, divine revelation occurs 
when the veiled is unveiled and ignorance is dispelled with God acting as the revealer.     
 I need not examine every form of divine revelation here.  I need only explain 
those forms of divine revelation that Malebranche and Berkeley accept.  As I showed in 
chapter 1, Malebranche and Berkeley were trained in Christian theology.  This means that 
                                                                                                                                                 
counterpart of the revealed is the hidden.  The difference between just telling somebody something and 
revealing it, is that telling becomes revealing when, to some degree and in some way, it discloses the 
hidden.”  Ibid., 23-24. 
 
12 If God is omniscient, then humans cannot reveal anything to him since it is impossible to dispel God’s 
ignorance.   
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both would have been familiar with the traditional account of divine revelation.  Those 
trained in Roman Catholic and Protestant theological schools would learn essentially the 
same doctrine of divine revelation.  Divine revelation is not a contested doctrine among 
these two theological traditions.13  So, Malebranche the Catholic priest and Berkeley the 
Anglican bishop would have studied the same basic theological doctrine concerning 
divine revelation.14
 Christian theologians have traditionally spoken about two species or forms of 
divine revelation: special and general revelation.  This same distinction is sometimes 
classified as a distinction between supernatural and natural revelation.
  We will see in sections 2.2 and 2.3 that both Malebranche and 
Berkeley accept the doctrine of divine revelation.   
15
                                                 
13 As I say in chapter 3, the Trinity is another doctrine where both Roman Catholics and Protestants would 
not hold any significant disagreements.  This is not true concerning many doctrines such as the church, 
justification by faith, or the sacraments.    
  I introduce and 
explain those aspects of this distinction that are relevant for both Malebranche and 
Berkeley.  This distinction between special and general revelation can be found 
throughout the history of Christian theology, from the Early Church Fathers to the most  
 
14 One of the differences between Roman Catholic and Protestant theology concerning divine revelation is 
that Protestants might say that Catholics accept more things into the category of special revelation than do 
Protestants.  Since the Reformation, Protestants hold a doctrine of sola Scriptura or Scripture alone is 
God’s special revelation while Catholics typically accept church councils and Papal degrees as special 
revelation.  But these differences do not come into play here.   
 
15 Special, or supernatural, revelation is also often called particular revelation.  I do not intend to give a 
complete historical overview of the distinction between these two species of divine revelation nor give a 
full account of this distinction, but only point out what is necessary for this project.  For a good historical 
treatment of revelation from within the Christian tradition see Bruce A. Demarest, General Revelation: 
Historical Views and Contemporary Issues (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1982).  Other works along the 
same lines are Paul Helm, The Divine Revelation: The Basic Issues (Westchester, IL: Crossway Books, 
1982).  G. C. Berkouwer, “General and Special Divine Revelation,” in Revelation and the Bible: 
Contemporary Evangelical Thought, ed. Carl F. H. Henry (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Publishing 1958).  
And Carl F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, and Authority, 6 vols. (Waco, TX: Word Books, 1976). 
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recent works on the subject.16  The basic idea is that general revelation occurs when God 
reveals something to humans through some natural means.  Special revelation occurs 
when God reveals something to humans through some supernatural means.  It is common 
for theologians to explain this distinction as a two book theory.  God has two books 
through which he reveals: the first book is the book of Scripture, or special revelation, 
and the second book is the book of nature, or general revelation.17  Traditional Christian 
theology often places the emphasis on the book of Scripture, saying that that special 
revelation is required to properly interpret the book of nature.18
 Special revelation is described as having many attributes.  It occurs when God 
reveals through supernatural means.  It is miraculous.  God is overriding the natural 
course of things to reveal.  It is God’s direct, unmediated revelation.  God is also 
  
                                                 
16 Here is an example of this distinction in revelation from a respected theologian that lived about 100 years 
after Malebranche and Berkeley, B.B. Warfield.  I chose Warfield because his work is dedicated to the 
doctrine of revelation, and also because Warfield thought of himself as summarizing the traditional account 
of divine revelation rather than introducing new elements in the doctrine.  So, the doctrine as it is 
summarized here by Warfield is similar to the doctrine of revelation that would have been familiar to both 
Malebranche and Berkeley: 
“These two species or stages of revelation have been commonly distinguished from one another by the 
distinctive names of natural and supernatural revelation, or general and special revelation, or natural 
and soteriological revelation.  Each of these modes of discriminating them has its particular fitness and 
describes a real difference between the two in nature, reach or purpose.  The one is communicated 
through the media of natural phenomena, occurring in the course of Nature or of history; the other 
implies an intervention in the natural course of things and is not merely in source but in mode 
supernatural.  The one is addressed generally to all intelligent creatures, and is therefore accessible to 
all men; the other is addressed to a special class of sinners, to whom God would make known His 
salvation.  The one has in view to meet and supply the natural need of creatures for knowledge of their 
God; the other to rescue broken and deformed sinners from their sin and its consequences.”  B. B. 
Warfield, The Inspiration and Authority of the Bible (London, UK: Marshall Morgan & Scott, 1951), 
74. 
     
17 McCracken refers to this two book explanation.  Charles J. McCracken, Malebranche and British 
Philosophy (New York: Clarendon Press, 1983), 225. 
 
18 Jonathan Edwards, a contemporary philosopher and theologian of Malebranche and Berkeley states this 
priority of special revelation clearly: 
“The book of Scripture is the interpreter of the book of nature in two ways, viz., by declaring to us 
those spiritual mysteries that are indeed signified and typified in the constitution of the natural world; 
and secondly, in actually making application of the signs and types in the book of nature as 
representations of those spiritual mysteries in many instances. . . .”  Jonathan Edwards, Works, ed. 
Various Editors (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1957-), unpublished note 156.  
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exclusive concerning this revelation, meaning that there is only a certain person, or group 
of people, who receive special revelation.  The content of special revelation concerns 
themes related to human salvation or other spiritual truths.  While some theologians in 
Malebranche and Berkeley’s time would have allowed that God still reveals 
supernaturally through direct communication or mystical experience, the majority of 
theologians in the modern period held that such forms of special revelation had ceased.  
Instead, God’s special revelation is limited to religious works such as the Christian 
scriptures.19
 General revelation, on the other hand, occurs when God reveals through natural 
means rather than supernatural.  It is an indirect form of revelation, mediated through 
some natural phenomenon.  The idea is that God writes the book of nature through 
creation.  Whereas special revelation was exclusive, natural revelation is inclusive.  God 
reveals to all humans through the book of nature; it is not reserved for a special, 
privileged group.  While the content of special revelation was human salvation, the 
content of general revelation is much less specific.  One can learn many things by 
studying the book of nature: theological principles about God, ethical truths, and even 
truths concerning science or mathematics.  The book of general revelation is akin to 
natural law.
  So, the Bible is the best representative of special revelation in the modern 
period of philosophy.    
20
                                                 
19 This is where the one difference between Malebranche’ Catholicism and Berkeley’s Protestantism 
concerning special revelation could be at play.  Protestants since the Reformation denied any ongoing 
supernatural revelation from God because of their doctrine of sola scriptura.  Catholics on the other hand 
were open to ongoing special revelation, but this would typically be found through church council or Papal 
decree.  But this potential difference between Malebranche and Berkeley is not relevant in this project since 
the main emphasis is on their views of general revelation.     
   
 




 Not every early modern philosopher accepted the traditional account of divine 
revelation.  Some of those that did accept this doctrine made significant alterations to fit 
their philosophical systems.  For example, John Locke shows that he accepts divine 
revelation when he defines faith in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding.      
Faith, on the other side, is the Assent to any Proposition, not thus made out by the 
Deductions of Reason; but upon the Credit of the Proposer, as coming from GOD, in 




What Locke is calling “revelation” is really only special revelation.  Locke wanted to 
define all revelation in terms of supernatural revelation.  From this quote, it seems that 
Locke has no theory of natural revelation.22
 Now that the theological context of both Malebranche and Berkeley concerning 
revelation has been set, I will mention one contemporary account of divine revelation that 
is similar to the accounts held by Malebranche and Berkeley.  Many contemporary 
philosophers in the analytical tradition have branched out from the traditional distinction 
between special and general revelation and added their own nuances.
  In section 2.3 I will show that Berkeley 
seems to hold the same position as Locke, he defines revelation in terms of supernatural 
revelation only.  But Berkeley does in fact have a theory of natural revelation, even 
though he does not use the term “natural revelation”.      
23
                                                 
21 Italics and capitalization in the original.  John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. 
P. H. Nidditch (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1979), 141.  Book 4, Chapter 18, section 2.   
  Of these 
 
22 It is possible that Locke does in fact have a theory of general revelation and does not call it general 
revelation. 
    
23 Here are some of the more important contemporary works on divine revelation that present different 
nuances: Cardinal Avery Dulles lists five different models of divine revelation: revelation as doctrine, 
history, inner experience, dialectal presence, and new awareness Avery Robert Dulles, Models of 
Revelation (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1983).  Robert Trembath gives two broad categories: divergence 
and convergence theories of divine revelation.  Kern Robert Trembath, Divine Revelation: Our Moral 
Relation with God (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1991).   
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contemporary distinctions, George Mavrodes has introduced one that is remarkably 
similar to the theories of divine revelation held by both Malebranche and Berkeley.  
Mavrodes in Revelation in Religious Belief  presents a model of revelation that he calls 
the causation model of divine revelation.24  The main idea in this model is God’s causal 
activity.  God causes or produces psychological effects in his human creations in a direct 
manner.25
Suppose, for example, that someone who has no discernable theistic belief throughout 
his life goes to bed one night, and wakes up in the morning with the firm conviction 
that there is a God who is the creator of the world.




The causation model suggests that God directly causes a new belief in this sleepy 
agnostic by inserting the idea of theism into his mind overnight.  Through this causal 
                                                 
24 He actually presents three models, but the first two are not relevant for this project since they are not 
similar to the positions of Malebranche or Berkeley.  Mavrodes calls these first two models the 
communication and the manifestation models of revelation.  The communication model picks out those 
instances where the revealer makes the unknown known through communication.  For example, I reveal 
that I am going bald by telling you that my hair is falling out.  God would be using the communication 
model when he speaks to humans.  The manifestation model is when the revealer makes the unknown know 
by showing something to be true.  For example, if I show that I am going bald by taking off my baseball 
cap, I have manifested my baldness.  Examples of God using the manifestation model include arguments 
from design or supernatural, mystical encounter.  In the former, it is purported that God reveals things 
about himself in the order and design of the universe that he created while in the later God reveals 
something about himself through a personal, subjective encounter.  George I. Mavrodes, Revelation in 
Religious Belief (Philadelphia: PA: Temple University Press, 1988).  He also presents a similar account of 
divine revelation in George I. Mavrodes, “Revelation and the Bible,” Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the 
Society of Christian Philosophers 6 (1989). 
 
25 Mavrodes says concerning the causation model of divine revelation:   
“The third model that I want to consider—and it is the one that I have already said may not fit the 
general idea of revelation as well as might be wished—is that of causation.  Suppose that we think of 
God as being powerful, perhaps even omnipotent.  And suppose that we think of God as being the 
creator of the world.  It would seem plausible to suppose that an agent of this sort would probably be 
able to produce psychological effects in human beings.  In fact, it might well seem plausible to think 
that God could produce some such effects directly.”  Mavrodes, Revelation in Religious Belief, 37. 
 




activity, God revealed in a very direct way a certain psychological effect, namely a belief 
that there is a God who created the world.27
 Mavrodes’ theory is unique on a few accounts.  First of all, neither of the 
traditional distinctions concerning divine revelation have anything to say about God 
directly causing ideas or psychological states in humans.  It is also unique because of the 
directness in which God alters the psychological states of humans.  In this model God 
uses no mediator such as experience of nature or the reading of a religious text to change 
psychological states.  God works directly on the human mind.
   
28
 Mavrodes suggests that many philosophers and theologians have held similar 
views to his causation model of revelation.  Among them he names Descartes, John 
Calvin, and some of the contemporary reformed epistemologists.  For example, Mavrodes 
suggests that Descartes’ argument for the existence of God from the third meditation is an 
example of the theory of causation.
   
29
                                                 
27 He introduces this model through the image of a black box vending machine.  This machine is a black 
box because we have no way of knowing what is going on inside, all we see are the inputs and the 
corresponding outputs.  In Mavrodes’ black box, when you put a coin in you receive a candy bar from the 
dispenser.  He conjectures that there are a few ways that such a vending machine might work.  One is that 
the machine might hold an internal stock of candy bars.  When the coin is inserted, the mechanism releases 
the candy bar.  Another option is that the machine holds all the ingredients for a candy bar.  In this case the 
candy bar is actually manufactured inside the machine when a coin is placed.  Yet another option is that the 
machine holds neither candy bars nor ingredients.  Instead, the coin prompts a signal to be sent to the 
warehouse which in turn sends the candy bar (or packet of ingredients) to the dispenser.  The final option 
Mavrodes considers is that the machine merely takes a coin and turns it into a candy bar.  In this fourth 
option, none of the other mechanisms are at play from the other options.  This final case for turning the 
coin into a candy bar is useful for Mavrodes in explaining his causation theory of divine revelation since 
the input and the output are very closely related, he suggests more closely related than in the earlier cases.  
The candy bar is actually made, somehow, from the material of the coin.  Mavrodes applied this black box 
to his theory by suggesting that God could have created humans with a psychological state like a vending 
machine.  When certain stimuli are placed into us, the result is the production of certain beliefs.  The input 
from God is causally related to the output in the mind.  Ibid., 36-40.    
  Descartes holds the concept of God as infinite, 
 
28 Some philosophers of religion may object to this theory of Mavrodes by saying that God would never 
directly act on the human mind in this way because it, in some way, nullifies the free will or dignity of 
man.   
 
29 Mavrodes, Revelation in Religious Belief, 55-63. 
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eternal, immutable, independent, all-knowing, all-powerful, and the being by which all 
things were created.  Descartes then concludes that this concept of God could not have 
been created by his own mind.  Descartes concludes that this concept came from God, or, 
in Mavrodes’ interpretation, it was produced in him by God.  That is to say that God 
directly caused him to have this concept.   
 But Mavrodes’ claim that Descartes’ argument is an example of the causation 
model of divine revelation does not work as well as he suggests.  This is because the idea 
of God was not directly produced in the mind of Descartes by God.  In Descartes’ view, 
this concept of God is innate.  Mavrodes is not ignorant that Descartes held a theory of 
innate ideas.  He claims that there are two Cartesian theses in this argument which are 
logically independent.  The first is the claim that Descartes held such a concept of God.  
The second is that the concept of God is innate.  Mavrodes suggests that Descartes’ 
argument rests on the former and not the latter.  He states that Descartes is only pointing 
out God has caused this concept, but it does not matter how God has caused it.  “The 
argument requires that God be the cause of Descartes’ having the concept, but it is 
completely neutral about how God causes that effect.”30
 I take it that Mavrodes is pointing out that in his model God could be acting 
directly, but it is not necessary that the action be direct.  When introducing his model, he 
says this concerning the directness of God’s action:   
   
It would seem plausible to suppose that an agent of this sort would probably be able 
to produce psychological effects in human beings.  In fact, it might well seem 
plausible to think that God could produce some such effects directly.31
 
 
                                                 
30 Ibid., 62. 
 
31 Ibid., 37. 
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So, while the most natural way to consider God’s action in the case of the sleepy agnostic 
is a direct, divine action, Mavrodes wants to leave open the possibility of some other, 
indirect action whereby God causes the idea of theism.     
 Even so, Mavrodes’ use of Descartes’ argument as an example of his causation 
model is still not a good choice.  Contrary to Mavrodes’ claim, Descartes’ belief in innate 
ideas diminishes the use of this argument as an example of the causation model of divine 
revelation.  In Mavrodes’ own example God caused an agnostic to wake up with the 
belief of theism.  If this were explained as an innate idea that somehow the agnostic 
realized, the example is not a clear example of God’s causal activity.  Mavrodes’ 
argument would benefit from a historical example that does a better job of explaining 
what is going in on the sleepy agnostic.  This would be a theory that explains God’s 
action in a more direct way than innate ideas.32
 The doctrine of divine revelation is relevant for epistemology and knowledge.  
Since divine revelation occurs when God dispels ignorance in humans by unveiling the 
veiled, it is obvious that a theory of divine revelation will have epistemological 
consequences.  Any philosopher who accepts a theory of divine revelation must also 
accept that some knowledge comes from that revelation since God is active in producing 
at least some human knowledge.
  As I explain in the next two sections, 
either Malebranche or Berkeley would have served as a better example for this theory 
than Descartes.  Both Malebranche and Berkeley hold causal theories of divine revelation 
according to ideas.            
33
                                                 
32 But this action need not be direct to do a better job of explaining this than Descartes.    
  I argue in the next two sections that Malebranche and 
 
33 Of course, this is only true if you accept my account of divine revelation.  Some may argue that 
revelation does not involve dispelling ignorance.  I am also assuming, naturally I think, that ignorance is 
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Berkeley hold a similar position; most human knowledge is the product of divine 
revelation.   
 Once it has been determined how much knowledge comes from divine revelation 
in the account of any given philosopher, a further distinction comes into play.  This is the 
distinction between general and special revelation.  What kind of revelation is responsible 
for producing knowledge?  The knowledge that is produced by God could be produced by 
special revelation, general revelation, or a mixture of both.  Malebranche and Berkeley 
agree that the emphasis is on general revelation in producing human knowledge.     
 I have now defined ‘revelation’ and ‘divine revelation’.  I have introduced the 
historical distinction between general and special revelation.  I have summarized 
Mavrodes’ causal theory of revelation.  And I have introduced my claim that 
Malebranche and Berkeley agree that most human knowledge comes from general 
revelation.  Now, the remainder of this chapter is dedicated to applying what has been 
said here concerning divine revelation to the theories of epistemology found in 
Malebranche and Berkeley.      
 
2.2 
 In section 1.2, I introduced Malebranche’s primary theory of knowledge; the 
vision in God.  This is a unique, theologically motivated epistemological doctrine where 
humans see ideas in God.34
                                                                                                                                                 
dispelled by knowledge.  But, someone may suggest otherwise and also reject the implication that I point 
out here.    
  My principle claim in this section is that Malebranche’s 
vision in God is his theory of revelation.  More specifically, it is his theory of general 
 
34 Nadler refers to this doctrine as a “theocentric theory of knowledge”.  Steven Nadler, The Cambridge 




revelation.  For the purposes of my argument, I do not need to give a comprehensive 
account of Malebranche’s theory of divine revelation.  I need only point out those 
features of Malebranche’s theory that are similar to Berkeley.   
 While many commentators overlook the relationship between divine revelation 
and the vision in God, this is not always the case.  A handful of interpreters have 
classified Malebranche’s epistemological project as involving divine revelation.  Andrew 
Pyle, for example, writes that for Malebranche, “all our knowledge is some form or other 
of revelation.”35  Other commentators also notice how his theory of epistemology is 
related to divine revelation in some form or another.36
  Malebranche accepts the doctrine of divine revelation.  While presenting the 
vision in God in The Search after Truth, Malebranche explicitly says that God reveals to 
human minds.    
  Still, even those who notice 
Malebranche’s theory of revelation merely mention it without any attempt to explain how 
his theory of epistemology can best be understood as a divine revelation.  Malebranche 
holds a theory of divine revelation and his epistemology is structured so that it can be 
held consistently alongside it.   
                                                 
35Andrew Pyle, Malebranche (London ; New York: Routledge, 2002).  Pyle also states “For Malebranche, 
as for Augustine, all knowledge is revelation.” on page 9.  Also, “In the final analysis, all knowledge is 
revelation, and attention to a problem (e.g. in mathematics) is just a form of prayer.  Illumination always 
comes from without.” On page 56.   
 
36 These commentators recognize that Malebranche calls this divine action “revelation”, but they do not 
attempt to explain what that means.  Steven Nadler, Malebranche and Ideas (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1992).  McCracken, Malebranche and British Philosophy.  Nicholas Jolley, “Intellect and 
Illumination in Malebranche,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 32 (1994).  Nicholas Jolley, The Light 
of the Soul: Theories of Ideas in Leibniz, Malebranche, and Descartes (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 
1990).  Susan Peppers-Bates, “Does Malebranche Need Efficacious Ideas? The Cognitive Faculties, the 
Ontological Status of Ideas, and Human Attention,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 43 (2005).  Andrè 
Robinet, Système Et Existence Dans L'oeuvre De Malebranche (Paris, FR: J. Vrin, 1965).  Tad M. 
Schmaltz, Malebranche's Theory of the Soul: A Cartesian Interpretation (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1996).  Tad M. Schmaltz, “Malebranche on Ideas and the Vision in God,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Malebranche, ed. Steven Nadler (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 
2000).  And Ferdinand Alquié, Le Cartésianisme De Malebranche (Paris, FR: J. Vrin, 1974). 
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Thus, the mind can see God’s works in Him, provided that God wills to reveal to it 
what in Him represents them.  (LO 230) 
 
Malebranche uses the term ‘revelation’ or ‘reveal’ widely in both the Search and the 
Dialogues.37
Thus, since God can reveal everything to minds simply by willing that they see what 
is in their midst, i.e., what in Him is related to and represents these things, there is no 
likelihood that He does otherwise, or that He does so by producing as many infinities 
of infinite numbers of ideas as there are created minds.  (LO 231) 
  A revelation for Malebranche occurs when God acts and causes a 
psychological change in human minds.  Revelation is a causal relationship between God 
and my mind.  When God reveals, he causes me to experience psychologically what he 
has caused.  
 
God reveals directly to the human mind through a psychological causal relationship.  
Divine revelation on Malebranche’s account is God making the unknown known through 
this causal action.     
 Malebranche also uses other terms to pick out the same causal activity by God.  
Malebranche uses terms like ‘enlighten’ and ‘illumination’ to express the same idea that 
God causally affects human psychological states.     
We do not consider that bodies can act on the mind only as occasional causes, that the 
mind cannot immediately or by itself possess anything corporeal and cannot unite 
itself to an object except through its knowledge and love, that only God is above it 
and can reward or punish it through sensations of pleasure or pain, can enlighten or 
move it—in a word, only He can act on it.38
 
  (LO 365) 
Nor should the understanding be taken to obey the will by producing in itself the 
ideas of things the soul desires—for the understanding does not act.  All it does is 
receive illumination or the ideas of things through the necessary union it has with 
                                                 
37 He does use these two terms more frequently on the Dialogues than in the Search, which mostly likely 
can be explained by the fact that in the Dialogues Malebranche is deliberately applying his philosophy to 
issues in metaphysics and religion.  Hence, the full name is Dialogues on Metaphysics and Religion.  Even 
though he uses the terms more in the Dialogues, I think that his theory of revelation is pervasive in both 
works.     
 
38 Also, “Surely, only God, only His always efficacious substance, can affect, enlighten and nourish our 
minds, as St. Augustine says.”  (LO 626) 
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Him who contains all beings in intelligible fashion, as has been explained in the third 
book.  (LO 559) 
 
These passages show that when Malebranche speaks of revelation he is talking about the 
causal action of God whereby God causes mental or psychological states in the minds of 
humans.  He refers to this divine action in at least three ways: reveal, enlighten, and 
illuminate.39  This is not to say that Malebranche means precisely the same thing by using 
all three terms, but only that the same causal work of God is in view.  The three terms are 
basically saying the same thing concerning God’s action.40
 In section 2.1, I introduced Mavrodes’ causation theory of divine revelation.  This 
is the theory whereby God directly causes psychological states in human minds.  I 
criticized Mavrodes’ use of Descartes’ argument for the existence of God as a paradigm 
example of this theory.  Mavrodes could have used Malebranche as the representative 
example of his theory instead of Descartes.  Mavrodes does not mention Malebranche as 
holding a version of the causation theory of divine revelation, but Malebranche’s theory 
of revelation fits the theory presented by Mavrodes seamlessly.  Malebranche held that 
  In each of these cases 
Malebranche is getting at the same idea: God causally affects mental states in humans.  
Therefore, I treat these three terms as basically synonymous in Malebranche’s theory of 
revelation: reveal, enlighten, and illuminate.    
                                                 
39 In a passage concerning divine ideas, Malebranche also equates God’s causal action with enlightenment:  
“We would see that the soul is essentially a substance that thinks or perceives everything that affects it, 
that it is an intelligence that nonetheless is actually made intelligent only through the efficacy of divine 
ideas, which alone can act on it, affect it, modify it, enlighten it, as I have explained elsewhere.”  (LO 
560) 
 
40 I say it is the same basic action because it is possible that Malebranche is using each of these three terms 
to point out different aspects of God’s action.  For example, it is possible that when he uses the term 
“enlighten” Malebranche is focusing on the result of God’s action it the human mind.  While when he uses 
“reveal” he is focusing on the action of God itself.  But my main point here is that all three of them are 
referring to the same general thing: the action of God in causing or producing mental states.  Any other 
nuances between the three terms would not take away from my general claim.    
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God reveals things to humans by causing psychological effects in them.  Malebranche’s 
theory of revelation can account for Mavrodes’s sleepy agnostic example.  The agnostic 
at one point has no discernable belief in God, but God reveals or illuminates him and 
produces an idea of God in his mind.  Malebranche is a much better example of 
Mavrodes’ causation model of divine revelation than Descartes.  Malebranche’s theory of 
divine revelation is a historical example of the causation model.        
 It is worthwhile to stop and consider an objection at this point.  If Malebranche’s 
theory of divine revelation is God directly causing psychological states, nothing 
substantively differentiates it from Malebranche’s occasionalism.  Or, another way to 
state this same objection is that when Malebranche uses the term “reveal”, he is merely 
dressing up his occasionalism in religious verbiage. 
 It is true that Malebranche’s theory of divine revelation is closely connected with 
his theory of occasionalism, but this is to be expected.  Malebranche’s epistemological 
doctrine of the vision in God, which I argue later is an important feature of 
Malebranche’s theory of divine revelation, is closely related to his occasionalism.  Jolley 
points out that the Malebranche’s vision in God and occasionalism share the same theme 
of extreme dependence on God.     
 Vision in God is of course a thesis about the mind’s union with God; occasionalism, 
at least in its specific form, is a thesis about the mind’s relationship with the body.   
More strikingly perhaps, it is characteristic of both doctrines that they place man in a  
condition of extreme dependence on God; indeed, they might be seen as respectively 
ontological and epistemological versions of this theme.41
                                                 
41 Jolley, The Light of the Soul: Theories of Ideas in Leibniz, Malebranche, and Descartes, 99.  McCracken 
also sees this connection.  “Again, every created thing depends wholly and directly upon its Creator.  The 
doctrine of the vision of all things in God is only an acknowledgement of this dependence in one particular 
domain—that of human knowledge.”  McCracken, Malebranche and British Philosophy, 66.  Pyle also 
points out the same epistemological implications of Malebranche’s occasionalism.  “Just as occasionalism 
emphasizes the causal dependence of all creatures on the divine will, the Vision in God emphasizes our 
absolute cogitative dependence on the divine intellect.  Just as I have no real causal powers of my own, but 




Since I argue that Malebranche’s vision in God is an integral part of his theory of divine 
revelation, it is not surprising that it also has much in common with his occasionalism.  I 
agree that we should not be surprised to find that Malebranche’s occasionalism leads him 
to think that God is able to cause psychological effects.  This connection has not been 
clearly explained in terms of divine revelation.    
 But Malebranche’s theory of divine revelation is more than his theory of 
occasionalism dressed up in religious verbiage.  The most obvious difference is that 
divine revelation concerns knowledge.  Divine revelation occurs when God acts upon the 
human mind and makes the unknown known.  This seems to create a problem for 
Malebranche concerning false beliefs.  According to Malebranche’s occasionalism, only 
God can act upon the mind.42
                                                                                                                                                 
can only invoke His aid to move my own body, so I have no real cognitive powers of my own, but must 
invoke His aid in order to understand anything at all.”  Pyle, Malebranche, 56.   
  This implies that God acts upon the mind in the same way 
regardless of whether he is causing knowledge or a false belief.  Given only 
Malebranche’s occasionalism, God produces my knowledge as well as my false beliefs.  
 For example, suppose that I currently hold the true belief that it is hot outside and 
I also currently hold the false belief that my car’s air conditioner will sufficiently cool me 
down when I get to my car.  However, I am not aware that one of my sworn enemies has 
broken into my car and destroyed my air conditioner.  Both of these beliefs are held for 
 For treatments of Malebranche’s occasionalism that fail to mention that it is also related to 
Malebranche’s epistemology see.  Lisa Downing, “Occasionalism and Strict Mechanism: Malebranche, 
Berkeley, Fontenelle,” in Early Modern Philosophy: Mind, Matter, and Metaphysics, ed. Christia Mercer 
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005).  Nicholas Jolley, “Berkeley and Malebranche on 
Causality and Volition,” in Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. J. A. Cover and Mark Kulstad 
(Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1990).  McCracken, Malebranche and British Philosophy.  
Steven Nadler, “Malebranche on Causation,” in The Cambridge Companion to Malebranche, ed. Steven 
Nadler (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2000).  Andrew Pessin, “Does Continuous Creation 
Entail Occasionalism?  Malebranche (and Descartes),” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (2000). 
 
42 “Surely, only God, only His always efficacious substance, can affect, enlighten and nourish our minds, as 
St. Augustine says.”  (LO 626) 
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various reasons, but, according to Malebranche’s occasionalism, God is the cause of both.  
So, in this example, God has caused me to hold one true belief and one false one.  
Suppose further that the true belief meets the requirements for knowledge, whatever 
those may be.  If this is the case, God is the cause of our knowledge as well as our errors.  
This is a problem for Malebranche because he holds that God is not a deceiver and cannot 
be the cause of errors.43
 Malebranche’s theory of divine revelation helps resolve this puzzle.  As I show 
below, Malebranche says that God reveals in two ways: through special revelation and 
through general revelation.  To equate Malebranche’s theory of divine revelation with his 
occasionalism is to ignore this distinction.  It makes all revelation special revelation.  
Malebranche thinks that his theory of revelation or enlightenment resolves this puzzle. 
        
Thus, there is a God and a true God who never deceives us, although He does not 
always enlighten us; and we are often mistaken when we do not have His 
enlightenment.  (LO 482) 
 
We will see below how Malebranche thinks we can be mistaken. 44
 As I have already mentioned, not only does Malebranche accept divine revelation, 
he also accepts the traditional distinction from Christian theology between general and 
   
 
  
                                                 
43 “Thus, there is a God and a true God who never deceives us”  (LO 482) 
 
44 There are still difficulties and lingering questions concerning Malebranche’s theory of revelation.  Other 
than further investigations concerning how exactly Malebranche’s occasionalism is related to his divine 
revelation, there is also a question concerning the role of natural judgments on Malebranche’s theory of 
divine revelation.  For good treatments of natural judgments, but no mention of their relationship to divine 
revelation, see:  Pyle, Malebranche  239-42.  and McCracken, Malebranche and British Philosophy  31-34.  
There is also a question concerning the role of God in producing knowledge and the role of humans in 
Malebranche’s account of divine revelation.  
“Illumination enlightens our mind and makes us aware of the good without actually or efficaciously 
leading us to love it.  … Illumination does not lead by itself; it merely permits us to lead ourselves, 
freely and by ourselves, to the good it presents to us when we already love it; illumination leaves us 




“And as the existence of created things does not depend on our wills but upon that of 
the Creator, it is again clear that we cannot be assured of their existence except by 
some kind of revelation, either natural or supernatural.”  (LO 319)  
   
 
“Hence, natural revelation, which is consequent upon the general laws of the union of 
the soul and body, is now subject to error.  I shall tell you the reasons for this.  
However, particular revelation can never lead directly to error, because God cannot 
will to deceive us.”  (DM 10)   
 
In these passages Malebranche makes a distinction between natural and supernatural or 
particular revelation.  As I pointed out in 2.1, these are other ways of referring to the 
traditional distinction between special and general revelation.  Supernatural and particular 
revelation are akin to special revelation and natural revelation is akin to general 
revelation.  In Dialogue 6 of the Dialogues on Metaphysics and Religion, Malebranche 
explains this distinction between general and special revelation in his own terms. 
In general there are two kinds of revelations.  Some are natural, others supernatural.  I 
mean that some occur as a consequence of certain general laws which are known to 
us, according to which the author of nature acts in our mind on the occasion of what 
happens to our body.  Others occur through general laws which are unknown to us, or 
through particular volitions added to the general laws to remedy the disagreeable 
effects they have because of the sin which has disordered everything.46
 
  (DM 96) 
From these passages we find that Malebranche holds the following concerning special or 
supernatural revelation:  special revelation is God’s revelation through unknown general 
                                                 
45 It is seldom mentioned in the secondary literature that Malebranche accepts the distinction between 
special and general revelation.  The one exception to this is McCrackin who points out in passing that 
Malebranche uses a theory of general or natural revelation, but this claim occurs on one page, with out any 
further discussion.  Also, McCracken does not mention Malebranche’s acceptance of special revelation.    
“For both Malebranche and Berkeley, visual sensa are signs by which God directly communicates to 
us something we need to know.  As such, vision is for them a ‘divine language’ or, as Malebranche 
liked to call it, a ‘natural revelation’ by which God speaks to man.”  McCracken, Malebranche and 
British Philosophy, 224. 
 
46 Malebranche holds this same distinction in other passages as well. 
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laws.  It is infallible since God never leads directly to error.47  And it concerns matters of 
faith such as the divinity of the Scriptures and the Gospel.48
 In a passage from the sixth elucidation, Malebranche says that we know bodies 
through special revelation.
  
49  He says that we cannot know the material world in any 
other way since it is “neither perceptible nor intelligible by itself.”50
“Nonetheless, I believe the blessed are certain that there is a world; but this is because 
God assures them of it by revealing His will to them in a way that is unknown to us.  
We here below are certain of the existence of the world because faith teaches us that 
God has created it…  Now in the appearance of Sacred Scripture and from the 
appearance of miracles we learn that God has created a heaven and an earth, that the 
Word was made flesh, and other such truths that assume the existence of a created 
world.  Hence it is certain through faith that there are bodies, and that through it all 
these appearances become realities.”
   
51
 
  (LO 575) 
The kind of revelation Malebranche is talking about here is special revelation since he is 
talking about the Christian Scriptures and miracles.  So, we know two things from this 
passage.  The first is that Malebranche considers the Christian Scriptures as a divine 
authority.  Second, we can know of the existence of bodies through the Scriptures and 
miracles, two forms of special revelation.52
                                                 
47 “However, particular revelation can never lead directly to error, because God cannot will to deceive us.”  
(DM 10) 
  He advocates the view that the Scriptures are 
true, which shows that he accepted special revelation.  We also know that special 
 
48 “Still, I grant that all those who read Scripture know by a particular revelation that the Gospel is a divine 
book which has not been corrupted through the malice and negligence of copyists;” (DM 256)   
 
49 For a paper that connects this passage to divine revelation see: Fred Ablondi, “Malebranche, Solipsism, 
and Divine Revelation,” Sophia 33, no. 1 (1994). 
 
50 “Now it must be noted that since only God knows His volitions (which produce all beings) by Himself, 
we can know only from Him whether there really is a material world external to us like the one we 
perceive, because the material world is neither perceptible nor intelligible by itself.”  (LO 573) 
 
51 There is a very similar passage in the Dialogues on pages 99-100.   
 
52 For an article that explains why Malebranche rejected Descartes’ argument for the existence of bodies, 
and thereby making it necessary that Malebranche turn to revelation, see Monte Cook, “Malebranche's 




revelation produces or is responsible for some knowledge—knowledge concerning the 
existence of the material world.   
 Malebranche also shows that he accepts the Christian Scriptures as special 
revelation through his habit of quoting Biblical passages as an authority.53  For example, 
Malebranche quotes many Biblical passages supporting the vision in God when he 
introduces this doctrine in the Search.54
 Malebranche’s acceptance of special revelation is not unusual.  Many 
philosophers of the early modern period held that God could reveal matters of faith to 
humans through supernatural means.  As I pointed out in section 2.1, Locke accepted 
special revelation and made use of it in his account of faith.
  We can see that Malebranche accepts special 
revelation by both his claim that we gain knowledge of the existence of bodies from the 
Scripture as well as his habit of citing the Bible to support of his conclusions.  
55
                                                 
53 The second sentence of the Search assumes the truthfulness of what is found in the Bible.  
  Malebranche’s application 
of special revelation— we know the existence of the physical world through special 
revelation—is unusual.   
“Sacred Scripture teaches us that men are miserable only because they are sinners and criminals, and 
that they would be neither if they had not enslaved themselves to sin by consenting to error.”  (LO 1) 
   
54 It is common for Malebranche to cite Biblical passages.  For example, he cites these passages when he is 
introducing the vision in God theory in the Search.  He cites them from the Latin Vulgate, which I have 
given the King James translation since it is closest to the Vulgate:   
“Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to think anything as of ourselves; but our sufficiency is of 
God.”  2 Corinthians 3:5  
“That was the true Light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world.”  John 1:9  
 
55 Here is the passage quoted above where Locke accepts special revelation:   
“Faith, on the other side, is the Assent to any Proposition, not thus made out by the Deductions of 
Reason; but upon the Credit of the Proposer, as coming from GOD, in some extraordinary way of 
Communication.  This way of discovering Truths to Men we call Revelation.” 
Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book 4, Chapter 18, Section 2.     
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 But according to Malebranche, we need more than special revelation.  God must 
use natural revelation as well since he teaches us different things through different kinds 
of revelations.   
Be advised, then, once and for all, that only Reason should stand in judgment on all 
human opinions not related to faith (in which God alone instructs us in an entirely 
different way from that in which he reveals natural things to us).  (LO xlii)   
 
God reveals matters of faith to us through special revelation and he reveals natural things 
to us through natural revelation.  While his use of special revelation is somewhat 
common among philosophers during his day, his use of general revelation is much more 
uncommon.   
 Malebranche uses the doctrine of natural revelation to get out of the problem of 
God causing false ideas.  According to Malebranche, general revelation is also from 
natural laws, but, unlike special revelation, these laws are known to us.56  While special 
revelation is infallible, general revelation is often confused and misleading.57
But the cause of our error does not come precisely from the falsity of our natural 
revelations, but from the imprudence and temerity of our judgments, from our 
ignorance of the path God must take, from the disorder which, in short, sin has caused 
in our faculties, and from the confusion it has introduced into our ideas, not by 
changing the laws of the union of the soul and body, but by elevating our body and 
through its rebellion depriving us of the power to put these laws to the use for which 
they were established.  (DM 99) 
  This 
confusion is not due to any inadequacy concerning God’s revelation, but it is instead due 
to the effects of sin on our ability to make proper judgments concerning this revelation.     
 
                                                 
56 “I mean that some occur as a consequence of certain general laws which are known to us, according to 
which the author of nature acts in our mind on the occasion of what happens to our body.”  (DM 96)   
 
57 “As God exactly follows and must exactly follow the laws He has established of the union of the two 
substances of which we are composed, and because we have lost the power to prevent the traces which the 
rebellious animal spirits effect in the brain, we take phantoms for realities.”  (DM 99)   
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Our cogitative faculties have been damaged by sin and therefore we make confused 
judgments concerning these natural revelations.  As I point out below, one of the results 
of sin on our cognitive faculties is that we do not realize that our sensations are revealed 
by God.    
 Malebranche clearly states that he accepts general revelation, but he does not 
explicitly say what that theory is.  It is my position that Malebranche’s vision in God is 
his doctrine of general revelation applied.  We see through the vision in God that the 
doctrine of divine revelation is philosophically relevant for Malebranche.  Malebranche’s 
doctrine of the vision in God is consistent with his claim that God reveals to humans.   
 Malebranche introduces the vision in God in the Search as the way that the “soul 
might see external objects”.58  In short, the vision in God is the claim that humans see all 
ideas in God.59  Malebranche argues for the vision in God through an eliminative 
argument. 60
                                                 
58 LO 230.  
  He rejects that ideas are produced by bodies themselves as well as the 
 
59 Malebranche’s vision in God can be understood to pick out two separate roles that ideas play in the 
epistemology of Malebranche.  Nadler and Jolly both explain the vision in God in this way.  “The vision in 
God serves in two related capacities in Malebranche’s system, basically corresponding to the two roles 
ideas are required to play.  On the one hand, it constitutes a theory of knowledge; on the other hand, it is the 
foundation of his account of our perceptual acquaintance with the world.”  Nadler, Malebranche and Ideas, 
152.  Jolley introduces this distinction in the forms of two separate chapters, chapters 4 and 5.  He says, 
“Malebranche’s theory of knowledge calls to mind not merely a distinctive theory of ideas, but the famous 
doctrine that we see all things in God.  Since Malebranche locates all ideas in God, there is a sense in which 
all mental activity involving ideas might be described as ‘vision in God’.  But the term ‘vision in God’ may 
also be taken in a narrower sense to denote Malebranche’s theory of visual perception; thus for 
Malebranche, it is in God that we perceive the primary quality features of physical objects such as tables 
and chairs.” Jolley, The Light of the Soul: Theories of Ideas in Leibniz, Malebranche, and Descartes, 55-
56.  See also Jolley, “Berkeley and Malebranche on Causality and Volition.” 
 
60 Malebranche rejects these possibilities concerning the ways that external objects are seen.   
“… either (a) the ideas we have of bodies and of all other objects we do not perceive by themselves 
come from these bodies or objects; or (b) our soul has the power of producing these ideas; or (c) God 
has produced them in us while creating the soul or produces them every time we think about a given 
object; or (d) the soul has in itself all the perfections it sees in bodies”  (LO 219)    
The final option, Malebranche thinks (although he does not give any arguments concerning why this list is 
exhaustive), is that ideas are in God. 
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possibility that God causes ideas in our minds, including innate ideas.  But Malebranche 
also gives positive arguments in support of this theory as well.61
 This brings up the important distinction in Malebranche between sensations and 
ideas.  While ideas are in God, sensations are not.  Sensations are in us,
  According to the vision 
in God, ideas are not in the minds of humans.  Ideas only exist in God.  When we 
perceive an object, we know it only through its idea in God.   
62 they are 
modifications of our souls.63
 There are some things we know only by ideas, for example the truths of geometry.  
There are other things that we know only by sensation.  A bodily pain is an example of 
something known through sensation.  But we know a great many things through a 
combination of ideas and sensations.  In every case where we perceive an object both 
ideas and sensations are playing a role. 
  This distinction plays an important role for Malebranche’s 
theory of perception which involves pure perception of ideas and sense perception of 
objects.     
When we perceive something sensible, two things are found in our perception: 
sensation and pure idea.  (LO 234) 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
“… or else (e) the soul is joined to a completely perfect being that contains all intelligible perfections, 
or all ideas of created beings.”  (LO 219)   
Malebranche rejects the first four options in LO 220-228 and he argues for the fifth at LO 229-235.    
 
61 Nadler calls these Malebranche’s positive arguments for vision in God.  They are: simplicity, creaturely 
dependence, efficacy, perception, and truth.  Nadler, Malebranche and Ideas, 140-45.  
     
62 “Thus sensations, qua sensations, do not involve vision in God: they are governed exclusively by the 
laws of the union of mind and body.”  Jolley, The Light of the Soul: Theories of Ideas in Leibniz, 
Malebranche, and Descartes, 109.  
 
63 “The sensation is a modification of our soul” (LO, 234)  
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While many things can be said concerning Malebranche’s sensations and ideas,64
 First, Malebranche is clear that ideas are in God and that we perceive or know 
these ideas through divine revelation.  God reveals through ideas.       
 my 
object is to show that both are matters of divine revelation.   
As for the idea found in conjunction with the sensation, it is in God, and we see it 
because it pleases God to reveal it to us.  (LO 234) 
 
You know that all intellects, which are united to that sovereign Reason, discover 
some of these ideas in it, inasmuch as God wishes to reveal these ideas to them.   
(DM 32) 
 
The things that we know by ideas, we know through divine revelation.  When introducing 
the vision in God, Malebranche says that ideas are in God and that humans can see these 
things in God if they are revealed.   
Given these two things, the mind surely can see what in God represents created 
beings, since what in God represents created beings is very spiritual, intelligible, and 
present to the mind.  Thus, the mind can see God’s works in Him, provided that God 
wills to reveal to it what in Him represents them.  (LO 230)     
 
The ideas of every created thing are in God and the only way that humans can have 
access to those ideas is through divine revelation.   
 Those familiar with Malebranche are likely to expect that he says that ideas are 
revealed to us, but it is surprising that he also says that sensations are known by divine 
revelation.  A sensation is a psychological state or what Malebranche calls a modification 
of the soul.  Sensations are caused by God.   
The sensation is a modification of our soul, and it is God who causes it in us  
(LO 234) 
                                                 
64 Jolley has an excellent discussion of Malebranche’s ideas and sensations.  He points out that the ideas 
that we see in God include only the primary qualities since these are the only qualities that bodies actually 
possess.  The secondary qualities are not in God and are therefore found in our souls.  Jolley, The Light of 
the Soul: Theories of Ideas in Leibniz, Malebranche, and Descartes, 81-98.  He also argues in a different 
work that the distinction between sensation and idea became less important for Malebranche in time as his 
theory of the efficacious ideas became to take over what Jolley calls his older theory.  Nicholas Jolley, 




This might be enough to claim that Malebranche holds that God reveals sensations since 
we know that Malebranche holds a causation theory of divine revelation.  But, 
Malebranche makes it clear that sensations are known by divine revelation in the 4th 
Dialogue.  The relevant passage starts when Theodore claims that we know of bodies by 
the revelation we have of them.   
Theodore:  There are only three kinds of beings about which we have any knowledge 
and to which we can have any connection:  God, of the infinite perfect being who is 
the principle or cause of all things; minds, which we know only through the inner 
feeling we have of our nature; and bodies, of the existence of which we are assured 
by the revelation we have of them.  (DM 93) 
  
Aristes asks for clarification of this claim.  It appears that we have knowledge of bodies 
through experience — that is seeing or touching bodies — rather than through divine 
revelation.   
Aristes:  But what do you mean, that we are assured of the existence of bodies “by the 
revelation we have of them”?  What!  Do we not see them, do we not sense them?  
We do not need “revelation” to teach us that we have a body when we are pricked; we 
sense it quite clearly.  (DM 94) 
 
Malebranche responds with the following explanation.   
Theodore:  Yes, undoubtedly, we do sense it.  But this sensation of pain we have is a 
kind of ‘revelation’.  This expression strikes you.  But it is just for this reason that I 
use it.  For you always forget that it is God Himself who produces in our soul all 
those various sensations by which it is affected on the occasion of the changes that 
happen to our body…  It is therefore God Himself, who through the sensations with 
which He affects us reveals to us what is happening outside us – I mean in our body 
and in those bodies surrounding us.65
 
  (DM  94)   
                                                 
65 Here is the rest of the passage:   
“For you always forget that it is God Himself who produces in our soul all those various sensations by 
which it is affected on the occasion of the changes that happen to our body, as a result of the general 
laws of the union of the two substances composing humans; laws which are simply the efficacious and 
continual volitions of the creator, as I shall explain to you in the following.  The point which pricks our 
hand does not cause pain despite itself.  Assuredly it is a superior power.  It is therefore God Himself, 
who through the sensations with which He affects us reveals to us what is happening outside us – I 
mean in our body and in those bodies surrounding us.  (DM 94)    
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 Malebranche is clear; God reveals through sensations.  While it seems strange to 
say that a sensation of pain is a revelation from God, this is Malebranche’s position.  
When I sense a pain in my back from a loose screw in my office chair, I do not normally 
attribute that pain to divine revelation.  But Malebranche says that I am wrong not to do 
this.  Malebranche calls this sensation of pain in my back a “revelation” since God is the 
one producing the sensation.  Through this sensation, God is revealing to me that there is 
something hurting my back.  His reasoning here supports my interpretation that his theory 
is a causation theory of divine revelation.  God caused the sensation to my back.  
Through that sensation he revealed to me the knowledge of what was happening to my 
body.        
 So, Malebranche holds that God causes all our ideas as well as all our sensations.  
Through this causal activity, Malebranche holds that God reveals through ideas as well as 
through sensations.   
 “But although I say that we see material and sensible things in God, it must be 
carefully noted that I am not saying we have sensations of them in God, but only that 
it is God who acts in us:… When we perceive something sensible, two things are 
found in our perception: sensation and pure idea.  The sensation is a modification of 
our soul, and it is God who causes it in us… As for the idea found in conjunction with 
the sensation, it is in God, and we see it because it pleases God to reveal it to us.”  
(LO 234)   
 
Revelation through ideas and revelation through sensations show that perception is divine 
revelation for Malebranche.  Pure perception is revelation since the ideas involved in 
geometry are in God and must be revealed for us to know them.  Sense perception is also 
revelation.  When we see an object, both the idea and the corresponding sensation is 
caused, and thereby, revealed by God.  This is why Malebranche can speak of this theory 
as a whole and call it divine revelation.     
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Thus, the mind can see God’s works in Him, provided that God wills to reveal to it 
what in Him represents them.  (LO 230) 
 
Malebranche’s vision in God is a theory of divine revelation.     
 But I have not yet shown what kind of revelation Malebranche’s vision in God is.  
We know that this theory must be general revelation, rather than special revelation, by an 
eliminative argument.  The revelation that Malebranche is talking about here cannot be 
special revelation.  According to Malebranche, special revelation is infallible, which my 
knowledge of objects is not.  Malebranche’s vision in God as a theory of perception is not 
fallible; we are often mistaken about what we sense.  Also, special revelation concerns 
matters of faith such as the Scriptures.  God does not reveal spiritual things through the 
vision in God, but natural things such as the objects in the world.66
 There are also positive arguments for the claim that Malebranche’s vision in God 
is general revelation.  Recall that when introducing his account of general revelation, 
Malebranche made two claims about natural revelation.  The first is that it is fallible, 
confused, and misleading due to the effects of sin on the human cognitive faculties and 
the second is that general revelation is according to known natural laws.  He makes both 
of these claims explicit when talking about the vision in God.   
  So, the first reason to 
think that the vision in God is Malebranche’s theory of general revelation is that it cannot 
be special revelation.   
 Malebranche says that original humans who were not yet affected by the fall had 
full cognitive power and were not confused by their sensations.  A human in a pre-fallen 
                                                 
66 Knowledge of natural things must come about by a different way: 
“Be advised, then, once and for all, that only Reason should stand in judgment on all human opinions 
not related to faith (in which God alone instructs us in an entirely different way from that in which he 
reveals natural things to us).”  (LO xlii)   
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state knew many things.67
He concluded, therefore, that the various sensation by which God affected him were 
simply revelations by which God taught him that he had a body and was surrounded 
by many other bodies.  (DM 97)   
  He knew that sensations were revealed by God.  When he had 
a sensation of a particular object, he recognized that the sensation was a revelation.  
 
But this is no longer the case.  Humans now make errors concerning the sensations we 
have when we perceive an object.  One of these is the error of not realizing that the 
sensation is from God.  Our natural capacities are not working properly because of the 
negative effects sin has had on our cognitive powers.68
 Malebranche also connects the vision in God to the natural law.  This shows that 
it is natural revelation since he says that natural revelation is according to known natural 
laws.  For Malebranche, the natural law is nothing but God’s general will.  In an 
  General revelation is confused 
and fallible because we no longer recognize that our sensation is a matter of divine 
revelation.  The vision in God is Malebranche’s account of general revelation.      
                                                 
67 Malebranche says humans knew the following before the fall: 
1.  Only God can act, modify, or affect humans 
2.  God always affected humans in the same way in the same circumstances 
3.  The action of God was and had to be uniform 
4.  Beings were the occasional causes of the general laws by which God acted 
5.  Humans were able to prevent themselves from sensing the action of sensible objects 
6.  The volitions of humans are inferior and subordinate to the human 
7.  On occasion of being affected by a sensation of an object, Humans saw clearly that they were only 
 bodies   
8.  Humans concluded that the sensations that affected them were simply revelations by which God 
 taught them that they have bodies and are surrounded by other bodies  
9.  Humans discovered that they must not judge the nature of the bodies by the sensations they had of 
 them 
Malebranche concludes 9: 
  “But, knowing by Reason that God’s action had to be uniform, and knowing by experience that the 
laws of the union of the soul and body were always the same; seeing indeed that these laws were 
established simply to inform him of what he had to do to preserve his life, he easily discovered that he 
must not judge the nature of bodies by sensations he had of them, nor let himself be persuaded of their 
existence by these same sensations, except when his brains was agitated by an external cause and not 
by a movement of animal spirits excited by an internal cause.”  (DM 97-98)   
 
68 In this sense, Malebranche can be interpreted as foreshadowing Alvin Plantinga’s epistemological theory 




important passage in which he concludes his argument for the vision in God in the 
Search, Malebranche stresses that we know what we know and we sense what we sense 
by the general will of God.   
Thus, our souls depend on God in all ways.  For just as it is He who makes them feel 
pain, pleasure, and all the other sensations, which is but His decree and general will, 
so it is He who makes them know all that they know through the natural union He has 
also established between the will of man and the representation of ideas contained in 
the immensity of the Divine being, which union is also but His general will.  As a 
result of this, only He can enlighten us, by representing everything to us—just as only 
He can make us happy by making us enjoy all sorts of pleasures.  (LO 235) 69
  
 
In this passage, Malebranche shows again that ideas and sensations are revealed by God.  
He sums up his vision in God doctrine by saying that both sensations and ideas are found 
in God’s general will.  This equation of the general will of God, or the natural law, and 
the doctrine of the vision in God is important for realizing that the vision in God is 
Malebranche’s theory of natural revelation.  It is common for theologians to connect 
natural revelation with the natural law and Malebranche is making the same connection 
here.     
 Finally, another reason to think that Malebranche’s vision in God is his theory of 
natural revelation is his use of the passage from Acts 17 in support of this position.  He 
cites this passage as he is summarizing the vision in God in the Search.70
Let us hold this view, then, that God is the intelligible world or the place of minds, as 
the material world is the place of bodies; that from His power minds receive their 
modifications; that in His wisdom they find all their ideas; that through His love they 
 
                                                 
69 He also says the same basic thing in the Dialogues:   
“I mean that some occur as a consequence of certain general laws which are known to us, according to 
which the author of nature acts in our mind on the occasion of what happens to our body.”  (DM 96)   
 
70  Malebranche cites this passage again in the Search: 
 “‘He who made all things,” he says, “is closer to us than the very things He made, for it is Him that we 
live and move and have our being.’” (LO 629)  
It also occurs in the Dialogues.     
“It is in Him that we exist.  It is in Him that we have movement and life, as the apostle says: “In him 
we live, and move, and are.”  (DM 131) 
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receive their orderly impulses, and because of His power and love are but Himself, let 
us believe with Saint Paul, that He is not far from any of us, and that in Him we live 
and move and have our being.”  (LO 235) 
 
This passage concerns natural revelation.  It suggests that God reveals to humans in all 
contexts by being present in all life experiences.  Malebranche’s uses of this passage to 
conclude his argument for the vision in God is further evidence this the vision in God is 
Malebranche’s theory of natural revelation.      
 So, I have now shown that Malebranche accepts both special and general 
revelation.  I have also shown that his theory of divine revelation is philosophically 
relevant for his epistemology.  His entire theory of perception, the vision in God, can be 
explained as fulfilling the role of general revelation for Malebranche. 
 The last thing I want to consider from Malebranche concerns what knowledge we 
receive from revelation.  Malebranche holds that all human knowledge comes from 
divine revelation.  Indeed, there are passages where he explicitly says as much:71
But not only are bodies incapable of being the true causes of whatever exists: the 
most noble minds are in a similar state of impotence.  They can know nothing unless 
God enlightens them.  (LO 449) 
  
 
Thus, our souls depend on God in all ways.  For just as it is He who makes them feel 
pain, pleasure, and all the other sensations… so it is He who makes them know all 
that they know through the natural union He has also established between the will of 
man and the representation of ideas contained in the immensity of the Divine being, 
which union is also but his general will.72
                                                 
71 While I tend to think that Malebranche is speaking loosely in these passages, Pyle takes these passages as 
representing Malebranche’s final position.  He comments that according to Malebranche “all our 
knowledge is some form or another of revelation”.  Pyle, Malebranche, 5. 
  (LO 235) 
 
72 There are other passages where Malebranche says that everything we know we know from divine 
revelation.   
“Human beings are not their own light unto themselves.  Their substance, far from enlightening them, 
is in itself unintelligible to them.  They know nothing except by the light of the universal Reason 
which enlightens all minds, by the intelligible ideas it reveals to them in its wholly luminous 
substance.”  (DM 32) 
Finally, only though the union we have with Him are we capable in this life of knowing what we 




But perhaps Malebranche is speaking loosely in these passages.  A better indicator of 
how much knowledge we derive from divine revelation comes in book three of the 
Search.  Malebranche states that there are four ways of knowing things:  
 [1]  “The first is to know things by themselves 
 [2]  The second is to know them through their ideas, i.e., as I mean it here,  
  through something different from themselves. 
 [3]  The third is to know them through consciousness, or inner sensation 
 [4]  The fourth is to know them through conjecture.”  (LO 236) 
 
I take Malebranche to show that all four are known through divine revelation.  In this 
passage Malebranche clearly shows that [1] is known through divine revelation.  The 
only thing that we know by itself, that is without the need for ideas, is God.  He states 
clearly that we know God by his self-revelation.   
“Only God do we know through Himself, for though there are other spiritual beings 
besides Him, which seem intelligible by their nature, only He can act on our mind and 
reveal Himself to it.”  (LO 236) 
 
The things that we know through their ideas, [2], are also revealed to us, this is the 
doctrine of the vision of God.73  I have just argued that Malebranche holds that when we 
know things by their ideas, we know them through divine revelation.74
 Things are a bit less clear concerning [3] and [4].  Concerning [3], Malebranche 
shows that sensations are produced in our souls by God.  Even those sensations which are 
not accompanying ideas are produced by God.  Not only are sensations caused by God, 
but Malebranche says that they are revelation.  For example, in the passage cited above 
   
                                                 
73 “Undoubtedly, we know bodies with their properties through their ideas, because given that they are not 
intelligible by themselves, we can perceive them only in that being which contains them in an intelligible 
way.  Thus, it is in God and through their ideas that we perceive bodies and their properties…”  (LO 237) 
 
74 [2] is the category that Malebranche typically and consistently refers to as “revelation”. 
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Malebranche says that the pain we sense from a knife is a “kind of revelation” from 
God.75
 This leaves the fourth way of knowing or perceiving things, conjecture, [4].  
Conjecture is the weakest form of knowledge, yet it is knowledge nonetheless. 
   
Finally, through conjecture we know those things that are different both from 
ourselves and from what we know either in itself or through ideas, such as when we 
believe that certain things are like certain others we know.  (LO 236) 
 
I interpret Malebranche as holding that whatever we know by conjecture we know 
through divine revelation.  According to Malebranche, it is by conjecture that we know 
other humans’ souls.76  We do not know them through their ideas or our own 
consciousness.77
But I know this with evidence and certainty because it is God who teaches me—for 
who else but God could reveal to me His designs and volitions?  (LO 239)  
  But, we only can know of other souls through divine revelation. 
 
So, we know the souls of other men, albeit in a confused manner, by divine revelation.   
                                                 
75 Here are two passages that were cited above concerning Malebranche’s use of the term “revelation” in 
cases of sensation:   
“Yes, undoubtedly, we do sense it.  But this sensation of pain we have is a kind of ‘revelation’.  This 
expression strikes you.  But it is just for this reason that I use it.  For you always forget that it is God 
Himself who produces in our soul all those various sensations by which it is affected on the occasion 
of the changes that happen to our body…  It is therefore God Himself, who through the sensations with 
which He affects us reveals to us what is happening outside us – I mean in our body and in those 
bodies surrounding us.”  (DM  94)  
“He concluded, therefore, that the various sensation by which God affected him were simply 
revelations by which God taught him that he had a body and was surrounded by many other bodies.”  
(DM 97)  
While he is consistent in claiming that sensations are caused by God, Malebranche does not always refer 
them as “revelations”.  One possible explanation of this is that God reveals something through the 
sensations that are caused like knowledge of what is being sensed.  This explanation fits with my account 
of divine revelation for Malebranche—God making known the unknown by a causal action on the human 
psychological state.     
 
76 LO 238-240. 
 
77 “At present we do not know them either in themselves or through their ideas, and as they are different 




Malebranche does not suggest if this knowledge is by special or natural revelation.78  Of 
the four ways that Malebranche says that we can know things, all four are from divine 
revelation.  This means that everything we know, we know by divine revelation.79
 Before I move to Berkeley, let me review.  Malebranche accepts divine revelation 
and there are four features of this doctrine and its relationship to his epistemology.  First, 
his theory is a historical example of Mavrodes’ causation theory of divine revelation.  
Second, Malebranche makes use of the traditional distinction between special and general 
revelation.  Third, this doctrine of revelation is philosophically relevant for Malebranche 
since his vision in God is a theory of general revelation.  And lastly, Malebranche holds 
that all human knowledge is the result of divine revelation.   




 Berkeley also accepts the doctrine of divine revelation.  While Berkeley does not 
explicitly use the distinction between special and general revelation, in practice he 
accepts this distinction and applies it to his epistemology.  Berkeley’s doctrine of divine 
revelation is philosophically relevant to his epistemology.  He builds an epistemological 
                                                 
78 McCracken interprets this to mean that we know other souls through special revelation: 
“At the time that he wrote the Search, Malebranche seems to have thought that the certainty we have 
of the existence of other minds, like that we have of the existence of bodies, comes only from God’s 
revelation in Scripture that there are many conscious beings in the world.  Natural knowledge can only 
render it probable that there are other souls in the world; for, through the conjecture that there are other 
souls in the world best explains the behaviour of other bodies that are much like my own, there is no 
necessity that God create such beings if he does not will do.  Hence, without a revelation of his will, I 
cannot be certain that any created person, other than myself, exists.”  McCracken, Malebranche and 
British Philosophy, 81.  
 
79 Pyle and McCracken agrees with me.  “In the final analysis, all knowledge is revelation, and attention to 
a problem (e.g. in mathematics) is just a form of prayer.  Illumination always comes from without.” Pyle, 
Malebranche, 56.  Also “In effect, the vision of all things in God is merely the extension of Occasionalism 
to the domain of human knowledge; no more are there secondary causes of knowledge than of anything 
else in the world:  God is the immediate cause of all our knowledge:  McCracken, Malebranche and British 
Philosophy, 66.   
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doctrine called the language of vision which is his account of general revelation.  
Berkeley holds that the majority of human knowledge is derived from divine revelation.  
 The goal of this section is to introduce Berkeley’s theory of divine revelation.  As 
was the case with Malebranche, I am not aiming at a comprehensive account of 
Berkeley’s theory of divine revelation.  I focus only on those features of Berkeley’s 
theory that are similar to Malebranche.  I do not attempt to answer every question or 
settle every issue that arises from Berkeley’s theory of divine revelation.   
 While Malebranche often says that God reveals things to humans, Berkeley 
seldom says this.80
“I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary and shift the scene as oft as 
I think fit.  It is no more than willing, and straightway this or that idea arises in my 
fancy: and by the same power it is obliterated, and makes way for another.”   
  Berkeley thinks that God causally acts on the human mind, but God 
is not the only being that is casually active.  Humans cause our ideas of memory and 
imagination.  
(PHK 28)     
 
Berkeley holds that God causes ideas.  Our ideas of sense must have a different cause.  
We could not have caused these ideas ourselves.       
But whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find the ideas actually 
perceived by sense have not a like dependence on my will.  When in broad day-light I 
open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to 
determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my view; and so 
likewise as to the hearing and other senses, the ideas imprinted on them are not 
creatures of my will.  There is therefore some other will or spirit that produces them.  
(PHK 29)  
 
Early in the Principles, Berkeley merely suggests that humans must not be the cause of 
these ideas of sense.  He does not explicitly say that God is the one doing this action.  But 
                                                 
80 Berkeley does not use the words “revelation” or “reveal” often in either the Principles or the Dialogues.  
He does use the term “revelation” one time in the Dialogues when speaking about supernatural revelation.     
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later in the work Berkeley leaves no room for misunderstanding.  The spirit that produces 
these ideas is God.81
 It is therefore plain, that nothing can be more evident to any one that is capable of the 
least reflection, than the existence of God, or a spirit who is intimately present to our 
minds, producing in them all that variety of ideas or sensations, which continually 
affect us, on whom we have an absolute and entire dependence.  (PHK 149) 
    
 
God is immediately present to our minds and produces all our ideas of sensation.  God 
acts on human minds in a causal manner and produces these ideas.   
 Berkeley describes this divine activity in different ways.  He also says that God 
imprints and excites ideas.     
The ideas imprinted on the senses by the Author of Nature are called real things:  
(PHK 33) 
 
If we follow the light of reason, we shall, from the constant uniform method of our 
sensations, collect the goodness and wisdom of the spirit who excites them in our 
minds.  (PHK 72) 
 
When Berkeley talks about God imprinting or exciting ideas, he is saying that God 
produces these ideas in human minds.  Berkeley thinks that God acts on the human mind 
in a causal manner, affecting psychological states.  So, even though Berkeley does not 
use the term ‘revelation’ or ‘reveal’ to explain God’s action of producing ideas into the 
human mind, this causal action by God is an aspect of his theory of divine revelation.  All 
knowledge derived from ideas of sense comes from God’s causal action of producing 
those ideas.  So, for Berkeley, part of divine revelation is God making the unknown 
known by his causal activity. 
                                                 
81 He also makes the same point in the Dialogues: 
“Philonous:  … From all which I conclude, there is a Mind which affects me every moment with all the 
sensible impressions I perceive. …  This I do not understand; but I say, the things by me perceived are 
known by the understanding, and produced by the will, of an infinite Spirit…   
Hylas:  I think I understand you very clearly; and own the proof you give of a Deity seems no less 
evident, than it is surprising…God is the supreme and universal cause of all things…”  (DHP 215)   
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 Berkeley is also a good historical example of the theory presented by George 
Mavrodes in Revelation in Religious Belief, the causation model of divine revelation.82  
According to Berkeley, God is the immediate or direct cause of all our ideas of sense. 83
 Berkeley does not use the terms “special” and “general” revelation.  He seems to 
hold something like the view of Locke presented in 2.1.  Locke used the term 
“revelation” only to refer to special or supernatural revelation.  Berkeley, perhaps due to 
influence by Locke, does the same thing.  Berkeley does not use the term often, but when 
he does use this term he is referring to special revelation.    
  
God causally acts on the human mind, impressing ideas upon it.  While Mavrodes does 
not mention Berkeley any more than he does Malebranche, Berkeley too fits this model 
better than Descartes.   
Hylas:  After all, can it be supposed God would deceive all mankind?  Do you 
imagine, he would have induced the whole world to believe the being of matters, if 
there was no such thing?     
Philonous:  That every epidemical opinion arising from prejudice, or passion, or 
thoughtlessness, may be imputed to God, as the Author of it, I believe you will not 
affirm.  Whatsoever opinion we father on him, it must be either because he has 
discovered it to us by supernatural revelation, or because it is so evident to our natural 
faculties, which were framed and given us by God, that it is impossible we should 
withhold our assent from it.  (DHP 243) 
 
Berkeley also uses the term ‘revelation’ in Alciphron to refer to special revelation when 
he refers to the Christian Scriptures as the “Christian revelation”.84
                                                 
82 Mavrodes, Revelation in Religious Belief.   
 
 
83 Here are other passages where God is said to be the immediate cause of these ideas: 
“But it is more unaccountable, that it should be received among Christians professing belief in the 
Holy Scriptures, which constantly ascribe those effects to the immediate hand of God, that heathen 
philosophers are wont to impute to Nature.”  (PHK 150) 
“It is equivalent to a constant creation, betokening an immediate act of power and providence.”   
(Alc. 4.14)   
 
84 After this, Berkeley goes into a full fledged defense of the Christian Scriptures using arguments from 
Church history and textual criticism.   
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 Crito: As this objection supposes there is no proof or reason for believing the 
Christian revelation… (Alc. 6.2) 
 
In the Alciphron Berkeley is speaking of the Christian Scriptures.  This is clear from the 
context, since he continues to defend the Christian scriptures.85
 Berkeley’s acceptance of the Christian scriptures as supernatural revelation is 
supported by his practice of citing from the Bible as an authority.    
   
But it is more unaccountable, that it should be received among Christians professing 
belief in the Holy Scriptures, which constantly ascribe those effects to the immediate 
hand of God, that heathen philosophers are wont to impute to Nature.  The Lord, he 
causeth the vapours to ascend; he maketh lightings with rain; he bringeth forth the 
wind out of his treasures, Jerem Chap. 10. ver 13. He turneth the shadow of death 
into the morning, and maketh the day dark with night, Amos Chap. 5. ver 8.   He 
visiteth the earth, and maketh it soft with showers:  he blesseth the springing thereof, 
and crowneth the year with his goodness; so that the pastures are clothed with flocks, 
and the valleys are covered over with corn.  See Psalm 65.  But notwithstanding that 
this is the constant language of Scripture; yet we have I know not what aversion from 
believing, that God concerns him so nearly in our affairs.  Fain would we suppose 
him at a great distance off, and substitute some blind unthinking deputy in his stead, 
though (if we may believe Saint Paul) he be not far from every one of us.  (PHK 150)            
 
This passage is interesting because in it we see Berkeley cite biblical passages to support 
this immaterialist theory.  Berkeley’s practice of citing biblical passages shows that he 
accepts special revelation even though he does not use the terminology “special 
revelation”.     
   It is clear that Berkeley accepted special revelation.  As was the case with 
Malebranche, Berkeley’s acceptance and use of special revelation is not unusual in his 
time.  Many philosophers from this period also accepted this form of divine revelation.  
But, Berkeley’s acceptance and use of general revelation is unusual. 
                                                 
85 This is the sixth dialogue of Alciphron.  This is one of the works where we see Berkeley doing theology 
proper.  In this dialogue, he defends the authority of the Bible, as well as its reliability showing a deep 
understanding of theological tools such as textual criticism and textual transmission theories.   
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   Berkeley nowhere says that he holds a theory of general revelation.  He does not 
use this terminology.  But even though Berkeley never says that he accepts such a theory, 
we shall see that he does.  Not only does he accept general revelation, but general 
revelation is philosophically relevant for Berkeley’ epistemology.  Before I can explain 
Berkeley’s theory of general revelation, I need to explain the role of God in his 
philosophy.  A proper understanding of the role of God in Berkeley’s philosophy is 
necessary for understanding the role God plays in human knowledge, which is 
fundamental to Berkeley’s theory of divine revelation.     
 That Berkeley holds a role for God in his philosophy is well known and widely 
commented upon.86
 The best known view of God in Berkeley is expressed by a pair of limericks:  
  Berkeley employs three different arguments concerning the role of 
God in his philosophy.  Each of these different arguments points out a different role of 
God in the philosophy of Berkeley.  While Berkeley employs each of them as an 
argument for God’s existence, my chief interest in these arguments concerns what they 
say about God’s divine action.  So, I will examine these arguments seeking to properly 




                                                 
86 The amount of secondary literature on the issue of the role of God in Berkeley is immense:  Jonathan 
Bennett, “Berkeley and God,” Philosophy 40 (1965).  Jonathan Bennett, Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central 
Themes (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1971).  J. D.  Mabbott, “The Place of God in Berkeley's 
Philosophy,” Journal of Philosophical Studies 6 (1931).  Charles J. McCracken, “What Does Berkeley's 
God See in the Quad,” Archiv fϋr Geschichte der Philosophie 61 (1995).  Robert McKim, “What Is God 
Doing in the Quad,” Philosophy Research Archives 13 (1987-88).  Nicholas Everitt, “Quasi-Berkeleyan 
Idealism as Perspicuous Theism,” Faith and Philosophy 14 (1997).  E. J. Furlong, “Berkeley and the Tree 
in the Quad,” Philosophy 41 (1966).  Douglas Jesseph, “Berkeley, God, and Explanation,” in Early Modern 
Philosophy: Mind, Matter, and Metaphysics, ed. Christia Mercer (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 
2005).  Craig Lehman, “Will, Ideas, and Perception in Berkeley's God,” The Southern Journal of 
Philosophy 19 (1981).  George Thomas, “Berkeley's God Does Not Perceive,” Journal of the History of 




There was a young man who said, ‘God 
Must think it exceedingly odd 
 If he finds that this tree 
 Continues to be 
When there’s no one about in the Quad’  
 Reply 
“Dear Sir: your astonishment’s odd: 
I am always about in the Quad. 
 And that’s why the tree 
 Will continue to be 
Since observed by Yours Faithfully, God.87
 
 
According to this argument, Berkeley is saying that God’s role is to keep things in 
existence by constantly observing them.  According to the common interpretation, 
Berkeley’s immaterialism requires that minds observe ideas for them to exist.  This 
creates the problem that when a mind is no longer observing an idea, the idea (which is 
the physical object) no longer exists.  Berkeley presents this problem and its solution in 
the Three Dialogues.    
Hylas:  Supposing you were annihilated, cannot you conceive it possible that things 
perceivable by sense may still exist.  
Philonous:  I can; but then it must be in another mind… There is therefore some other 
Mind wherein they exist, during the intervals between the times of my perceiving 
them: as likewise they did before my birth, and would do after my supposed 
annihilation.  And, as the same is true, with regard to all other finite created spirits; it 
necessarily follows that there is an omnipresent eternal Mind, which knows and 
comprehends all things…88
 
  (DHP 230-231)  
                                                 
87 Bertrand Russell, in his History of Philosophy, attributes the limericks to Monsignor Ronald Knox.  
Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, Inc, 1945).  See 
also David Berman, George Berkeley: Idealism and the Man (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 
1994), 46, note 2.  My thanks to Dr. Ken Merrill for chasing this limerick down late one night when we 
were both working on the 6th floor of Dale Hall Tower (even though I did not ask him to), at the University 
of Oklahoma.     
 
88 A similar claim is also made in the Principles.   
“The table I write on, I say, exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it 
existed, meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually 
does perceive it.”  (PHK 3)  
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The argument Berkeley advances here has been called the continuity argument by 
interpreters in the secondary literature.89
[1]  Things (ideas and collections of ideas) exist only when perceived by a mind 
  It can be summarized like this: 
[2]  Things continue to exist when not perceived by any human mind 
[3]  Therefore, there is an omnipresent mind (God) which perceives things90
 
   
The interpretation of the continuity argument has been under fire in the secondary 
literature for the last 50 years.  Berkeley scholars are split concerning whether Berkeley 
held to the continuity argument or not.91  Bennett argues that this argument is an 
aberration in Berkeley’s philosophical system and that he did not put much stock in it.92
 There is a second argument that plays the primary role for Berkeley.  This is what 
has become known in the literature as the passivity argument.
  
But whatever the view concerning Berkeley’s acceptance of this argument there is wide 
agreement in the secondary literature that the continuity argument is not Berkeley’s 
primary argument for the role of God in his philosophy.     
93
                                                 
89 Berkeley never used the term ‘continuity argument’.  For a few works that mention the continuity 
argument see:  Bennett, Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes.  Louis E. Loeb, From Descartes to Hume 
(Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981). and McCracken, “What Does Berkeley's God See in the 
Quad.” 
  Berkeley, through the 
passivity argument, says that God causes certain ideas.  Since all ideas rely on minds for 
 
90 I have adapted this version of the argument from both Bennett and Berman.  Bennett, “Berkeley and 
God,” 207.  Berman, George Berkeley: Idealism and the Man, 47.  
  
91  There is a lot of debate in the secondary literature concerning the continuity argument.  See Bennett, 
“Berkeley and God.”  Bennett, Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes.  Berman, George Berkeley: 
Idealism and the Man.  Furlong, “Berkeley and the Tree in the Quad.”  Lehman, “Will, Ideas, and 
Perception in Berkeley's God.”  Mabbott, “The Place of God in Berkeley's Philosophy.”  McCracken, 
“What Does Berkeley's God See in the Quad.”  McKim, “What Is God Doing in the Quad.”  Thomas, 
“Berkeley's God Does Not Perceive.”  Kenneth P. Winkler, Berkeley: An Interpretation (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 2001). 
 
92 Bennett, “Berkeley and God.”  and Bennett, Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes. 
 
93 Berkeley never used the term ‘passivity argument’.  For a few works that mention the passivity argument 
see:  Bennett, Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes, Loeb, From Descartes to Hume. and Berman, 
George Berkeley: Idealism and the Man.     
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their existence, every idea must be caused or produced by some mind.  While Berkeley 
suggests that human minds produce certain ideas, those of reflection and memory, the 
ideas we have of sensation must have a different cause.     
From all which I conclude, there is a mind which affects me every moment with all 
the sensible impressions I perceive.  And from the variety, order, and manner of 
these, I conclude the Author of them to be wise, powerful, and good, beyond 
comprehension.  (DHP 215)94
 
     
While the force of the continuity argument was on God’s perceiving ideas to keep them 
from popping out of existence, the force of this argument is on God’s causal power over 
ideas.  For Berkeley, all causes are mental.  God is the cause of all ideas of sensation 
while humans are the causes of our own ideas that come from memory and imagination.  
So, the role of God according to the passivity argument is to cause ideas of sense.  The 
passivity argument can be laid out like this: 
[1]  We have ideas of sense, the cause of which must be a mind   
[2]  My mind cannot cause the ideas of sense 
[3]  Therefore, there must be some other mind (God) which causes them95
  
  
 Berkeley also uses a third argument to explain the role of God in his system.  This 
is the divine language argument.  This argument has been overshadowed in the secondary 
literature by the continuity and passivity arguments.96
                                                 
94 Here is another passage that supports the passivity argument: 
  While it can be found throughout 
It is therefore plain, that nothing can be more evident to anyone that is capable of the least reflection, 
than the existence of God, or a spirit who is intimately present to our minds, producing in them all that 
variety of ideas or sensations, which continually affect us… (PHK 149) 
 
95 Again, I have adapted this argument from both Bennett and Berman.  Bennett, “Berkeley and God,”, 208.  
Berman, George Berkeley: Idealism and the Man, 45-46.  
 
96 Loeb calls it the “visual-language argument” and says that it is “Berkeley’s least known argument for the 
existence of God”.  Loeb, From Descartes to Hume, 249.  Jonathan Dancy says that Berkeley’s views 
concerning the language of God and its relationship to scientific knowledge have been “inexplicably 
neglected”.  Johathan Dancy, Berkeley: An Introduction (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 112.      
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Berkeley’s works, the divine language argument is presented in its strongest form in the 
later, and more theologically motivated, work Alciphron.97
 Berkeley wrote Alciphron to refute religious skeptics, atheists, and deists, who 
were gaining popularity during his lifetime.
   
98
Alciphron:  But, to cut short this chicane, I propound it fairly to your own conscience, 
whether you really think, that God Himself speaks every day and in every place to the 
eyes of all man.   
  Alciphron is written as a series of 
conversations, in the same vein as the Platonic dialogues.  At one point, Alciphron 
advances the deistic claim that God created the world but is no longer present in it.  
Euphranor, Berkeley’s spokesperson in the dialogue, says that God constantly speaks to 
humans in the ‘language of vision’.  God’s language of vision can be seen in his causal 
action of presenting ideas of sense to our minds.    
Euphranor: That is really and in truth my opinion; and it should be yours too, if you 
are consistent with yourself, and abide by your own definition of language.  Since you 
cannot deny that the Author of Nature constantly explaineth Himself to the eyes of 
men by the sensible intervention of arbitrary signs... In consequence, I say, of your 
                                                 
97 Loeb traces in some detail the development of Berkeley’s divine language argument throughout all his 
works showing that it is a position that Berkeley held throughout his philosophical career.  His earliest 
work, A New Theory of Vision, embraces an early version of the divine vision language, with the exception 
that he does not connect this language with God.  In the Principles and the Dialogues, his focus is on God’s 
causing ideas more than on the language that these ideas produce.  Although see PHK 30, 31, 60-65, and 
105.  For Berkeley on the laws of nature, which are formed from these ideas of sense.  Then, later in his 
life, in the Alciphron and the The Theory of Vision or Visual Language shewing the immediate Presence 
and Providence of a Deity Vindicated and Explained Berkeley picks the theme back up from the early work 
on vision, that the ideas of sensation that God causes make a divine language.  Berkeley actually also at this 
time went back and edited his original work on vision, making the divine language explicit.  Where the 
earliest version said “the proper objects of vision constitute the universal language of nature”, he changed 
in the newer edition to read “the proper objects of vision constitute an universal language of the Author of 
nature.”  (NTV 147)  This change is mentioned by Loeb at page 251.  Berkeley is still committed to 
defending this thesis at Siris 252-254.  Berkeley has the same primary role of God in mind throughout all of 
these works.  Berkeley is pointing out both that God both causes our ideas of sensation and that these ideas 
constitute a divine language.  Interestingly, Loeb points out that Berkeley does not use the divine language 
argument in the Dialogues and suggests that the reason why is that it could be a “transmuted version of 
Malebranche’s vision in God.”  Loeb says “The visual-language argument, whatever we may think of it, 
was a favorite of Berkeley’s”.  Loeb, From Descartes to Hume, 249-54.       
 
98 While Alicphron has received much less attention in the secondary literature as Berkeley’s earlier works, 
there has been some works dedicated entirely to this work.  David Berman, George Berkeley Alciphron in 
Focus, Philosophers in Focus (New York, NY: Routledge, 1993).  Roomet Jakapi, “Faith, Truth, 
Revelation and Meaning in Berkeley's Defense of the Christian Religion (in Alciphron),” The Modern 
Schoolman 80 (2002). 
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own sentiments and concessions, you have as much reason to think the Universal 
Agent or God speaks to your eyes, as you can have for thinking any particular person 
speaks to your ears.  (Alc. 4.12) 
 
Berkeley’s language of vision is a language whereby God, the Author of Nature, 
communicates to all people.  God talks to humans in this language by constantly 
impressing ideas into their minds.  In Alciphron, Berkeley uses the language of vision to 
refute the deist by showing that God is casually active in the world on a daily basis. 
 On the one hand, the passivity argument and the divine language argument seem 
to highlight the same role of God in the philosophy of Berkeley.  In both, God’s role is to 
create ideas of sense and present them to human minds.  Loeb points out that there are 
two similarities between these two arguments.  Both lead to the conclusion that God is 
continuously active and both require the premise that ideas are casually inefficacious.99
 According to Berkeley’s language of vision, God impresses ideas upon the human 
mind.  Then, when these ideas of sense are grouped together into general rules, we see 
that there is a uniformity of the appearances we receive from these ideas.  This uniformity 
constitutes the grammar of this divine language. 
  
But on the other hand, these arguments differ.  The divine language argument makes the 
additional step of suggesting that these ideas produced by God actually constitute a 
language, which the passivity argument does not.   
There is a certain analogy, constancy, and uniformity in the phenomena or 
appearances of nature, which are a foundation for general rules: and these are a 
grammar for the understanding of nature, or that series of effects in the visible world 
whereby we are enabled to foresee what will come to pass in the natural course of 
things.  (Siris 252)       
 
Berkeley uses analogy to suggest how these ideas of sense constitute a language.  
According to Berkeley, a language is a series of signs which signify their referents.  The 
                                                 
99 Loeb, From Descartes to Hume, 249-50.  
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connection between the sign and the referent is arbitrary—it is only made through 
convention.  The divine language argument shows that ideas of sense act as signs in the 
same way.  The connection between these ideas and the things they signify is arbitrary.  
Speaking of these ideas, Berkeley says: 
And the manner wherein they signify and mark unto us the objects which are at a 
distance is the same with that of languages and signs of human appointment, which 
do not suggest the things signified by any likeness or identity of nature, but only by 




 The main point of Berkeley’s divine language is that God, the author of nature, 
creates all our ideas of sense.  He then impresses these ideas on our minds.  These ideas 
constitute a language from God.  The divine language argument can be set up like this:   
[1]  Ideas of sense suggest or signify other ideas.   
[2]  Ideas of sense are related to their signification arbitrarily.  
[3]  A language is a system of arbitrary signs. 
[4]  Therefore, visible ideas constitute a universal language of the author of nature.101
 
  
 At this point, it looks as if Berkeley’s position may have a similar problem that 
Malebranche’s faced concerning false beliefs.  If God is producing all my ideas of sense, 
it seems that God is also causing me to have ideas that lead me to false beliefs.  It looks 
as if the idea that I have of the bent stick in the water is caused by God in the same way 
as my idea of the stick before it was put into the water.   
                                                 
100 Berkeley makes the same general claim in the Principles:   
“To all which my answer is, first, that the connexion of ideas does not imply the relation of cause and 
effect, but only of a mark or sign with the thing signified.  The fire which I see is not the cause of the 
pain I suffer upon my approaching it, but the mark that forewarns me of it.  In like manner, the noise 
that I hear is not the effect of this or that motion or collision of the ambient bodies, but the sign thereof.  
Secondly, the reason why ideas are formed into machines, that is, artificial and regular combinations, 
is the same with that for combining letters into words.”  (PHK 65) 
 
101 I have adapted this argument from Loeb.  Loeb, From Descartes to Hume, 249.   
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 Berkeley is aware of this problem and the potential damage it could do to his 
entire system.  In a well known passage, he confronts the problem of ideas of the 
imagination, or what he calls chimeras, in the Principles.  
The ideas of sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than those of the imagination; 
they have likewise a steadiness, order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, 
as those which are the effects of human wills often are, but in a regular train or series, 
the admirable connexion whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of 
its Author.  Now the set rules or established methods, wherein the mind we depend on 
excites in us the ideas of sense, are called the Laws of Nature: and these we learn by 
experience, which teaches us that such and such ideas are attended with such and 
such other ideas, in the ordinary course of things.  (PHK 30)  
 
In the end, the solution to this problem is that we must learn by experience which ideas 
are from the senses and which ideas are from the imagination.  Those from our senses are 
from God and those from the imagination are not.  In short Berkeley gets out of the 
problem of false ideas through a mandate to learn God’s language of vision.  Once we 
learn this divine language, we are able to distinguish between the true and false ideas of 
sense.       
 Jonathan Dancy and John Russell Roberts argue that learning the language of 
vision amounts to Berkeley’s account of science.102  Berkeley’s scientific theory holds 
that an event is explained not by showing its cause, but by showing that the event is part 
of the regular order of things as well as how it fits into the general rules derived from the 
divine language.103
                                                 
102 Dancy, Berkeley: An Introduction, 104-12.  John Russell Roberts makes the same point.  “The point of 
doing science is to help us learn to understand better the language that constitutes the natural world.  The 
natural world is nothing more than a vast collection of signs.”  John Russell Roberts, A Metaphysics for the 
Mob: The Philosophy of George Berkeley (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007), 65.    
  In short, the explanation of any event is merely its reduction to 
 
103 Dancy, Berkeley: An Introduction, 105-06.   
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general rules.  Dancy suggests that Berkeley’s account of science as learning the divine 
language is found in the Principles.104
There are certain general laws that run through the whole chain of natural effects: 
these are learned by the observation and study of Nature and are by men applied … to 
the explaining the various phenomena: which explication consists only in shewing the 
conformity any particular phenomena hath to the general Laws of Nature, or, which is 
the same thing, in discovering the uniformity there is in the production of natural 
effects.  (PHK 62)    
 
   
 The natural philosopher, or the scientist, is not the person who studies the cause of 
nature.  It is the person who best understands these general rules.  The scientist is the one 
who studies and masters God’s language of vision.105
If therefore we consider the difference there is betwixt natural philosophers and other 
men, we shall find it consists, not in an exacter knowledge of the efficient cause that 
produces them, for that can be no other than the will of a spirit, but only in a greater 
largeness of comprehension, whereby analogies, harmonies, and agreements are 
discovered in the works of Nature, and the particular effects explained, that is, 
reduced to general rules.  (PHK 105)   
   
 
 Berkeley’s theory of divine revelation sidesteps the problem of false ideas 
through science—learning how to interpret God’s language of vision.  According to 
                                                 
104 “The Principles contain the rudiments of an account of natural science as the attempt to learn the 
language in which God is speaking to us.  Individual events are conceived on this account as utterances of 
God’s, our understanding of which is to be taken on the model of our understanding of ordinary utterances, 
that to understand an event will be to know what it means.”  Ibid., 109.  
 
105 Dancy concludes: 
“Once this point is sorted out it becomes possible to see that Berkeley’s account of science as the 
attempt to learn the language of God is enormously suggestive, and offers a rich and promising 
philosophy of science which generates far better answers to questions about the relation between 
scientific and non-scientific knowledge and to many other difficult problems about science.  
Berkeley’s views here have been inexplicably neglected, partly perhaps because the Principles as we 
have them contain only a few hints which need to be teased out.  But I want to suggest that they are a 
rich and untapped source of good philosophy of science, and also that they constitute an important 
move in the progress of eighteenth-century thought.”  Ibid., 112.   
Roberts concludes:  
“Science, at its best, is nothing more (and nothing less!) than a well-managed body of activities that 
helps us to learn to vaticinate more and more effectively.  And in doing so, it does not reveal to us a 
body of knowledge the contemplation of which is valuable in-itself.  The end of science is not the 
cobbling together of a mind independent description of “the natural world.”… Its end is not to 
represent or to convey to us some idea, image, or bit of “cognitive content,” but rather to teach us how 
to regulate our own behavior.  The content of the divine language is expressive of his divine love for 
us.”  Roberts, A Metaphysics for the Mob: The Philosophy of George Berkeley, 66.  
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Berkeley, God’s impressing these ideas to our mind is one part of his theory of divine 
revelation, but our senses are not enough to properly understand this language.  The next 
step is that we must learn how to interpret this language.   
We know a thing when we understand it; and we understand it when we can interpret 
or tell what it signifies.  Strictly speaking, the sense knows nothing.  We perceive 
indeed sounds by hearing, and characters by sight; but we are not therefore said to 
understand them.  After the same manner, the phenomena of nature are alike and 
visible to all; but all have not alike learned the conexion of natural things, or 
understand what they signify, or know how to vaticinate by them.  (Siris 253) 
 
It is crucial in Berkeley’s theory of divine revelation that we learn how to interpret the 
language of vision.  We can become more competent interpreters of this language with 
study which helps us properly differentiate true ideas from false.    
Therefore, the phenomena of nature, which strike on the senses and are understood by 
the mind, form not only a magnificent spectacle, but also a most coherent, 
entertaining, and instructive Discourse; and to effect this, they are conducted, 
adjusted, and ranged by the greatest wisdom.  This Language or Discourse is studied 
with different attention, and interpreted with different degrees of skill.  But so far as 
men have studied and remarked its rules, and can interpret right, so far they may be 
said to knowing in nature.  A beast is like a man who hears a strange tongue but 
understands nothing.  (Siris 254)       
 
Berkeley holds that those who study God’s language of vision will be able to properly 
interpret this language.   
 Finally, Berkeley states that the purpose of the divine language is self-
preservation.  God communicates to us through this language so that we will know how 
to regulate our actions.   
This gives us a sort of foresight, which enables us to regulate our actions for the 
benefit of life.  And without this we should be eternally at a loss: we could not know 
how to act any thing that might procure us the least pleasure, or remove the least pain 
of sense.  That food nourishes, sleep refreshes, and fire warms us; that to sow in the 
seed-time is the way to reap in the harvest, and, in general, that to obtain such or such 
ends, such or such means are conducive, all this we know, not by discovering any 
necessary connexion between our ideas, but only by the observation of the settled 
laws of Nature, without which we should be all in uncertainty and confusion, and a 
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grown man no more know how to manage himself in the affairs of life, than an infant 
just born.  (PHK 31)106
 
 
For example, when we perceive the ideas of sense that signify the presence of a bear, we 
are receiving a divine language from God that is intended for a very practical end—our 
self-preservation.107
 In the New Theory of Vision, his first work where he introduces the divine 
language argument Berkeley summarizes this argument including the practical 
motivation for God to communicate to us in this way.   
   
Upon the whole, I think we may fairly conclude that the proper objects of vision 
constitute an universal language of the Author of nature, whereby we are instructed 
how to regulate our actions in order to attain those things that are necessary to the 
preservation and well-being of our bodies, as also to avoid whatever may be hurtful 
and destructive of them.  It is by their information that we are principally guided in all 
the transactions and concerns of life.  (NTV 147)  
  
 Berkeley’s divine language argument is his doctrine of general revelation.  This 
doctrine comes in two steps.  First, God creates these ideas of sense and presents them to 
human minds in a causal manner.  So the vision of language argument is in this sense a 
causation theory of divine revelation.  But, as Berkeley points out, the senses alone know 
                                                 
106 Berkeley makes this same point in Alciphron.   
“Since you cannot deny that the great Mover and Author of Nature constantly explaineth Himself to 
the eyes of man by the sensible intervention of arbitrary signs, which have no similitude or connexion 
with the things signified … thereby informing and directing men how to act with respect to things 
distant and future, as well as near and present.”  (Alc.  4.12)  
 
107 I take this bear example from Roberts: 
 “We do our best to make use of the order present in nature (i.e., the ideas of sense we receive) by 
means of introducing words that help us to organize, inculcate, and communicate appropriate 
expectations.  If I say “Lo, a bear!” to my friend, he may expect, upon turning his head in the 
appropriate direction, to receive certain ideas of sense typical of bear sightings.  This may be of great 
help to him in getting through the next few minutes of his life.  If he knows the meaning of the word 
‘bear’, he will know what sorts of ideas of sense may be coming his way next.  These new ideas of 
sense, in turn, are only meaningful insofar as he is able to regard them as signs.  If he is wise in the 
ways of bears, he will take his ideas of sight, e.g. vivid visual ideas of brown fur and olfactory ideas, 
like that of a strong musky odor, to be indications of impending extremely painful ideas of sense, ones 
typical of a mauling.  If he is a good vaticinator, he will take these as signs that he ought to either get 
out of there or make himself appear unappetizing.  Thus, the organizing of the ideas of sense into 
objects by means of the introduction of words is ultimately a practical matter.”  Roberts, A 
Metaphysics for the Mob: The Philosophy of George Berkeley, 66.  
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nothing.  So, there is a necessary second step.  We must become scientists and learn to 
interpret this language correctly.   
 Berkeley’s theory of general revelation is philosophically relevant to his 
epistemology.  We know ideas of sense through God’s action of revealing them to our 
minds in a causal manner along with our interpretation of these ideas.  The language of 
vision argument is found in Berkeley’s works throughout his philosophical career.  I have 
shown that he embraces this theory as early as the New Theory of Vision and as late as 
Siris.  If the language of vision is his theory of general revelation, which I show below, 
this doctrine from Berkeley’s philosophical theology is present throughout his works and 
informs his entire epistemological picture.    
 There is good evidence that Berkeley’s language of vision is his theory of general 
revelation.  First, he connects the language of vision to the natural law.  God presents all 
the ideas of sense to our minds.  We in turn, organize them into general rules which 
constitute the grammar of the language.  It is common for Berkeley to say that the 
language of vision makes up the natural law or laws of nature.  According to Berkeley, 
we discover the general law through these general rules.   
The ideas of sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than those of the imagination; 
they have likewise a steadiness, order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, 
as those which are the effects of human wills are, but in a regular train or series, the 
admirable connection whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its 
Author.  Now the set rules or established methods, wherein the mind we depend on 
excites in us the ideas of sense, are called the Laws of Nature; and these we learn by 
experience, which teaches us that such and such ideas are attended with such and 
such other ideas, in the ordinary course of things.  (PHK 30)   
 
…it necessarily follows that there is an omnipresent eternal Mind, which knows and 





according to such rules, as he himself hath ordained, and are by us termed the Laws of 
Nature.  (DHP 231)108
 
   
As I pointed out in 2.1, theologians typically equate the natural law and general 
revelation.  Berkeley uses the divine language as his theory of natural revelation, even 
though he does not use that terminology.  
 Further evidence that the language of vision is Berkeley’s account of general 
revelation can be found in Principles 62 and 63.  After establishing that this language 
constitutes the laws of nature, Berkeley suggests that God can interrupt the ordinary 
course of events and cause a miracle. 
Thus, for instance, it cannot be denied that God, or the intelligence which sustains 
and rules the ordinary course of things might, if he were minded to produce a miracle, 
choose all the motions on the dial-plate of a watch, though no body had ever made the 
movements, and put them in it.  (PHK 62) 
 
It may indeed on some occasions be necessary, that the Author of Nature display his 
overruling power in producing some appearance out of the ordinary series of things.  
Such exceptions from the general rules of Nature are proper to surprise and awe men 
into an acknowledgement of the Divine Being: but then they are used but seldom, 
otherwise there is a plain reason why they should fail of that effect.  (PHK 63) 
 
While Berkeley does not use the terms special and general revelation, he is defending that 
distinction from traditional Christian theology in these passages.  There is a normal series 
of events called the natural law.  God causes the ideas which make up these events.  But, 
on rare occasion, God can interrupt this normal series of events and create an appearance 
                                                 
108 The same idea is found from a passage cited in the text earlier: 
“There are certain general laws that run through the whole chain of natural effects: these are learned by 
the observation and study of Nature and are by men applied … to the explaining the various 
phenomena: which explication consists only in shewing the conformity any particular phenomena hath 
to the general Laws of Nature, or, which is the same thing, in discovering the uniformity there is in the 
production of natural effects.”  (PHK 62)    
Berkeley also calls these the ‘works of nature’:   
“But though there be some things which convince us, human agents are concerned in producing them; 
yet it is evident to everyone, that those things which are called the works of nature, that is, the far 
greater part of the ideas or sensations perceived by us, are not produced by, or determined on the wills 





out of the ordinary.  According to Berkeley, this interruption is a “miracle”.  Since the 
normal series that makes up the natural law is God’s language whereby he communicates 
to humans, it can rightly be called general revelation.  And, the disturbance that God 
causes in that series—the miracle—can be rightly called special or supernatural 
revelation.109
 Another reason to think that Berkeley’s language of vision is his account of 
general revelation is that it is consistent with the two books view of divine revelation.  I 
introduced this view from traditional Christian theology in section 2.1.  God writes two 
books and uses both to reveal to humans.  On the two book theory, general revelation is 
God’s book of nature and special revelation is God’s book of Scriptures.  Berkeley talks 
about his language of vision as if it is God’s book of nature.  God communicates to 
humans through creating, or writing, his language of vision.  Since it is always present to 
our minds, the language of vision is God’s constant revelation to humans.  As John 
Russell Roberts puts it, “On Berkeley’s view, from the womb to the grave, God is 
communicating with us, training us to be interacting persons.”
       
110
 Berkeley’s insistence that we learn how to interpret this language of vision is 
consistent with the two book theory.  If God has written a book or text in nature, it is our 
   
                                                 
109 It is not clear that Berkeley has a method for distinguishing such miracles from chimeras.  We know that 
we are to distinguish ideas of sense from ideas of imagination by recognizing that ideas of sense have “a 
steadiness, order, and coherence, and are not excited at random.. a regular train or series”.  (PHK 30)  It 
seems according to this passage that those ideas which we have that are not a part of that regular train 
should be dismissed as chimeras.  It seems that anytime God interrupts the normal series with a miracle, I 
should dismiss such ideas rather than embrace them as miracles.  If I see a bush burning on the 
mountainside and hear a voice coming from the bush, I should dismiss this event as the product of my 
imagination since I know that the normal series does not allow for burning bushes to talk.  It seems that 
Berkeley here wants to carve out room for miracles, but his philosophical system will not allow humans to 
differentiate between miracles and chimeras.  Berkeley could suggest that such miracles are similar to ideas 
of sense because they are “more strong, lively, and distinct than those of the imagination” (PHK 30), but it 
is not clear how I could determine that upon encountering the burning bush that talks.   
 
110 Roberts, A Metaphysics for the Mob: The Philosophy of George Berkeley, 85-86. 
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responsibility to learn how to interpret that text.  Dancy and Kenneth Winker point out 
that the world is a text for Berkeley,111
 Berkeley’s use of the passage from Acts 17 – “In Him we live and move and have 
our being” – is another reason to think that Berkeley’s language of vision is his account 
of general revelation.  He quotes this passage twice in the Principles, and both times it is 
quoted as supporting the language of vision. 
 but neither connects this up with the language of 
vision being Berkeley’s account of general revelation.  Berkeley’s view is that the 
language of vision constitutes the text of the world whereby God communicates to 
humans for their own well-being.    
And it is the searching after, and endeavouring to understand those signs instituted by 
the Author of Nature, that ought to be the employment of the natural philosopher, and 
not the pretending to explain things by corporeal causes; which doctrine seems to 
have much estranged the minds of men from that active principle, that supreme and 
wise spirit, in whom we live, move and have our being.  (PHK 66)   
 
It is therefore plain, that nothing can be more evident to anyone that is capable of the 
least reflection, than the existence of God, or a spirit who is intimately present to our 
minds, producing in them all that variety of ideas or sensations, which continually 
affect us, on whom we have an absolute and entire dependence, in short, in whom we 
live, and move, and have our being.  (PHK 149) 
 
This is a passage that points out God’s general revelation and it has been historically 
interpreted as such.  God is constantly present in the world and in humans, revealing 
Himself in every aspect of life.  Berkeley’s citing this passage in connection with his 
language of vision shows that he considers this theory to be his doctrine of general 
revelation.     
 It is important to remember that Berkeley was trained in theology as well as 
philosophy.  We can expect that someone who was conversant in theology would be 
                                                 
111  Winker states that it is “important to bear in mind Berkeley’s belief that experience is a text, authored 
by God in the language of ideas for the sake of our well-being.”  Winkler, Berkeley: An Interpretation, 231.  
See also Dancy, Berkeley: An Introduction, 120-24. 
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familiar with the doctrine of general revelation as well as the two book theory of God’s 
revelation.  The difference between his language of vision and these theological doctrines 
is not accidental.  Berkeley’s language of vision is his account of general revelation.   
 However, at this point an objection can be brought against my conclusion.  My 
argument rests on the similarities between Berkeley’s language of vision and general 
revelation.  But Berkeley says things about this language of vision that we would not 
expect him to say about general revelation.  Berkeley takes this language of vision 
beyond any traditional doctrine of general revelation by suggesting that it is necessary for 
knowledge, wisdom, and goodness and stating that this language is clear, full, and 
direct.112
 My response to this objection is that the evidence supporting the claim that the 
language of vision is Berkeley’s theory of natural revelation is overwhelming.  It would 
be indeed surprising and unexpected if Berkeley connected special revelation to the 
natural law as he does the language of vision.  Berkeley’s theory of general revelation is 
more robust than the traditional theory.  He takes general revelation to be clearer, fuller, 
  In the traditional theories from Christian theology, general revelation is not 
considered direct, full, and clear.  These adjectives are usually reserved for Special 
revelation.  According to the traditional understanding, general revelation is indirect, 
incomplete, and unclear.  The objector could suggest that Berkeley here is suggesting that 
the language of vision is special revelation, not general revelation.   
                                                 
112  Berkeley says these things about the language of vision in Alciphron:   
“Euphranor:  You, who, in the beginning of this morning’s conference, thought it strange that God 
should leave Himself without a witness, do now think it strange the witness be so full and clear.   
Alciphron:  I must own I do.  I was aware, indeed, of a certain metaphysical hypothesis of our seeing 
all things in God… But I never imagined it could be pretended that we saw God with our fleshly eyes 
as plain as we see any human person whatsoever, and that He daily speaks to our sense in a manifest 
and clear dialect.  (Alc. 4.14)   
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and more direct than the traditional theologian and this should not be surprising given 
Berkeley’s philosophical system.   
 Berkeley’s language of vision is his account of general revelation.  This theory of 
divine revelation is philosophically relevant to Berkeley’s epistemology because we 
derive knowledge from divine revelation according to this theory.  Any knowledge we 
receive from ideas of sense is the result of divine revelation.  Divine revelation plays a 
crucial role in knowledge acquisition in Berkeley’s epistemology.113
 It is important to point out that Berkeley thinks that the majority of our ideas are 
from God, not ourselves.  
  On Berkeley’s 
theory, we obtain knowledge from ideas.  Ideas are generated by minds, either human 
minds or God’s mind.  Humans generate ideas of memory and imagination.  The 
knowledge we have from our memories and imaginations does not depend on anything 
outside of ourselves.  God generates our ideas of sense.   
But though there be some things which convince us, human agents are concerned in 
producing them; yet it is evident to everyone, that those things which are called the 
works of nature, that is, the far greater part of the ideas or sensations perceived by us, 
are not produced by, or determined on the wills of men.  There is therefore some 
other spirit that causes them, since it is repugnant that they should subsist by 
themselves.  (PHK 146)   
 
God generates these ideas and then excites or produces them in human minds according 
to the language of vision.  We gain knowledge from these ideas once we interpret this 
language properly.  God writes the text of the world and reveals it to humans.  Therefore, 
the knowledge we have from these ideas is knowledge that is dependent upon divine 
                                                 
113 For one work on Berkeley’s epistemology that looks at some related issues see  Robert Merrihew 
Adams, “Berkeley and Epistemology,” in Essays on the Philosophy of George Berkeley, ed. Ernest Sosa 
(Boston, MA: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1987).  But Adams does not consider the relationship 




revelation.  In Berkeley’s own terms, this knowledge constitutes “the far greater part” of 
the knowledge we have from ideas.  Berkeley’s empiricist philosophical system claims 
that the majority of our knowledge comes from sensations, which in turn come from 
divine revelation.  While Berkeley may also hold that humans receive knowledge from 
special revelation, there can be no question that the majority of our knowledge is derived 
from general revelation in the form of the ideas of sense that we know from interpreting 
the language of vision.114
 To summarize, Berkeley holds a theory of divine revelation even though he does 
not use this specific terminology.  There are four features of his acceptance of this 
doctrine.  First, Berkeley embraces a causation theory of divine revelation where God 
produces ideas in the minds of humans.  Second, he accepts and makes use of the 
traditional distinction between natural and special revelation from Christian theology.  
Third, his view of divine revelation is philosophically relevant to his epistemology.  The 
language of vision is Berkeley’s attempt to do epistemology that is consistent with his 
view that God reveals ideas and that humans acquire knowledge from these ideas.  And 
finally, we see that Berkeley accepts that the majority of human knowledge of ideas 
comes from divine revelation, of which general revelation plays the primary role.  
  So, Berkeley’s theory of divine revelation is philosophically 
relevant for his epistemology in that he holds that the majority of human knowledge is 
derived from general revelation.   
  
                                                 
114 This argument only works for knowledge of or from ideas, which is another reason that I am concluding 
that Berkeley holds that the majority of our knowledge is from divine language.  If Berkeley holds that we 
have knowledge without ideas (and there are good reasons to think that he does) and if that knowledge is 
not the result of divine revelation, it is still likely that the knowledge we have from ideas is greater than the 
knowledge we have that is not.  The conclusion still holds.  The majority of our knowledge requires divine 






 Malebranche and Berkeley’s accounts of divine revelation are similar.  Both hold 
a causation theory where God directly produces ideas in the human mind.  Malebranche 
and Berkeley serve as historical examples of Mavrodes’ theory presented in Revelation 
and Religious Belief.  In fact, Malebranche and Berkeley actually hold a stronger position 
concerning God’s causal activity than Mavrodes.  Mavrodes talks about God casually 
inserting one idea into the human mind.  In his example, God produces the idea of theism 
in the mind of a sleeping agnostic.115
 Secondly, Malebranche and Berkeley embrace and utilize the distinction from 
Christian theology between special revelation and general revelation.  While they both 
accept this doctrine, Malebranche and Berkeley do not talk about special and general 
  But according to Malebranche and Berkeley, God 
causes many ideas.  On Malebranche’s account, God causes all our ideas.  Every idea is 
in God and we perceive those ideas when God chooses to reveal them to us.  For 
example, when I perceive the idea of Eagle Nest Lake in the valley, the idea of the lake is 
in God and I perceive it because God is revealing that idea to me.  On Berkeley’s 
account, God causes the vast majority of the ideas that I perceive.  The only ideas that 
God is not revealing to me, according to Berkeley, are those ideas of memory or 
imagination.  While gazing upon the lake, the ideas that signify the lake are generated by 
God and excited in my mind.  He reveals the visual ideas of the mountains, the aspen 
trees, and the sky as well as every other idea I sense such as the sound of the birds and 
the cool feel of the breeze.  Malebranche and Berkeley hold very robust causation 
theories of divine revelation concerning ideas.     
                                                 
115 Mavrodes, Revelation in Religious Belief, 37-38.  
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revelation in the same way.  Malebranche explicitly accepts this distinction, and gives his 
own philosophical explanation of it.  When Berkeley uses the term ‘revelation’, he seems 
to follow Locke by referring to special or supernatural revelation.  But, even though he 
does not use the terminology, we have seen that Berkeley also makes use of general 
revelation.  Both hold that special revelation is infallible and pertains to matters of faith.  
The Christian scriptures are regarded as special revelation by both philosophers.  They 
also agree that general revelation is fallible and allows room for confusion and false 
ideas.   
 Malebranche and Berkeley regard the natural law as natural revelation.  
Malebranche connects his account of general revelation, the vision in God, to the natural 
law.  Berkeley connects the language of vision to the natural law in a more 
straightforward way than does Malebranche since Berkeley actually uses the terminology 
‘natural law’ while Malebranche does not.   
 Also, Malebranche and Berkeley agree that the doctrine of divine revelation is 
philosophically relevant to their epistemological theories.  Malebranche constructs a 
theory of knowledge that can be held consistently alongside his view that God reveals 
ideas to humans: the vision in God.  Berkeley does the same thing through his divine 
language argument.  These theories are not only consistent with the doctrine of divine 
revelation, the vision in God and the divine language are natural revelation for 
Malebranche and Berkeley.  The vision in God and the divine language argument play a 
crucial role in the epistemological systems of Malebranche and Berkeley respectively.  
Since these epistemological doctrines are the philosopher’s accounts of natural 
revelation, understanding their theories of divine revelation sheds light on their other 
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epistemological projects.  For example, in section 4.2 I show how Malebranche’s theory 
of divine revelation helps resolve a puzzle concerning efficacious ideas.      
 Finally, Malebranche and Berkeley hold a very high place for the role of divine 
revelation in human knowledge.  Malebranche holds that all human knowledge is derived 
from divine revelation.  Berkeley holds that the majority of our knowledge is derived 
from such revelation.  Both philosophers also emphasize general revelation over special 
revelation in producing human knowledge.  Malebranche and Berkeley hold accounts of 
divine revelation that places the priority on general revelation.     
  While there are many similarities between Malebranche and Berkeley’s theories 
of divine revelation, there are also some differences in these two accounts of revelation.  
While Malebranche and Berkeley accept special revelation and the Bible as a part of that 
special revelation, Berkeley rejects Malebranche’s conclusion about what we can know 
from special revelation.  Malebranche thought that we could be sure of the existence of 
bodies by this revelation, Berkeley rejects this conclusion.   
Some there are who think, that though the arguments for the real existence of bodies, 
which are drawn from reason, be allowed not to amount to demonstration, yet the 
Holy Scriptures are so clear in the point, as will sufficiently convince every good 
Christian, that bodies do really exist, and are something more than mere ideas; there 
being in Holy Writ innumerable facts related, which evidently suppose the reality of 
timber, and stone, mountains, and rivers, and cities, and human bodies. .. (after 
suggesting that his theory does not dispute those statements).. And I do not think, that 
either what philosophers call matter, or the existence of objects without the mind, is 
any where mentioned in Scripture.  (PHK 82)    
 
Berkeley is clearly referring to Malebranche’s position in this passage and distances 
himself from Malebranche’s theory of divine revelation by rejecting the conclusion that 
we can know the existence of bodies only through special revelation.  Instead, Berkeley 
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states that the scriptures do not teach the existence of matter or the external world, if 
these are more than ideas.116
 There are also differences in the broader epistemological theories of Malebranche 
and Berkeley.
   
117  Berkeley highlights these differences in a passage that was cited in 
section 1.3.118  He says that his philosophy is different from that of Malebranche.  While 
Malebranche accepts abstract general ideas and the existence of a mind-independent 
external world, Berkeley rejects both.  There are also differences concerning each of 
these philosophers’ views of ideas.119
 I recognize these differences between Malebranche and Berkeley’s theories of 
revelation and epistemology; they do not damage my argument.  By arguing that 
Malebranche and Berkeley hold similar theories of divine revelation as well as similar 
epistemological positions, I am not arguing that all of their positions of philosophical 
   
                                                 
116 Some similar questions have been brought up in articles that have focused on Berkeley’s theory and his 
view of creation and resurrection.  Lynn D. Cates, “Berkeley on the Work of the Six Days,” Faith and 
Philosophy 14 (1997).  Marc A. Hight, “Berkeley and Bodily Resurrection,” Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 45 (2007). 
 
117 While there is secondary literature concerning the philosophical similarities of Malebranche and 
Berkeley, there is also some literature that rejects any similarity.  Some of this literature I summarized in 
section 1.3.  Margaret Atherton, Berkeley's Revolution in Vision (Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1990).  Geneviève Brykman, “Berkeley: Sa Lecture De Malebranche À Travers Le Dictionnaire De Bayle,” 
Revue Internationale de Philosophie 114 (1975).  T. E. Jessop, “Malebranche and Berkeley,” Revue 
Internationale de Philosophie 1 (1938).  J. Pucelle, “Berkeley a-T-Il Ètè Influencè Par Malebranche?,” Les 
Études Philosophiques 38 (1979). 
 
118 I cite that passage again for reference: 
“I shall not therefore be surprised, if some men imagine that I run into the enthusiasm of Malebranche, 
though in truth I am very remote from it.  He builds on the most abstract general ideas, which I entirely 
disclaim.  He asserts an absolute external world, which I deny.  He maintains that we are deceived by 
our senses, and know not the real natures or the true forms and figures of extended beings; all of which 
I hold the direct contrary.  So that upon the whole there are no principles more fundamentally opposite 
than his and mine.” (DHP, 214)    
 
119 Malebranche thinks that ideas are not mental, but logical, abstract, and eternal.  He also thinks that ideas 
are not in the minds of humans but in God.  Berkeley, on the other hand, thinks that ideas are not eternal 
(they are produced by spirits) and are located in the minds of humans.  
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theology and epistemology are similar.120
 While I have been making contributions throughout this chapter concerning 
Malebranche and Berkeley’s theories of divine revelation, I can at this point stop and 
systematically categorize some of the more significant contributions.  This is the first 
work to argue in detail that Malebranche and Berkeley hold theories of divine revelation.  
Apart from a few works that mention it in passing, there has not been a serious study 
showing that each of these philosophers accepts the doctrine of divine revelation.
  I am arguing that Malebranche and Berkeley 
hold similar theories of divine revelation and thereby also share similarities in 
epistemological doctrines that are related to these theories of revelation.  While there are 
some notable differences, the similarities in philosophical theology concerning revelation 
and the similarities in the corollary epistemological doctrines between Malebranche and 
Berkeley outweigh these differences.    
121
 Neglecting Berkeley and Malebranche’s similar theories of divine revelation has 
implications.  Understanding this feature of Malebranche and Berkeley’s thought sheds 
light on certain puzzles and disputes pointed out in the secondary literature that compares 
  Not 
only do Malebranche and Berkeley each hold a theory of divine revelation, I have also 
shown that their theories are similar in many respects.  While commentators have pointed 
out many different philosophical similarities between Malebranche and Berkeley, they 
have not mentioned that these two philosophers hold similar theories of philosophical 
theology.  This aspect has slipped through the cracks.     
                                                 
120 Jolley makes the same point, just because someone highlights philosophical similarities between two 
philosophers, it does not follow that that interpreter does not recognize salient differences.  Jolley, The 
Light of the Soul: Theories of Ideas in Leibniz, Malebranche, and Descartes.     
 
121 One exception that has pointed out that Malebranche’s theory of knowledge is divine revelation is Pyle, 
Malebranche.  And another exception points out that both Malebranche and Berkeley hold accounts of 
natural revelation:  McCracken, Malebranche and British Philosophy, 224.  But neither of these argues this 
point in detail.   
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the two philosophers.  In other words, there is a payoff that comes from recognizing that 
these philosophers accept the doctrine of divine revelation.  
 In section 1.4, I introduced the secondary literature that compares the 
philosophical systems of Malebranche and Berkeley.  Many of the commentators 
introduced point out that Malebranche and Berkeley shared certain epistemological 
similarities.  Now that we are familiar with the theories of divine revelation held by each 
philosopher, we can look back at that literature and see the philosophical relevance of 
these theories more clearly.  I have made the claim that Malebranche and Berkeley’s 
theories of divine revelation are philosophically relevant to their epistemologies (and I 
have pointed out instances of this along the way).  Now we can see how understanding 
Malebranche and Berkeley’s position concerning divine revelation sheds light on 
positions and disputes in the literature.  Appreciating the theories of divine revelation in 
Malebranche and Berkeley also provides a payoff in the individual literature that 
considers each philosopher in isolation.  Chapter 4 is dedicated to highlighting some of 
those instances.         
  The most promising result of this study is that it advances some of the work 
already done in the literature.  While others have pointed out epistemological similarities 
between Malebranche and Berkeley, now, through an appreciation of their theories of 
divine revelation, we can see why they hold some of these similarities.   
 One important similarity in epistemology that is pointed out in the secondary 
literature concerns Malebranche and Berkeley’s similar theories of perception.  This 
similarity has been pointed out in two related, but different approaches.  The first 
approach points out that Malebranche and Berkeley agree that the human is passive in 
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regards to sensations.  That is to say that Malebranche and Berkeley hold epistemological 
theories where the human is passive and God is active.  The second approach focuses on 
the actual arguments each philosopher gives in support for their theories of perception.  
This approach points out that Malebranche and Berkeley share similar accounts of 
perception.  This similarity is usually described by suggesting that Berkeley was 
influenced by Malebranche: the vision in God is, in some way or another, a precursor of 
Berkeley’s theory of sense perception.  Malebranche and Berkeley’s shared acceptance of 
the doctrine of divine revelation sheds light on both of these approaches to this issue.        
 The best representatives of the first approach are Fritz and Jolley.  They point out 
that Malebranche and Berkeley hold theories of sensation where the human is passive.  
On both theories, God is doing all the work.  God produces the sensations and impresses 
or excites them in the minds of humans.  Fritz summarizes this position: “Central to both 
theories is the passivity of the self in relation to the cause of sensation.”122  Jolley agrees, 
suggesting that Malebranche’s later vision in God would be more aptly called “vision by 
God” since humans are passive in the process.123
 While Fritz and Jolley point out that Malebranche and Berkeley agree that the 
human is passive, neither attempts to explain why these philosophers agree on this point.  
Taking into account their theories of divine revelation, we know that they agree 
concerning the passive nature of the human in this regard because they both hold 
causation theories of divine revelation.  God, the revealer is active in producing 
psychological states in humans.  This epistemological relationship between the one 
   
                                                 
122 Anita D. Fritz, “Berkeley's Self-- Its Origin in Malebranche,” Journal of the History of Ideas 15 (1954): 
571.   
 
123 Jolley, “Berkeley, Malebranche, and Vision in God,” 540. 
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revealing and the revealee explain why Malebranche and Berkeley agree on these two 
general points.  They both hold epistemological positions that place a priority on divine 
revelation.  Jolley gets very close to saying this when he concludes that Malebranche and 
Berkeley hold “a theological version of the causal theory of perception”.124
    The second approach points out that Malebranche and Berkeley hold similar 
theories of perception; Berkeley’s language of vision is similar to Malebranche’s vision 
in God.  This approach is more common than the first and has been taken by many 
interpreters including Bracken, Loeb, and McCrackin.
   
125  The claim is that 
Malebranche’s vision in God is similar to Berkeley’s theory of perception, the language 
of vision.  This similarity is usually explained by Malebranche’s direct influence over 
Berkeley.  Berkeley read the Search, and patterned his theory of sense perception after 
Malebranche.  Loeb is a good example of this.  He suggests that Berkeley’s divine 
language argument is a “transmuted version of Malebranche’s vision in God.”126
                                                 
124 Ibid., 539.  Before moving on, it is important to note that these interpretations by Fritz and Jolley are 
disputed.  For example, Susan Peppers-Bates presents an argument that Jolley’s interpretation is wrong 
concerning the passivity of Malebranche.  I side with Jolley’s interpretation of Malebranche while I might 
not agree so quickly concerning Berkeley.  I agree that Berkeley holds a passive position concerning our 
reception of ideas of sense, but he also states that we must learn how to interpret those ideas before we can 
know what they signify.  It does not matter if Fritz and Jolley are right concerning this interpretation.  
Either way, an understanding of Malebranche and Berkeley’s theories of divine revelation would provide 
them with an answer to the question of why these theories are similar.  My point can be made in the 
hypothetical: If Malebranche and Berkeley hold a similar account that the human is passive concerning 
sensation, then that similarity can be explained by their similar theories of a causation theory of divine 
revelation.  See Peppers-Bates, “Does Malebranche Need Efficacious Ideas? The Cognitive Faculties, the 
Ontological Status of Ideas, and Human Attention.” 
  As I 
pointed out in section 1.3, there is a problem with this kind of explanation.  Berkeley 
denies that his philosophy follows Malebranche.  We should seek an explanation of these 
 
125 Harry M. Bracken, “Berkeley and Malebranche on Ideas,” The Modern Schoolman 41 (1963): 13.  Loeb, 
From Descartes to Hume  254.  McCracken, Malebranche and British Philosophy, 224.    
 
126 Loeb, From Descartes to Hume, 254.  Brackin says that there are “important parallels between 
Berkeley’s Divine Language account and Malebranche’s Intelligible Extension.”  Bracken, “Berkeley and 
Malebranche on Ideas,” 13.  
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epistemological similarities that takes Berkeley’s statement concerning his use of 
Malebranche at face value.  A proper understanding of both philosophers’ acceptance of 
the doctrine of divine revelation gives such an explanation.   
 The commentators who point out that the similarities between the vision in God 
and the language of vision fail to mention that Malebranche and Berkeley’s theories of 
divine revelation are relevant to these accounts of perception.  The vision in God and the 
language of vision are the philosophers’ accounts of natural revelation.  The vision in 
God and the language of vision are the means by which God reveals ideas, and thereby 
knowledge to humans.   
 Once these theories of natural revelation are seen and appreciated we can see why 
these philosophers held similar epistemological theories concerning sense perception.  
Malebranche’s vision in God is similar to Berkeley’s language of vision because these 
theories are both able to be held alongside the doctrine of divine revelation.  I have 
provided a better explanation to why Malebranche’s vision in God is similar to 
Berkeley’s language of vision.  They both accept the doctrine of divine revelation and 
they both construct these theories of perception in a way that can be held consistently 
alongside their belief that God reveals knowledge to humans.      
 











The Trinity in the Metaphysics of Malebranche and Berkeley 
 
 This chapter continues my main argument that Malebranche and Berkeley hold 
similar theories of philosophical theology and those theories are philosophically relevant 
to their epistemologies and metaphysics.  The second similarity between Malebranche 
and Berkeley’s philosophical theologies concerns the doctrine of the Trinity.  As was the 
case with divine revelation, Malebranche and Berkeley accept the doctrine of the Trinity.  
The Trinity is also philosophically relevant for Malebranche and Berkeley.  While divine 
revelation is epistemologically relevant, the Trinity is metaphysically relevant.  
Malebranche and Berkeley construct metaphysical theories that are consistent with their 
acceptance of the Trinity. 
 As was the case with the doctrine of divine revelation, it is necessary to do some 
theological groundwork before we can look at Malebranche and Berkeley.  This 
groundwork is done in 3.1.  I explain the doctrine of the Trinity as well as some 
developments on that theory from Augustine and Jonathan Edwards since these 
developments are found in Berkeley and Malebranche.1
 
  Then in 3.2, I discuss 
Malebranche’s Trinitarian metaphysics and show how this theological doctrine is relevant 
to his occasionalism.  In 3.3, I argue that Berkeley also held to a Trinitarian metaphysical 
position that is philosophically relevant to his theory of causation.  Finally in 3.4, I 
conclude this chapter by summarizing the similarities between Malebranche and Berkeley 
concerning the doctrine of the Trinity and I apply my findings to some relevant 
discussions in the secondary literature.        
                                                 
1 Jonathan Edwards is a helpful figure to introduce since he was basically a contemporary of both 
Malebranche and Berkeley.  I give a full explanation for my use of Edwards below in section 3.1.    
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3.1   
 
 Before I can show that Malebranche and Berkeley accept the Christian doctrine of 
the Trinity, I introduce the doctrine so that its features may be more clearly recognized in 
the works of these philosophers.  As was the case with divine revelation, the Trinity is 
one of the Christian doctrines that Catholic and Protestant theology hold in common.  So 
Malebranche, the French Roman Catholic Priest, and Berkeley, the English Anglican 
Bishop, would have both been familiar with the same basic formulation of the Trinity 
from their respective theological backgrounds.  For example, Malebranche and Berkeley 
both follow Augustine’s analogy of the Trinity as being, understanding, and will.  One of 
the explanations for this is that Augustine, who wrote one of the more important treatises 
on the Trinity in the west, was widely read and respected by both Catholic and Protestant 
theologians.      
 The Trinity as a Christian doctrine has a history of its own.  A lengthy account of 
this history is unnecessary, but it is important to introduce enough of it to allow us to 
recognize the doctrine as it would have been taught during the early modern period.   
 The doctrine of the Trinity is a difficult doctrine for Christians and non-Christians 
alike.  At best it has been called a doctrine that is shrouded in mystery and at worst it has 
been called nonsensical.2  St. Augustine is said to have stated that anyone who tried to 
understand the Trinity is in danger of losing their mind.3
                                                 
2 For a contemporary attempt to defend the Trinity in philosophical terms see Brian Hebblethwaite, 
Philosophical Theology and Christian Doctrine (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 75-90.     
  Some theologians have 
attempted to explain it rationally while others have claimed that it is a mystery beyond 
 
3 Roger Olsen reports that Augustine said this, but does not cite it in Roger E. Olson and Christopher A. 
Hall, The Trinity (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2002), 1. 
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human comprehension.4  The approach to the rationality of the Trinity that has dominated 
the Church in the west is derived from both Augustine and Aquinas, both of whom 
accepted that the Trinity is not learned from natural reason.  While human reason can 
learn certain things about God, such as his existence and some of his attributes, the 
Trinity is not a doctrine that can be inferred from the existence of the natural world.5  
Instead it can only be learned from Divine Revelation in the form of the Christian 
Scriptures.  I have already shown in Chapter 2 that both Malebranche and Berkeley 
accept Divine Revelation, so it is not hard to imagine that they both might have agreed 
with Augustine and Aquinas concerning this issue.  But, even though this doctrine is not 
accessible by human reason alone, it is still a doctrine that is open to rational scrutiny.  
Both Augustine and Aquinas held that the Trinity is a mystery beyond mere natural 
reason but it was not incomprehensible.  It could be known, discussed, and debated in 
light of God’s divine revelation.6
                                                 
4 Jonathan Edwards, who I will introduce below, says that the Trinity is a mystery.   
   
“But I don’t pretend to fully explain how these things are, and I am sensible a hundred other objections 
may be made, and puzzling doubts and questions raised, that I can’t solve.  I am far from pretending to 
explaining the Trinity so as to render it no longer a mystery.  I think it to be the highest and deepest of 
all divine mysteries still, notwithstanding anything that I have said or conceived about it.”  Jonathan 
Edwards, Works, ed. Various Editors (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1957-), Vol 21, no 135. 
(Discourse on the Trinity).       
 
5 For a quick summary of Aquinas on the rationality of the Trinity see Hebblethwaite, Philosophical 
Theology and Christian Doctrine, 76-78.  For the same concerning Augustine, see Mary T. Clark, “De 
Trinitate,” in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, ed. Elenore Stump and Norman Kretzmann 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 91.  
 
6 My intention here is not to become involved in the argument concerning the understandability of doctrine 
of the Trinity.  Nor is my intention here to argue that the Trinity is philosophically understandable.  I 
merely intend to show that both Malebranche and Berkeley accepted the doctrine and that they applied it to 
their metaphysics.  My goal in this section is merely to explain this doctrine in a way that will help us 
recognize it in the writings of Malebranche and Berkeley.  Since this is the case, I need not give a 
comprehensive introduction to this doctrine, but only highlight those aspects of the Trinity that come into 
play for Malebranche and Berkeley.  This explains why I only give the theological arguments concerning 
the Trinity rather than its Biblical support.  Even though many of the theologians in question grounded 
these arguments in the Christian Scriptures, I do not explore any of the Biblical grounds for the Trinity.   
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 As we will see in section 3.2 and 3.3, Malebranche and Berkeley accept the 
traditional formulation of the Trinity: God is one substance and three persons.  The 
Trinity is the claim in Christian Theology that God exists in three persons.  But since 
Christianity is committed to monotheism, this doctrine does not imply that there are three 
Gods.  God is one substance and three persons.  The first person of the Trinity is God the 
Father.  The second person is the Son, Jesus Christ.  The third person is the Holy Spirit.  
These three are not individual substances but are one substance— God.  This formulation 
is intended to mean that the three persons of the Trinity share essential qualities equally 
but are still distinct in relations with one another and distinct concerning missions in 
relation to the world.7
There is one God; the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.  The Son is not the Father, 
the Father is not the Son.  Neither the Father nor the Son is the Holy Spirit and the 
Holy Spirit is neither the Father nor the Son.  These three are an inseparable trinity; 
equal, co-eternal, and absolutely of one inseparable nature, yet distinct in mutual 
relation to one another and in presentation to humans.
  Augustine summarizes the Trinity in this way. 
8
      
  
Here is a more concise summary statement of the Trinity from a contemporary 
theologian: 
The doctrine of the Trinity affirms that God’s whole and undivided essence belongs 




                                                 
7 Olson and Hall, The Trinity, 3. 
 
8 I have cleaned up the statement on the Trinity that Letham extracted from one of Augustine’s letters.  
Here is Letham’s full version, “There is ‘one God, the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit… [The Son 
is not the Father, the Father is not the Son, and neither the Father nor the Son is the Holy Spirit.]…[T]hese 
are equal and co-eternal, and absolutely of one nature… and inseparable trinity, yet … a trinity …. In 
inseparable union ,,, distinctively and in mutual relation to each other … presenting the three to our 
attention separately … but in no wise separated.”  Robert Letham, The Holy Trinity: In Scripture, History, 
Theology, and Worship (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing Company, 2004), 186. 
 
9Bruce A. Ware, Father, Son, & Holy Spirit: Relationships, Roles, and Relevance (Wheaton, IL: Crossway 
Books, 2005).    
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 Since the early church councils of Nicea and Constantinople the doctrine of the 
Trinity has been cast in metaphysical terms: God is one substance with three persons.  
This means that God has one being or substance (ousia) yet is also three distinct persons 
or subsistences (hypostases).10
 The background to the early church councils is helpful for understanding the 
doctrine of the Trinity.  It is also helpful for locating the doctrine of the Trinity in 
Malebranche and Berkeley since they adopt the Nicene formulation and terminology.  
The Nicene council was sparked by various controversies concerning the reconciliation 
of the Deity of Jesus with Christian monotheism.  There is an apparent inconsistency 
between the claim that there is only one God and the claim that Jesus Christ is somehow 
also God (not to mention the Holy Spirit).  There were two views that were gaining an 
audience in the third and fourth centuries.  The first, taught by Sabellius, was called 
modalism.  Modalism proposed that the way to reconcile the apparent inconsistency was 
that God fulfills the roles of all three persons of the Trinity by manifesting himself in 
only one mode at a time.  So, God can manifest himself as the Father, or as the Son, or as 
the Holy Spirit at any one given time.  In other words, modalism held that God is 
successively Father, Son, and Holy Spirit but God is not simultaneously all three.
  The general framework has not changed from these 
councils to the modern period.  Because of the role they played in the formulation of the 
Trinity, I summarize the creeds that came from these early councils below.   
11
                                                 
10 Olson and Hall, The Trinity, 2-3. 
  The 
second view that led to the Nicene council was proposed by the Arians.  This view was 
more instrumental in the formulation of the Trinity than Modalism.  Arius, the leader of 
 
11 Modalism did not have much of a following after the council at Antioch in 268.  Letham, The Holy 
Trinity: In Scripture, History, Theology, and Worship, 109.  The theology of Modalism is summarized in 
Ware, Father, Son, & Holy Spirit: Relationships, Roles, and Relevance, 36-37. 
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the Arians, advanced the claim that, rather than God himself,  Jesus was God’s first 
creation.  Jesus was the first begotten of all God’s creations.  Arius concluded that that 
there is only one God, the Father, and the Son is not co-eternal with the father.  There 
was a time when the Son was not.12
 These two views led to the council of Nicaea, and the later council of 
Constantinople, where various leaders of the early church gathered to discuss the 
orthodoxy of these teachings.  The product of these councils was a creed: a formal 
statement of doctrine.  This creed introduced the language that has been adopted by 
theologians since that time.
   
13
We believe in one God Father Almighty maker of all things, seen and unseen: 
  Here is the Nicene Creed in its entirety (325 AD):  
 And in one Lord Jesus Christ the Son of God, begotten as only begotten of the 
Father, that is the substance (ousia) of the father, God of God, Light of Light, true 
God of true God, begotten not made, consubstantial with the Father, through whom 
all things came into existence, both things in heaven and things on earth; who for us 
men and for our salvation came down and was incarnate and became man, suffered 
and rose again the third day, ascended into the heavens, is coming to judge the living 
and the dead: 
 And in the Holy Spirit. 
 But those who say, “There was a time when he did not exist,” and “Before being 
begotten he did not exist,” and that he came into beings from non-existence, or who 
allege that the Son of God is of another hypostasis or ousia, or who is alterable or 
changeable, these the Catholic and Apostolic Church condemns.14
 
 
The creed that is today known as the Nicene Creed was not crafted at the council at 
Nicaea but was crafted at a later council, in Constantinople.  However, the two creeds are 
very similar since the council at Constantinople was based on the creed that was written 
at Nicaea.  The creed that is known today as the Nicene Creed is perhaps more accurately 
                                                 
12Letham, The Holy Trinity: In Scripture, History, Theology, and Worship, 112.  
 
13 Ibid., 115-17, 68-69.    
 
14 This is a translation from the original Greek by Hanson as quoted in  Ibid., 115-16.      
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called the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed.  Here is that creed which was the product of 
the later council of Constantinople (381 AD): 
 
We believe in one God the Father Almighty, maker of heaven and earth and of all 
things visible and invisible. 
 And in one Lord Jesus Christ the Son or God, the Only-begotten, begotten by his 
Father before all ages, Light from Light, true God from true God, begotten not made, 
consubstantial with the Father, through whom all things came into existence, who for 
us men and for our salvation came down from the heavens and became incarnate by 
the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary and became a man, and was crucified for us 
under Pontius Pilate and suffered and was buried and rose again on the third day in 
accordance with the Scriptures and ascended into the heavens and is seated at the 
right hand of the Father and will come again with glory to judge the living and the 
dead, and there will be no end to his kingdom; 
 And in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and life-giver, who proceeds from the Father, 
who is worshipped and glorified together with the Father and the Son, who spoke by 
the prophets; 
 And in one holy, catholic and apostolic Church; 
 We confess one baptism for the forgiveness of sins; 
 We wait for the resurrection of the dead and the life of the coming age.  Amen.15
 
 
While there is some variation, both statements say the same basic thing about the Trinity.  
The Son is of the same substance (ousia) or consubstantial (homoousios) with the Father.  
The choice of the term homoousios, same substance, was deliberate.  There was a 
competing interpretation of the Trinity at the time that taught that the Son was 
homoiousios, or of like substance.16
  In the end, the result of these councils was that the Trinity was cast in 
metaphysical terms.  These are the same general metaphysical claims that Malebranche 
  The councils deliberately chose to declare that the 
Son was of the same substance or one substance with the Father to preserve the notion 
that persons of the Trinity were of the same nature or substance.  The Holy Spirit, by 
extension, was also considered of the same substance as the Father.    
                                                 
15 Translated from the Greek by Hanson.  Ibid., 171-72. 
 
16 Ware, Father, Son, & Holy Spirit: Relationships, Roles, and Relevance, 37.  And Allan Coppedge, The 
God Who Is Triune (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2007), 94-95. 
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and Berkeley accept.  God the Son (and God the Holy Sprit) was of the same substance 
with God the Father.  To say that they are the same substance or one substance is to say 
that they share essential qualities equally.   
“When the church says that the Son and the Holy Spirit are fully God, it means that 
the whole being of God, without remainder, is in each person.  All that is God, all that 
can ever be said to be God, without dilution or subtraction, constitutes the person of 
the Son, and in turn the person of the Spirit, just as it is with the person of the Father.  
Each person of the Trinity, when considered in Himself, is absolutely, one hundred 
percent God, and at the same time one hundred percent of God is in each person.  The 
whole God is in each person, and each person is the whole God.”17
    
   
The conclusion from these early creeds is that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are 
distinct yet numerically one in substance.18
 At this point in the discussion, it may seem that the sameness of the three persons 
of the Trinity erases any distinction between each of the persons of the trinity.  However, 
many theologians throughout history, both before and after the councils of Nicaea and 
Constantinople, have worked on the distinctiveness of the three persons of the Trinity.  
This is where we turn to Augustine.  Augustine wrote extensively on the Trinity, most 
notably in De Trinitate, an entire treatise dedicated to the subject.  The influence of 
Augustine’s work on the Trinity is hard to overestimate as Olsen and Hall point out: 
  This notion of the unity within the Trinity 
found in these early creeds continues into contemporary Christian theology.  
Malebranche and Berkeley both accept the notion that the second and third persons of the 
Trinity share the same substance with God the Father, the first person of the Trinity.  
Also, as I will point out, both philosophers hold accounts of substance that leaves room 
for the Trinitarian formulation of God being one substance with three persons.        
                                                 
17 This is summarized by Letham.  Letham, The Holy Trinity: In Scripture, History, Theology, and 
Worship, 176.    
 
18 This is the way that Coppedge puts it in Coppedge, The God Who Is Triune, 102.   
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Christian reflection on the Trinity of God declined in creativity and depth after the 
great achievements of the patristic era which ended around 500 to 600 CE.  Many 
theologians and church leaders in the Latin West regarded Augustine’s constructive 
proposals – especially De Trinitate – the final word on the subject.19
 
         
Augustine wrote extensively on the Trinity refining numerous points.  The aspect of his 
work on the Trinity that is important later in the philosophy of Malebranche and Berkeley 
is the differentiation of the persons of the Trinity. 
 Augustine held firmly that three persons of the Trinity were comprised of only 
one substance.  While in the creeds the Holy Spirit was implicitly considered 
consubstantial or of the same substance with the Father, Augustine made this explicit.20  
Augustine stressed that the three persons of the Trinity were differentiated by their works 
or attributes.  The work of the Trinity is complex.  On the one hand, all three persons of 
the Trinity are involved in all the works of God, but, on the other hand, each work can be 
appropriately applied to one of the persons of the Trinity.  For example, the Son alone is 
the subject of the incarnation since only the Son becomes man.  But the Father and the 
Holy Spirit are both also directly engaged in this work.21
 Augustine also differentiated among the Trinity by means of their relations within 
the Trinity.  This was perhaps the major impact that Augustine had on later Trinitarian 
discussions.  Augustine was somewhat uncomfortable with the term “person” as being 
applied to the Trinity because he feared it led to a conception of the Trinity where the 
three could be separated from the one.  Augustine held that the Trinity was one 
   
                                                 
19 Olson and Hall, The Trinity, 51. 
 
20 Letham, The Holy Trinity: In Scripture, History, Theology, and Worship, 188. 
 
21 Ibid., 187.   
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inseparable being.22  He did however use the term ‘persons’ in relation to the Trinity, but 
with some explanation.  He did not want the three persons of the Trinity to be understood 
in an analogous way as three separate individual human beings since the persons of the 
Godhead share one substance.  Instead, Augustine expressed that the three persons should 
be identified as a part of the whole first and foremost.23
 Once the term “person” is correctly understood as not being three separate beings 
analogous to three human beings, Augustine moves on to talk about the relations within 
the Trinity that distinguishes each person from the other.  God the Father is absolute 
being, simple, and indivisible.  In short, the Father is the principium, or source of all 
deity.
  So, the emphasis for Augustine 
is on the one substance over and above the separate persons of the Trinity.   
24  The Father being the source of all deity is important for understanding the 
relations within the Trinity.  The Father is the source of being.  The Father begets the 
Son, but this begetting is not a temporal begetting since both the Father and Son are 
eternal.25  The Father is also the source of the Holy Sprit who proceeds from the Father 
and the Son.  Augustine famously explained the Holy Spirit as the communion or mutual 
love between the Father and the Son.26
 Augustine also advanced the differentiation of the persons of the Trinity through 
analogies or illustrations.  This is an important feature of Augustine’s formulation of the 
  Yet, the Holy Spirit is still consubstantial with 
the Father.   
                                                 
22 Clark, “De Trinitate,” 96. 
 
23 Coppedge, The God Who Is Triune, 102. 
   
24 Clark, “De Trinitate,” 94. 
 
25 This is called the eternal begetting or generation of the Son and is not unique to Augustine, but predates 
even the early councils of Nicaea and Constantinople.  Olson and Hall, The Trinity, 33-50. 
 
26 Ibid., 103-04. 
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Trinity that is found in Malebranche and Berkeley.  Augustine’s analogies are very 
influential in both Roman Catholic churches as well as Protestant churches in the Modern 
period.   
 In books 8 – 15 of De Trinitate, Augustine looked for analogies of the Trinity 
within humans.  He felt he was justified in looking at the created human for evidence of 
the creator God because of the Christian claim that humans are made in the image of 
God.  This doctrine that humans are created in the image of God is found in the Old 
Testament book of Genesis and is therefore sometimes called the Genesis doctrine.27
 Augustine presents analogies for the Trinity in the De Trinitate and in the 
Confessions.  Augustine uses three analogies that are quite similar concerning the human 
mind.  The first is the triad of the mind, its knowledge, and its love.   
  The 
analogy that is repeated by Malebranche, Berkeley, and Jonathan Edwards is his triad of 
being, understanding, and will.   
And so there is a certain image of the Trinity: the mind itself, its knowledge, which is 
its offspring, and love is the third: these three are one and one substance.  The 
offspring is not less, while the mind knows itself as much as it is; nor is the love less, 
while the mind loves itself as much as it knows and as much as it is.28
 
   
The second analogy is found in De Trinitate involving memory, understanding, and will. 
Since these three, memory, understanding, and will, are, therefore, not three lives but 
one life, not three minds but one mind, it follows that they are certainly not three 
substances, but one substance… Therefore, these three are one in that they are one 
life, one mind, and one essence.  And whatever else they are called in respect to 
themselves, they are spoken of together, not in the plural but in the singular.29
                                                 
27 Jolley refers to this as the Genesis doctrine in Nicholas Jolley, “Berkeley and Malebranche on Causality 
and Volition,” in Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. J. A. Cover and Mark Kulstad 
(Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1990). 
   
 
28 In the same section as this quote, Augustine says that the love that seeks knowledge is also called ‘will’.   
Augustine, On the Trinity, ed. Gareth B. Matthews, trans. Stephen McKenna (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 40 [9.12.18].    
 




We can compare these two analogies.  The first aspect of the analogies is the mind or 
memory.  The second part of both analogies is similar: knowledge and understanding.  
The third looks somewhat different since the first is love and the second is will.  In fact, 
Augustine states in the midst of the first analogy that the love is the same thing as the 
will.30
 Augustine presents a third analogy concerning the human mind in the 
Confessions.  This is the analogy that seems to have the most staying power, at least for 
Malebranche and Berkeley; both present similar analogies to this one.  In Chapter 13, 
Augustine uses analogy of being, knowledge, and will as a means of understanding the 
Trinity. 
      
Who can understand the omnipotent Trinity? … There are three things, all found in 
man himself, which I should like men to consider… The three things are existence, 
knowledge, and will, for I can say that I am, I know, and I will… In these three – 
being, knowledge, and will – there is one inseparable life, one life, one mind, one 
essence; and therefore, although they are distinct from one another, the distinction 
does not separate them.31
 
  
Augustine’s primary goal in using these analogies is to explain the Trinity.  These 
analogies are examples from human experience that are intended to help us understand 
how something can be both three and one.    
 Augustine does not typically connect the three parts of the analogy directly to the 
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.  However, in one passage he does make a connection from 
each of the persons of the Trinity to one of the features of the mind.  Augustine says that 
the memory is like the Father or first person of the Trinity, the understanding is like the 
                                                 
30 Ibid., 40 [9.12.18]. 
 
31 Translation by R. S. Pine-Coffin in Augustine, Confessions, trans. R. S. Pine-Coffin (London, UK: 
Penguin Books, 1961). 
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Son, and the love or will is like the Holy Spirit.32  In all three respects he is very guarded 
in these associations, repeatedly stating that these likenesses are only to be understood 
loosely.  He does not make these same connections for the being, knowledge, and will 
triad although such a connection would not be contrary to the spirit of what he writes 
here.  Augustine frequently uses the analogy of the being, mind, and will, but he is 
reluctant to connect these three parts of the analogy to different persons of the Trinity.  
As will be seen below, this connection of each person of the Trinity to a part of the 
analogy to the human mind will become emphasized more than Augustine himself 
desired.33
   This analogy of the Trinity to being, understanding, and will is found in the 
metaphysics of Malebranche and Berkeley.  In the history of interpretation of Augustine, 
what he intended as a mere analogy or illustration of the Trinity shows up as a full 
metaphysical picture.  This metaphysical picture connects each of these features of the 
mind to one person of the Trinity.  The mind, memory, and being are all associated with 
the Father.  Knowledge, reason, and understanding are connected to the Son.  And the 
love or will of God is connected to the Holy Spirit.  I call this the “amplified analogy”.  
What was merely a psychological illustration of the Trinity for Augustine became a 
   
                                                 
32 “Although the memory of man, and particularly that which beasts do not have, namely, that in which 
intelligible things are so contained that they do not come into it through the senses of the body, has, in 
proportion to its own small measure in this image of the Trinity, a likeness, incomparably unequal, of 
course, but yet a likeness of whatever kind it may be to the Father; and similarly, although the 
understanding of man, which is formed from the memory by the attention of thought, when that which is 
known is spoken—it is a word of the heart and belongs to no language—has in its great unlikeness some 
likeness to the Son; and although the love of man which proceeded from knowledge and combines the 
memory and the understanding, as though common to the parent and the offspring—whence it is 
understood to be neither the parent and the offspring—whence it is understood to be neither the parent nor 
the offspring—has in this image some likeness, although very unequal, to the Holy Spirit, yet we do not 
find that , as in this image of the Trinity, these three are not the one man, but belong to the one man, so in 
the highest Trinity itself, whose image this is, are those three of one God, but they are the one God, and 
there are three Persons, not one.  Augustine, On the Trinity, 213 [15.23.43].  
 
33 This is what I call the amplified analogy that we see in Edwards.   
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component of later systematic theology because of how this illustration was used by 
Anselm and St. Thomas Aquinas.34
 We will see in sections 3.2 and 3.3 that Malebranche and Berkeley hold versions 
of this amplified analogy.  Jonathan Edwards also held the amplified analogy.  His 
development of this analogy is very close to what we will see in Malebranche and 
Berkeley.  Since Jonathan Edwards was an American philosopher and theologian who 
lived in New England his entire life, it may seem strange to examine his account here.  
He was in North America while Malebranche and Berkley were in France and Britain, 
respectively, and Edwards was younger than both Malebranche and Berkeley.  While it is 
possible that Augustine was a common influence on both Malebranche and Berkeley’s 
views on the Trinity, it is impossible that Edwards could have been a common influence 
on both earlier philosophers.  So, why dedicate time and space to Edwards’ view of the 
Trinity? 
   
 It is helpful to look at Edwards’s account for a number of reasons.  First, as was 
pointed out earlier, some strands of Augustine’s thought on the Trinity were picked up 
and altered in some ways by later thinkers.  One way to see what these strands looked 
like by the time of Malebranche and Berkeley is to trace them through all the 
philosophers and theologians that advanced Augustine’s ideas.  But, another way to get a 
similar result is by looking at what contemporaries of Malebranche and Berkeley had also 
picked up concerning Augustine’s account of the Trinity.  I think that Edwards’ use of the 
amplified analogy shows that this interpretation of Augustine was in the air during the 
early modern period.       
                                                 
34 Letham, The Holy Trinity: In Scripture, History, Theology, and Worship, 198.  
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 One reason to look at Edwards is that he was a contemporary of both 
Malebranche and Berkeley.  Edwards was not part of the philosophical and theological 
circles of Malebranche or Berkeley, nor did Malebranche or Berkeley write in response to 
any of Edwards’ works.  Still, Edwards was alive at the same time as both Malebranche 
and Berkeley and therefore was a part of the same intellectual era.35  While Edwards’ 
actual life only overlapped Malebranche’s for a bit over 10 years, I am calling Edwards a 
contemporary of these men because all three philosophers lived and wrote during the 
later parts of the early modern period.36
 In addition to being a contemporary of Malebranche and Berkeley, albeit a bit 
younger, Edwards also held some philosophical similarities to both Malebranche and 
   Since Edwards was a contemporary of 
Malebranche and Berkeley, we can examine the writing of Edwards to get a feel for the 
shape of philosophical theology during the early modern period.     
                                                 
35 Of the three, Malebranche was the oldest.  He lived from 1638 to 1715 and published his first edition of 
the Search in 1674 at the age of 36.  But Malebranche lived to the age of 77 so he was alive at the same 
time as both younger men.  Berkeley, who lived from 1685-1753 was 47 years younger than Malebranche.  
But Berkeley published early, the Principles was published in 1710 when he was 25 years old and when 
Malebranche was 72 years old.  Despite Malebranche’s age, there is some historical evidence that 
Malebranche was aware of Berkeley and there is conjecture that the may have even met. Edwards was the 
youngest of the three, he lived from 1703 to 1758, making him 65 years younger than Malebranche and 18 
years younger than Berkeley.  Edwards studied at Yale and was a tutor there before becoming a pastor.  
While Berkeley was living in Rhode Island, Edwards was serving as a pastor in nearby Massachusetts.  
There is reason to think that Edwards read Berkeley, but there is no evidence that the two men met while 
Berkeley was living in New England.  For these dates see Nicolas Malebranche, The Search after Truth, ed. 
Thomas M. Lennon and Paul J. Olscamp, trans. Thomas M. Lennon and Paul J. Olscamp, Cambridge Texts 
in the History of Philosophy (Cambridge: UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997).  For discussions of the 
alleged meeting between Malebranche and Berkeley see A. A. Luce, Berkeley and Malebranche; a Study in 
the Origins of Berkeley's Thought (London, UK: Oxford University Press, 1934), 208-10.  Charles J. 
McCracken, Malebranche and British Philosophy (New York: NY: Clarendon Press, 1983), 210.  See also 
Kenneth P. Minkema’ Chronology at the beginning of  Sang Hyun Lee, The Princeton Companion to 
Jonathan Edwards (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), xxiii-xxviii.  And David Berman, 
George Berkeley: Idealism and the Man (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1994), 101-04. 
 
36 I am using here the timetable that holds that the Early Modern period ends with Kant’s publication of the 
Critique of Pure Reason in 1781.    
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Berkeley.37  There are good reasons to think that Edwards read both Malebranche and 
Berkeley while at Yale.  The library had copies of Malebranche’s Search as well as 
Berkeley’s Principles.38  But even if Edwards did not actually read these philosophers, 
the philosophical similarities are striking.  Edwards held that the world which we 
perceive is an ideal world that is in God.39  Edwards was associated with occasionalism 
and held a doctrine of continuous creation.40
 But the most important reason to look at Edwards’ view of the Trinity before we 
look to Malebranche and Berkeley is that Edwards gives a more thoroughgoing 
discussion of the Trinity.  Edwards is a good resource because, as I show in sections 3.2 
and 3.3, Malebranche and Berkeley adopt views of the Trinity that are similar to that of 
Edwards.   
  Given Edwards philosophical affinities with 
both Malebranche and Berkeley and his being a contemporary of both, his thought will 
prove to be enlightening concerning the Trinity because he states the amplified analogy 
more sharply than what can be found in Malebranche or Berkeley.   
                                                 
37 For the relationship and similarities between Malebranche and Edwards, see McCracken, Malebranche 
and British Philosophy, 329-40, Jasper Reid, “The Trinitarian Metaphysics of Jonathan Edwards and 
Nicolas Malebranche,” The Heythrop Journal 43, no. 2 (2002).  For the same between Berkeley and 
Edwards see  Stephen H. Daniel, “Berkeley's Christian Neoplatonism, Archetypes, and Divine Ideas,” 
Journal of the History of Philosophy 39 (2001), Sang Hyun Lee, The Philosophical Theology of Jonathan 
Edwards (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).   
 
38 While Edwards never states that he read both Malebranche and Berkeley, both Malebranche’s Search and 
Berkeley’s Principles were available at the library at Yale while Edwards was a student.  The evidence that 
Edwards may have read both Berkeley and Malebranche is pointed out in Lee, The Philosophical Theology 
of Jonathan Edwards, 59, footnote 29.  McCracken, Malebranche and British Philosophy, 329-31.    
 
39 Reid, “The Trinitarian Metaphysics of Jonathan Edwards and Nicolas Malebranche,” 152-53. 
McCracken, Malebranche and British Philosophy, 330-31. 
 
40 There is debate concerning Edwards position on occasionalism.  McCracken says that Edwards “taught a 
thoroughgoing doctrine of occasionalism” while Lee rejects that Edwards held to the position at all.  Lee 
points out that Edwards instead holds a doctrine of continuous creation but is not occasionalism.  




 Perhaps Edwards wrote more carefully on the matter of the Trinity because he 
was more interested in doing theology than Malebranche or Berkeley.  As I argued in 
section 1.1, Malebranche and Berkeley were not concerned with doing the work of a 
theologian.  Their concerns were philosophical in nature and they borrow from their 
theological views at times to aid them in their philosophical projects.  On the other hand, 
Edwards was a theologian.  His works include treatises on the Christian Scriptures, 
human sin, and the Trinity.  Edwards was also interested in philosophical matters, but he 
was more interested in theology than either Malebranche or Berkeley.  Whatever the 
reason, Edwards wrote more fully and systematically on the Trinity than Malebranche or 
Berkeley.  This is the primary reason that Edwards’ work is helpful.      
 Edwards stresses the same two characteristics of the Trinity that were pointed out 
from Augustine: the relational differentiation between the three persons of the Trinity and 
the analogy of being, understanding, and will.  The first follows Augustine’s account 
fairly closely while the second is an advance on Augustine’s analogy, which is why I call 
it the “amplified analogy”.  
 Edwards clearly held the Augustinian distinctions between persons of the Trinity, 
as well as the Nicaean formulation. 
I think that it is within the reach of naked reason to perceive certainly that there are 
three distinct things in God, each which is the same [God], three that must be distinct; 
and that there are not nor can be any more distinct, really and truly distinct, but three, 
either distinct persons or properties or anything else; and that of these three, one is 
(more properly than anything else) begotten of the other, and that the third proceeds 
alike from both, and that the first neither is begotten nor proceeds.41
 
    
Edwards shows that he embraced the three in one doctrine.   
                                                 
41 Edwards, Works, Vol 13, pg 258. (The ‘Miscellanies’, no.94).  In this passage, it seems that Edwards 
disagrees with Augustine and Aquinas that the Trinity is a doctrine that is not open to natural reason, but he 
says more about this elsewhere where he lines up with the notion that the Trinity is only available from 
Divine revelation.   
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 Secondly, and more importantly for our purposes, Edwards embraced the analogy 
of being, understanding, and will from Augustine.   
There are two more eminent and remarkable images of the Trinity among the 
creatures.  The one is in the spiritual creation, [the] soul of man.  There is the mind, 
and the understanding or idea, and the spirit of the mind, as it is called in Scripture, 
i.e. the disposition, the will or affection.42
  
  
But Edwards places more emphasis on this analogy than does Augustine.  While 
Augustine uses the psychological analogy only to help understand the nature of the 
Trinity, Edwards holds the amplified analogy.  He connects each of the persons of the 
trinity to a different attribute or activity of God, something that Augustine was hesitant to 
do.  God the Father is God in pure essence or being.  God the Son is the intellect, 
wisdom, or understanding of God, also called God’s Word.  God the Holy Spirit is the 
active nature of God, hence the love or will of God.     
And this I suppose to that blessed Trinity that we read of in the holy Scriptures.  The 
Father is the Deity subsisting in the prime, unoriginated and most absolute manner, or 
the Deity is in its direct existence.  The Son is the Deity generated by God’s 
understanding, or having an idea of himself, and subsisting in that idea.  The Holy 
Ghost is the Deity subsisting in act of the divine essence flowing out and breathed 
forth, in God’s infinite love to and delight himself.  And I believe the whole divine 
essence does truly and distinctly subsist both in the divine idea and divine love, and 
that therefore each of them are properly distinct persons.  And it confirms me in it, 
that this the true Trinity, because reason is sufficient to tell us that there must be these 
distinctions in the Diety, viz. of God (absolutely considered), and the idea of God, 
and the love and delight; and there are no other real distinctions in God that can be 
thought [of].43
 
     
The primary reason to introduce Edwards is due to this development on Augustine’s 
analogy.  As I show below, both Malebranche and Berkeley hold similar accounts of the 
                                                 
42 Ibid., Vol 21, pg 139. (Discourse on the Trinity).    
 
43  Ibid., Vol 21, pg 132 (Discourse on the Trinity).  Edwards says the same thing in Edwards, Works.(The 
‘Miscellanies’, no.94).   
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amplified analogy as Edwards and both attach these activities to each of the persons of 
the Trinity. 
 There are metaphysical implications from these attachments.  The first concerns 
the metaphysical definition of a substance.  A philosopher who believes that the Trinity 
consists of three persons and one substance is going to try and define substance in such a 
way to make sense of this claim.  Secondly, a philosopher who embraces the amplified 
analogy will hold that each of the persons of the Trinity is distinct in relation to the 
creation concerning their roles.  God the Father will be connected to the creation as its 
source of being.  God the Son will be connected to the creation as intelligence of 
understanding and the Holy Spirit will play the role of God’s efficacious will.  I show 
below that Malebranche and Berkeley connect the persons of the Trinity to the creation in 




 Malebranche nowhere explicitly states that he embraces the doctrine of the Trinity 
or that it influences his metaphysics.44  Nevertheless some of the recent secondary 
literature on Malebranche has pointed out that he embraced a Trinitarian metaphysical 
picture.45
                                                 
44 Malebranche does talk about the Trinity, but he does not give any arguments in support of this doctrine, 
perhaps because he considered it a mystery. 
  Jasper Reid argues that Malebranche structured his metaphysics from a 
“We believe the mystery of the Trinity, for example, although the human mind cannot conceive it; and 
yet we do not give up our belief that two things now differing from a third are not different from each 
other, although this proposition seems to overthrow it.”  (LO 245) 
 
45 The seminal work seems to be by Jasper Reid in two articles.  Reid, “The Trinitarian Metaphysics of 
Jonathan Edwards and Nicolas Malebranche.” And Jasper Reid, “Malebranche on Intelligible Extension,” 
British Journal for the History of Philosophy 11 (2003).  This same idea has also been mentioned by 
Andrew Pessin, “Malebranche's "Vision in God",” Philosophy Compass 1, no. 1 (2006).  There is a section 
concerning Malebranche’s Trinitarian metaphysics in a PhD dissertation by Brandon Watson at the 
University of Toronto Brandon Watson, “The External World and the Fall from Reason: Malebranche's 
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traditional Trinitarian model that was common during his day in two works: 
“Malebranche on Intelligible Extension” and “The Trinitarian Metaphysics of Jonathan 
Edwards and Nicolas Malebranche.”46
 Reid argues that a metaphysical outlook derived from the Trinity was common 
during Malebranche’s time, largely due to the influence of Augustine.
  While Reid notices that that Malebranche accepts 
a Trinitarian model of metaphysics, he does not show how the Trinity is relevant in 
Malebranche’s other metaphysical doctrines.  I go beyond Reid’s work in two ways.  
First, I give more textual support for the claim that Malebranche accepts the Trinity.  
Secondly, I show how the Trinity is philosophically relevant to Malebranche’s theory of 
causation.    
47  Reid highlights 
some of the same features of Augustine’s view of the Trinity that I pointed out above in 
section 3.1.  Namely, that Augustine’s work on the Trinity was grounded in the historical 
dispute that led to the Nicene Creed which affirmed that the three Persons of the Trinity 
were consubstantial or held common being.48
                                                                                                                                                 
Account of Our Knowledge of the Existence and Nature of Bodies” (PhD diss., University of Toronto, 
2005). 
  Augustine held that there are three persons 
of the Trinity but only one substance, God.  This Trinitarian account goes on to explain 
how God creates the world.  God creates all things through the relationship that exists 
between all three members of the Trinity.  The Father creates through wisdom, or the 
Son, as well as through love or will, the Holy Spirit.  Therefore, all three persons are 
46 Reid, “Malebranche on Intelligible Extension.”, Reid, “The Trinitarian Metaphysics of Jonathan Edwards 
and Nicolas Malebranche.” 
 
47 Reid, “Malebranche on Intelligible Extension,” 588. and Reid, “The Trinitarian Metaphysics of Jonathan 
Edwards and Nicolas Malebranche,” 153. 
 
48Clark, “De Trinitate,” 91-95.  
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involved in the creation of the world.  Reid points out that Malebranche embraced this 
Trinitarian framework from Augustine.   
 I expand upon Reid’s work by giving a more comprehensive textual argument that 
Malebranche holds to a Trinitarian picture.49
 Malebranche accepts the Trinity as formulated by the Nicene Creed.  He thinks 
that the Son is consubstantial with the Father.  Malebranche does not explicitly state this, 
but this conclusion follows from what he does say.  First of all, Malebranche states that 
the Son, Jesus Christ, is the same as the Word and Wisdom of God. 
  More than that, I show that Malebranche 
actually holds the theological doctrine of the Trinity alongside his philosophical 
doctrines.  While talking about occasionalism, Malebranche says some things that will 
strike many of his philosophical readers as strange.  An understanding of his Trinitarian 
picture will help make those sayings less strange.   
We have but one true Master, Jesus Christ, our Lord, the eternal Wisdom, the Word 




From this passage, we are justified in reading Malebranche’s uses of Word and Wisdom 
as referring to the Son.  Malebranche adds that the Word of God is also Reason. 
Although this idea that we receive through the immediate union we have with the 
Word of God, sovereign Reason, never deceives us by itself  as do those we receive 
because of the union we have with our bodies (LO 242-242) 
 
The final move to see Malebranche’s Nicene account of the Trinity is that Reason is also 
God Himself.   
                                                 
49 This is because I find that some of the texts that he presents in support for these claims are reaching for 
the conclusion that Malebranche holds a traditional account of the Trinity.  I provide stronger textual 
support for the claim that Malebranche embraces a Trinitarian picture.  I present a number of passages from 
Malebranche that Reid does not consider.  .    
 
50 Malebranche states that Jesus Christ is the Word elsewhere:   
“… and which overturns the entire edifice of the Christian religion by despoiling Jesus Christ or the 
Word of God of His divinity,…”  (LO 650) 
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This reason, therefore, is not different from God Himself; it is, therefore, coeternal 
and consubstantial with Him.  (LO 614)  
 
Malebranche says that the Son is the same thing as the Word or Reason and that Reason 
is coeternal and consubstantial with God.51  This language reminds us of the precise 
language from the Nicene Creed concerning the relationship between the Father and the 
Son.  The creed states that the Son is consubstantial with the Father.52
 Malebranche also says that the third person of the Trinity, the Holy Spirit receives 
the entirety of the substance of God.   
   
The Son and the Holy Spirit do not participate in the divine Being, they receive it in 
its entirety.  (DM 22)  
 
Another way of saying this is that the Holy Spirit is also consubstantial with the Father 
and the Son.53
 Malebranche also makes the same differentiation of the persons of the Trinity as 
Augustine.  God begets the Son, and the Holy Spirit is generated from the Father and the 
Son. 
  So, Malebranche’s theory of the Trinity matches the traditional account 
from the Nicene Creed.  God is one substance in three persons; Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit.   
                                                 
51 Malebranche also writes:   
“This learned man did not notice that there was an order, a law, a sovereign reason that God 
necessarily loves, which is coeternal with Him and according to which He necessarily acts, given that 
he wills to act.”  (LO 587)   
 
52 Notice the similarity between what Malebranche says and the Nicene Creed quoted above: 
And in one Lord Jesus Christ the Son of God, begotten as only begotten of the Father, that is for the 
substance of the father, God of God, Light of Light, true God of true God, begotten not made, 
consubstantial with the Father, through whom all things came into existence, both things in heaven and 
things on earth; 
 
53 Reid takes Malebranche to hold that the Holy Spirit is also consubstantial with the Son and the Father 
from a passage from LO 620 which I quote below in reference to the Holy Spirit.  “But, again, He could 
conclude this without ever having to look outside Himself at the created world itself, because His will was 
also consubstantial with Him, this time as the third person of the Trinity.  Reid, “Malebranche on 
Intelligible Extension,” 589. 
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The saints in heaven see by an evident light that the Father begets His Son and that 
the Father and the Son produce the Holy Spirit, for these emanations are necessary.”  
(LO 574) 
 
In this passage Malebranche displays both the eternal begetting of the Son and the eternal 
proceeding of the Holy Spirit, which are both found from Augustine’s differentiation of 
the persons of the Trinity.  He also agrees with this Augustinian picture that God creates 
the world in accord with this Trinitarian account. 
For since God cannot act in ignorance and in spite of Himself, He created the world 
according to wisdom and through the impulse of His love—He made all things 
through his Son and the Holy Spirit as Scripture teaches us.  (LO 620)     
    
We can conclude that Malebranche accepts both the Nicene account of the Trinity—that 
God is one substance with three persons—and he also accepts Augustine’s differentiation 
of the persons of the Trinity.     
 Malebranche also embraces the amplified analogy.  He equates God the father 
with absolute being. 
God’s essence is His own absolute being (LO 231)54
 
 
Malebranche equates the second person of the Trinity with reason, wisdom, or the word. 
Malebranche is clear that he speaks of the second person of the Trinity in many different 
ways.   
I have said this before and I repeat it: only sovereign Reason makes us rational, only 
sovereign Truth enlightens us, only God speaks to us clearly and can teach us.  We 
have but one true Master, Jesus Christ, our Lord, the eternal Wisdom, the Word of the  
Father in whom are all the treasures of the knowledge and wisdom of God:… (LO 
649)55
                                                 
54 Here are other passages where Malebranche makes this same claim concerning God: 
 
“But such is not the case with created minds, which can see in themselves neither the essence nor the 
existence of things.  They cannot see the essence of things within themselves since, given their own 
limitations, created minds cannot contain all things as God does, who might be termed universal being, 
or simply, He Who Is, as He calls Himself.”  (LO 229) 
“There are only three kinds of beings about which we have any knowledge and to which we can have 





So, from these passages, we see that Malebranche embraces the amplified analogy 
concerning the Father and the Son.  God the Father is absolute being and therefore the 
source of everything and the Son is God’s word, wisdom, or reason.    
 The final part of the amplified analogy is that Malebranche also connects the third 
person of the Trinity to God’s love or will, as Edwards did.  Malebranche clearly 
connects the Holy Spirit to God’s love.  In the same passage quoted above, he creates a 
parallel between God’s wisdom and love and then between the Son and the Holy Spirit.    
He created the world according to wisdom and through the impulse of His love—He 
made all things through his Son and the Holy Spirit as Scripture teaches us.  (LO 620)     
 
In this passage the Holy Spirit, or the love of God, is active in the creation of the world.  
Malebranche extends this activity to the will of God, thereby showing that the Holy Spirit 
is also connected to God’s will.   
We ought to know that it is God’s will that creates and rules nature, that the force or 
power of natural causes is but his will, and in a word, that all things depend upon God 
in every way.  (LO 291) 
 
God wills that a certain kind of world exist.  His will is omnipotent, and this world is 
thus created.  Let God no longer will there to be a world, and it is thereby annihilated.  
For the world assuredly depends on the will of the creator.  (DM 112) 
 
Malebranche in these passages and many more like them is talking about the third person 
of the Trinity.  We know this because of the similar language with both Augustine and 
Edwards.  Malebranche says that God creates the world through the Holy Spirit or love, 
but in the vast majority of passages he simply refers to this active part of God as God’s 
will.  Therefore, we can see that Malebranche holds the amplified analogy.   
                                                                                                                                                 
 
55 “All ideas are present in the divine Word or universal Reason, and our intellects discover ideas in it, 
insofar as God wishes to reveal them to us”.  (DM 32) 
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 Malebranche’s acceptance of the amplified analogy causes him to speak about the 
persons of the Trinity according to this analogy.  So, when he speaks of absolute being, 
he is referring to that distinguishing feature of first person of the Trinity.  When he 
speaks of God’s word, reason, or wisdom, he is talking about the second person of the 
Trinity.  And finally, when he talks about God’s will or love, he is referring to the action 
of the third person of the Trinity.   
 Malebranche’s amplified analogy is found throughout his works.  We can now 
begin to see the philosophical application of the theology of the Trinity for Malebranche.  
Puzzling passages from Malebranche are made clearer with an understanding of his 
position on the Trinity.  For example, Malebranche appears inconsistent concerning who 
or what can act upon or enlighten the human mind.  Malebranche’s occasionalism entails 
that God is the only true cause.   
…God alone can act in us and enlighten us… (DM 78)56
 
 
Yet Malebranche states in other passages that many other entities act on the human mind.  
The Word enlightens.  
We believe, finally, that all minds see eternal laws, as well as other things, in God, 
but with a certain difference.  They know order and eternal truths, and even the 
beings that God has made according to these truths or according to order, through the 
union these minds necessarily have with the Word, or wisdom of God, which 
enlightens them, as has just been explained.  (LO 234) 
 
Reason enlightens.  
                                                 
56 See also this passage translated by Susan Peppers-Bates, “Does Malebranche Need Efficacious Ideas? 
The Cognitive Faculties, the Ontological Status of Ideas, and Human Attention,” Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 43 (2005).  96 
Thus, God, the infinitely perfect Being, including eminently in himself all that there is of reality or 
perfection in all Beings, can represent them to us in touching us with his essence, not taken absolutely, 
but taken insofar as it is relative to those beings, because his infinite essence includes all there is of 
true reality in all finite beings.  Thus God alone acts immediately in our soul; he alone is our life, our 
light, and our wisdom.  (OC XV 23) 
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I suggest this to you, I say, on the ground that it is only Reason which enlightens us, 
that we are not a light unto ourselves nor an intelligence to anyone else.  (DM 37) 
  
In a word, they can never discover the truth by contemplating themselves.  They 
cannot be nourished by their own substance.  They can find the life of the intellect 
only in the universal Reason which animates all minds, which enlightens and leads all 
people.57
 
  (DM 33) 
Malebranche also refers to the Word as Wisdom which also enlightens.     
 
Since most men do not distinctly know that only Eternal Wisdom enlightens them, 
and that intelligible ideas that are their mind’s immediate object are not created, they 
imagine that eternal laws and immutable truths are established as such by a free 
volition of God: (LO 587) 
 
And, finally, Malebranche thinks that the will of God is efficacious and can enlighten 
humans.    
Therefore, His power is His will, and to communicate His power is to communicate 
the efficacy of His will.”  (LO 450) 
    
These passages taken together generate a mystery at best and a stream of inconsistencies 
at worst unless they are interpreted in light of Malebranche’s Trinitarian formulation.58
                                                 
57 There are other passages where Reason enlightens:   
  If 
Malebranche’s philosophical theology is ignored, these passages must be dismissed or 
written off as an unsolvable puzzle.  The key to understanding Malebranche here is his 
“They know nothing except by the light of the universal Reason which enlightens all minds, by the 
intelligible ideas it reveals to them in its wholly luminous substance” (DM 32) 
“For I cannot reiterate this to you too often: we must not consult our senses, our own modalities, which 
are only darkness, but Reason which enlightens us by its divine ideas, but the immutable, necessary, 
eternal truths.”  (DM 47) 
 
58 There are other passages that are mysterious until they are interpreted in light of Malebranche’s 
Trinitarian metaphysics:   
“… It is, then, the idea or archetype of bodies which affects us in different ways.  I mean, it is the 
intelligible substance of Reason which acts in our mind through its all-powerful efficacy and which 
touches and modifies it with color, taste, pain, by what there is within it representing bodies.”  (DM 
77) 
“But it should be carefully noted that we cannot conclude from their seeing all things in God in this 
way that our minds see the essence of God. God’s essence is His own absolute being, and minds do not 
see the divine substance taken absolutely but only as relative to creatures and to the degree that they 
can participate in it”  (LO 231) 
“Only He can enlighten our mind with His own substance” (LO 237)   
“Surely, only God, only His always efficacious substance, can affect, enlighten and nourish our minds, 
as Saint Augustine says”.  (LO 626) 
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acceptance of the Trinity and its metaphysical relevance.  Since all of these other entities 
are connected to the Trinity, Malebranche is making the same claim in every statement 
above.  When he says that the Word, Reason, and Will enlighten us, Malebranche is 
making the same claim in each passage— “God alone can act in us and enlighten us” 
(DM 78).  Malebranche holds that all three of these persons of the Trinity enlighten or act 
upon the mind or soul:  God enlightens, the Son enlightens, and the Holy Spirit 
enlightens.     
 What is particularly interesting about the list of passages above is the number of 
times that the particular agent Malebranche is talking about is the only agent that can act 
or enlighten. Malebranche says that only God enlightens (DM 78), only Reason 
enlightens (DM 33), and that only Wisdom enlightens (LO 587).  Apart from an 
understanding of Malebranche’s philosophical theology, it would be a mystery how 
Malebranche can claim that more than one entity is the only one than can enlighten.  But 
this does not create a puzzle given Malebranche’s Trinitarian perspective, which he 
makes clear in the Search.   
I have said this before and I repeat it: only sovereign Reason makes us rational, only 
sovereign Truth enlightens us, only God speaks to us clearly and can teach us.  We 
have but one true Master, Jesus Christ, our Lord, the eternal Wisdom, the Word of the 
Father in whom are all the treasures of the knowledge and wisdom of God:…  
(LO 649) 
 
This passage makes clear Malebranche’s view concerning the relationship between the 
first two persons of the Trinity, the Father and the Son.  Both hold the full substance of 
God, so to say that only Reason, or the Second person of the Trinity, can enlighten is the 
same as saying that only God does this activity. 59
                                                 
59 Here is another similar passage where Malebranche makes clear this same relationship.  
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 I have shown that Malebranche holds an account of the Trinity that is similar to 
the Nicene Creed, Augustine, and Edwards.  He holds that God is one substance with 
three distinct parts or persons.  He also follows the Augustinian tradition concerning the 
differentiation between the persons of the Trinity.  And he holds the amplified analogy, 
connecting each person of the Trinity with a particular attribute or activity of God.   
 I have already shown that an understanding of Malebranche’s commitment to the 
Trinity helps us understand passages that would otherwise be mysterious.  There are also 
three other ways in which the doctrine of the Trinity is philosophically relevant for 
Malebranche.  The first concerns Malebranche’s notion of divine substance.  
Malebranche holds an account of God’s substance that is consistent with his account of 
the Trinity.   Malebranche not only says that the three persons of the Trinity share the 
same divine substance with God, he also says that ideas share in the divine substance as 
well.  Just as he spoke of each of the persons of the Trinity being able to act upon or 
enlighten the mind, he also says the same thing concerning ideas.           
I believe that there are essential differences between knowing and sensing, between 
the ideas which enlighten the mind and the sensations which affect it.  (DM 35) 
 
 Malebranche makes similar statements concerning ideas holding divine properties 
throughout his works.  For example, Malebranche holds that ideas are causally active.  
This generates a puzzle.  Given his occasionalism, Malebranche thinks that God is the 
only true cause.  But he also says that ideas are causally active.  I show how 
Malebranche’s Trinitarian metaphysics solves this puzzle in section 4.2.  For now, it is 
enough to point out that Malebranche’s acceptance of the Trinity is philosophically 
                                                                                                                                                 
“He is indeed able not to produce anything external to Himself; but if He wills to act, He can do so 
only according to the immutable order of wisdom that He necessarily loves.  For religion and wisdom 
teach me that He does nothing without His Son, without His Word, without His wisdom.”  (LO 587)  
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relevant for his metaphysical view on the divine substance:  all three persons of the 
Trinity share the divine substance and, apparently, Malebranche says that ideas share this 
divine substance as well.     
 The second area where we see the philosophical relevance of Malebranche’s 
doctrine of the Trinity is his theory of causation.  As was pointed out in 1.2, Malebranche 
is an occasionalist: that is the view that God is the only true cause.  All other apparent 
causes are merely occasional causes for God to work.  Malebranche’s theory of the 
Trinity from his philosophical theology is relevant to his occasionalism because of the 
emphasis Malebranche places on the third person of the Trinity, or the will of God. 
 Andrew Pyle suggests that Malebranche supports his occasionalism with two very 
different lines of argument: a “thin argument” concerning necessary connection and a 
“deep argument” from continuous creation.60
 According to his “thin” argument, Malebranche believes that a cause must be 
necessarily connected with its effect.  The only substance that meets this requirement is 
the will of God.  Since God is omnipotent, what he wills necessarily comes about.    
  I agree with Pyle that Malebranche uses 
both arguments to support this theory, and I add that there is one important similarity 
found in both arguments that Pyle does not highlight—both rely upon the will of God, or 
the third person of the Trinity. 
A true cause as I understand it is one such that the mind perceives a necessary 
connection between it and its effect.  Now the mind perceives a necessary connection 
only between the will of an infinitely perfect being and its effects.  Therefore, it is 
only God who is the true cause and who truly has the power to move bodies…  God 
needs no instrument to act; it suffices that He wills in order that a thing be, because it 
                                                 
60 “Malebranche has two very different lines of argument in support of his occasionalism.  There is what 
might be called the ‘thin’ argument, starting with the notion of cause as a necessary connection, and 
arguing that only God’s will meets this condition.  Then there is the ‘deep’ argument, taking its origin from 
the theological doctrine of continuous creation, which we touched on briefly in our discussion of Descartes 
in Chapter Two.”  Andrew Pyle, Malebranche (New York, NY: Routledge, 2002), 97-98. 
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is a contradiction that He should will and that what He wills should not happen.  
Therefore, His power is His will, and to communicate His power is to communicate 
the efficacy of His will.  (LO 450) 
 
All that God willed then, He wills yet; and because His will is efficacious, He 
produces what he wills (LO 340)61
 
 
Recall that Malebranche’s acceptance of the amplified analogy of the Trinity means that 
when he refers to God’s will, he is referring to the third person of the Trinity: the Holy 
Spirit.  With that in mind, Malebranche’s view of causation hangs on the Holy Spirit.  
Only God’s will, the Holy Spirit, is necessarily connected with effects.  So, 
Malebranche’s argument from necessary connection highlights the role of the Holy Spirit 
in his occasionalism.    
 The same thing is true of Malebranche’s “deep” argument from continuous 
creation.  It also rests upon the third person of the Trinity.  In short, Malebranche believes 
that the earth and everything in it remains in existence only because God is continuously 
re-creating them.62
For I believe it certain that conservation is but continued creation, for it is but the 
same will of God, who continues to will what He has willed, and this is the general 
view among theologians.  A body, for example, exists because God wills that it exist, 
and He wills that it exist either here or there, for He cannot create it nowhere.  And if 
He creates it here, is it conceivable that a creature should displace it and move it 
  Malebranche’s argument for continuous creation rests on the will of 
God.    
                                                 
61 Here are two other passages where Malebranche’s view of causation rests on the will of God: 
“But what is a moving body?  It is a body transported by a divine action.  The action which transports 
it can also transport that body which it meets, if it is extended to it.  Who doubts this?  However, this 
action—this motive force—does not in any way belong to body.  It is the efficacy of the will of Him 
who creates them or who conserves them successively in different places.”  (DM 119) 
“We ought to know that it is God’s will that creates and rules nature, that force or power of natural 
causes is but His will, and in a word, that all things depend upon God in every way.”  (LO 291) 
 
62 For two good treatments of Malebranche’s continuous creation see Pyle, Malebranche.  And the 
Introduction to Nicolas Malebranche, Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion, ed. Nicholas Jolley, 




elsewhere unless God at the same time wills to create it elsewhere in order to share 
His power with His creature as far as it is capable of it? 
 
… an ignorance of God’s continuous operations on His creatures could make us 
imagine a cause of this union other than the always efficacious will of God (LO 339) 
 
 Malebranche’s Trinitarian metaphysics is philosophically relevant to his 
occasionalism.  Both arguments that Malebranche uses to support his occasionalism rest 
upon the will of God, or the third person of the Trinity.  Malebranche has constructed a 
theory of causation that is consistent with his acceptance of the amplified analogy of 
Trinity.   
 The final way in which Malebranche’s Trinitarian metaphysics is relevant for his 
view of causation does not concern his occasionalism per se, but his theory of the 
creation of the world.  Malebranche considered all three persons of the Trinity involved 
in the creation of the earth, including humans.  In one of the strongest Trinitarian 
passages in Malebranche, he states that all three persons of the Trinity are involved in the 
creation of humans.       
It is through this dependence, this relation, this union of our mind with the Word of 
God, and of our will with his love, that we are made in the image and likeness of 
God.  And though this image be greatly effaced through sin, yet it must subsist as 
long as we do.  But if we bear the image of the Word humiliated upon earth, and if we 
follow the impulses of the Holy Ghost, this union of our mind with the Word of the 
Father, and with the love of the Father and the Son, will be reestablished and made 
indelible.  (LO 235)     
 
Since humans are the image-bearers of God, all three persons of the Trinity are involved 
in our creation.63
 To summarize, Malebranche accepts an account of the Trinity that is similar to the 
Nicene formulation.  He also differentiates between the persons of the Trinity in the same 
  
                                                 
63 Jolley refers to the doctrine that humans are made in the image of God as the “Genesis doctrine”.  Jolley, 
“Berkeley and Malebranche on Causality and Volition.” 
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way as Augustine.  Malebranche advances Augustine’s thought by embracing the 
amplified analogy that connects the persons of the Trinity to a specific action or 
characteristic of God.  Recognizing these features of Malebranche’s Trinitarian doctrine 
from his philosophical theology helps make sense of many passages that would be 
puzzling otherwise.  Malebranche’s Trinitarianism is also philosophically relevant for his 
views concerning the divine substance, causation, and the creation of man.  
Malebranche’s commitment to the doctrine of the Trinity is philosophically relevant to 




 Berkeley also held a Traditional account of the Trinity that is philosophically 
relevant to his metaphysics.  Berkeley’s Trinitarianism has not been the subject of much 
attention.  The only paper that recognizes that Berkeley holds the doctrine of the Trinity 
is by Stephen Daniel.64  Daniel argues that Berkeley’s doctrine of the Trinity is important 
for understanding Berkeley’s divine ideas and alleged Neoplatonism.  He suggests that 
Berkeley evokes the Trinity in the context of a discussion on personal identity in the 
Philosophical Commentaries and in Alciphron.  Daniel cites passage from these works to 
support his thesis that Berkeley holds to a Trinitarian metaphysical picture.65
                                                 
64 Daniel, “Berkeley's Christian Neoplatonism, Archetypes, and Divine Ideas.”     
  I go 
beyond Daniel’s work by giving stronger textual support that Berkeley accepts the 
 
65 Many of the passages that Daniel cites are not clear.  The passages from the Commentaries are not 
Berkeley’s clearest presentation of the Trinity: 
“The danger of Expounding the H: Trinity by extension” (PC, 310)  
“The Concrete of the Will & Understanding I must call Mind not person, lest offence be given, there 
being but one volition acknowledge to be God.  Mem: Carefully to omit Defining of Person, or making 
much mention of it.”  (PC, 713) 
Alciphron is a much clearer presentation of Berkeley’s view of the Trinity and how it is related to 
understanding personal identity.  (Alc. 7.5–7.9)   
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Trinity.  I show that Berkeley’s doctrine of the Trinity can be found throughout his 
works, including the Principles.  I also point out that the Trinity is relevant to areas of 
Berkeley’s philosophy that Daniel does not mention.      
 It is surprising that Daniel is the only commentator who mentions Berkeley’s 
acceptance of the Trinity in light of the fact that there have been articles dedicated to 
explaining certain theological positions of Berkeley.66
 Unlike Malebranche, Berkeley explicitly states that he accepts the Trinity.  He 
also explicitly states that his view of the Trinity holds philosophical implications.  These 
explicit statements are found in two of his later, more theological works: Alciphron and 
Siris.
  This neglect of the Trinity in 
Berkeley is also surprising because of the amount of textual evidence for the Trinity from 
his works.  Neglecting Berkeley’s philosophical theology has philosophical ramifications.  
The philosopher who neglects Berkeley’s philosophical theology misses important 
background information that aids in his interpretation.        
67  In Alciphron, Berkeley endorses the Nicene formulation of the Trinity.  He states 
that Monotheism is true and that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are God.  He also states 
that the Trinity holds philosophical implications concerning substance and personality.68
“Whence it seems to follow that a man may believe the doctrine of the Trinity, if he 
finds it revealed in the Holy Scripture that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, 
 
                                                 
66 While many of these works imply that they are working on Berkeley’s theology, they are largely 
concerned with explaining Berkeley’s arguments for the existence of God.  Issues from Berkeley’s 
philosophical theology such as divine revelation and the Trinity are strangely absent.  Robert R. Hurlbutt, 
“Berkeley's Theology,” in George Berkeley: Lectures Delivered before the Philosophical Union of the 
University of California, ed. S. C. Pepper, Karl Aschenbrenner, and Benson Mates, University of California 
Publications in Philosophy (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1957), Douglas Jesseph, 
“Berkeley, God, and Explanation,” in Early Modern Philosophy: Mind, Matter, and Metaphysics, ed. 
Christia Mercer (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005), Douglas Jesseph, “Faith and Fluxions: 
Berkeley on Theology and Mathematics,” in New Interpretations of Berkeley's Thought, ed. Stephen H. 
Daniel (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2008). 
 
67 But these are not the only works where Berkeley’s doctrine of the Trinity can be found.   
 
68 Later in this same section I will show how Berkeley’s formulation of substance has a Trinitarian flavor.     
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are God, and that there is but one God, although he doth not frame in his mind any 
abstract or distinct ideas of trinity, substance, or personality; (Alc. 7.7)69
 
    
Later in the work, Berkeley displays that he is familiar with the council of Nicaea when 
he mentions the dispute between the homoousians and the homoiousians. 70
 While his Trinitarian metaphysical picture can be found throughout his works, 
Berkeley gives the doctrine of the Trinity the most prominent role in Siris.  Siris is a book 
where Berkeley weaves many strands of thought together, leading to a theological 
conclusion.  In the later sections of this book, Berkeley begins to trace a historical 
argument for the doctrine of the Trinity.  After looking at this doctrine from other 
historical philosophers, Berkeley concludes the Siris with a defense of the Trinity.  In this 
conclusion, we see hints of all three of the historical elements of the Trinity that were 
introduced in section 3.1:  The Nicene formulation, Augustine’s differentiation, and the 
amplified analogy:     
  Berkeley 
was certainly familiar with the traditional formulation of the Trinity and he affirms that 
he accepts this doctrine.   
There is first the source of all perfection, or Fons Deitatis; secondly, the supreme reason, 
order, or lógos; and lastly, the spirit, which quickens and inspires.  We are sprung from 
the Father, irradiated or enlightened by the Son, and moved by the Spirit.  Certainly, that 
there is Father, Son, and Spirit; that these bear analogy to the sun, light, and heat; and are 
                                                 
69 Here is the full passage:  
“Whence it seems to follow that a man may believe the doctrine of the Trinity, if he finds it revealed in 
the Holy Scripture that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, are God, and that there is but one God, 
although he doth not frame in his mind any abstract or distinct ideas of trinity, substance, or 
personality; provided that this doctrine of a Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier makes proper 
impressions on his mind, producing in therein love, hope, gratitude, and obedience, and thereby 
becomes a lively operative principle, influencing his life and actions, agreeably to that notion of saving 
faith which is required in a Christian.”  (Alc., 7.7)    
 
70 “What are we to think of then of the disputes and decisions of the famous Council of Nicea, and so many 
subsequent Councils?  What was the intention of those venerable Fathers, the homoousians and the 
homoiousians?  Why did they disturb themselves and the world with harsh words, and subtle 
controversies?”  (Alc., 7.9)    
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otherwise expressed by the terms Principle, Mind, and Soul, by One or tò én, Intellect, 
and Life, by Good, Word, and Love;…  (Siris, 362)71
 
   
The first person of the Trinity is the source of divinity, the second person is the reason, 
and the third person, the Holy Spirit, is active.  Berkeley gives a few analogies of the 
Trinity, all loosely connected to the analogies from Augustine.  So, we see Berkeley’s 
acceptance of the formulation of the Trinity from the Nicene Council: God is three 
persons and one substance.   
 While the passage just mentioned hints that Berkeley accepts the amplified 
analogy, this becomes clearer in another set of passages from Siris.  When speaking about 
the first person of the Trinity, Berkeley states that God is pure being.   
The one, or tò én, being immutable and indivisible, always the same and entire, was 
therefore thought to exist truly and originally… This gives unity, stability, reality, to 
things.  (Siris, 342)  
   
Berkeley also refers to Christ, the second person of the Trinity, as the Word and wisdom 
of God.72
He produced or made the Word … Christ is the wisdom of God by which all things 
were made (Siris, 359) 
 
 
But perhaps most significant for seeing the amplified analogy in Berkeley is through the 
way that Berkeley talks about the third person of the Trinity.  Berkeley stresses the 
casually efficacious will of God.  
But I say, the things by me perceived are known by the understanding, and produced 
by the will, of an infinite spirit.  (DHP, 215) 
                                                 
71 See also: 
And these were conceived to be necessary universal principals, co-existing and co-operating in such 
sort as never to exist asunder, but on the contrary to constitute one Sovereign of all things.  And, 
indeed, how could power or authority avail or subsist without knowledge?  Or either without life and 
action?  (Siris, 361) 
 
72 This is found in the section where Berkeley is finding these doctrines in philosophers of the past.  So 
these comments are made concerning what others believe, but from Berkeley’s conclusion to this section 




How therefore can you suppose, than an ill-perfect spirit, on whose will all things 
have an absolute and immediate dependence, should need an instrument in his 
operations, or not needing it make use of it?  (DHP, 219) 
 
From the effects I see produced, I conclude there are actions; and because actions, 
volitions; and because there are volitions, there must be a will.  (DHP, 240)  
 
In these passages Berkeley nowhere connects the will of God with the third person of the 
Trinity.  But through the preponderance of evidence that Berkeley accepts the doctrine of 
the Trinity, and the evidence that he accepts the amplified analogy, we can safely assume 
that Berkeley sees a connection between the will of God and the Holy Spirit.   
 While it has gone largely unnoticed, it is clear that Berkeley accepts the doctrine 
of the Trinity.  Berkeley accepts the Nicene formulation of the Trinity; that God is one 
substance in three persons.  His formulation of the Trinity follows Augustine’s 
differentiation of the persons.  Berkeley also accepts the amplified analogy, creating 
connections between each of the persons of the Trinity with various roles: Father with 
being, Son with wisdom or understanding, and Holy Spirit with will.   
 Berkeley also held that the doctrine of the Trinity is philosophically relevant to 
his metaphysics.  First of all, Siris is important for understanding how Berkeley 
considered this doctrine to be philosophically relevant.  As I said before, the work is 
considered mysterious since it begins by prescribing the drinking of tar water for 
medicinal purposes and it ends with a defense of Theism.  There is disagreement 
concerning Berkeley’s aim in writing this book.  Some interpreters dismiss it as the 




out of its twists and turns.73
 At the end of the Siris, Berkeley points out that there are traces of the doctrine of 
the Trinity in non-Christian philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus as well as 
in early philosophical schools such as the Egyptians and Chaldeans.
  I interpret this work as providing one long argument that the 
Trinity is philosophically relevant for his contemporaries.  He is advising that 
philosophers should take heed before abandoning this doctrine.     
74
Therefore, how unphilosophical soever that doctrine may seem to many of the present 
age, yet it is certain the man of greatest fame and learning among the ancient 
philosophers held a Trinity in the Godhead.  It must be owned that upon this point 
some later Platonists of the Gentile world seem to have bewildered themselves (as 
many Christians have also done) while they pursued the hints derived from their 
predecessors with too much curiosity.”  (Siris, 364)   
  From this 
historical survey he concludes the entire book by saying that the doctrine of the Trinity is 
philosophically important even if the vast number of contemporary philosophers 
disagree.   
 
Berkeley’s goal in writing this work is to argue that the Trinity is philosophically relevant 
and that the philosophers of his day should recognize it so.  He uses these important 
historical philosophers to support his claim.75
                                                 
73 Siris is often dismissed and not given much attention compared to Berkeley’s others works, so not many 
commentators have set out to explain Berkeley’s aim in this work.  For a work dedicated to explaining the 
nature and structure of the Siris, see Timo Airaksinen, “The Path of Fire: The Meaning and Interpretation 
of Berkeley's Siris,” in New Interpretations of Berkeley's Thought, ed. Stephen H. Daniel (Amherst, NY: 
Humanity Books, 2008).  There are other commentators who mention this work and make comments on it.  
Daniel, “Berkeley's Christian Neoplatonism, Archetypes, and Divine Ideas.”  Berman focuses on the 
religious element of Berkeley, so he talks about Berkeley’s intentions in writing Siris. Berman, George 
Berkeley: Idealism and the Man. 
   
 
74 On a personal note, I think that Berkeley’s approach here is an example of how not to do philosophical 
theology.  It sounds frighteningly close to those early church Fathers such as Justin Martyr who claimed 
that earlier philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle were Christians without knowing it.    
 
75 I cannot say that I agree with Berkeley’s strategy or conclusion.  I only intend to show that this is his 
goal.  I also cannot say that he is altogether successful in achieving that goal.  I am not sure he is successful 
in showing how tar water and all the other things from earlier in the book are explained or point in some 
way to the Trinity.   
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 Berkeley also shows that the doctrine of the Trinity is philosophically relevant for 
solving mysteries concerning personal identity.  In Alciphron Berkeley introduces the 
idea that the Trinity can “clear up the notion of person” and “untie the knots and answer 
the objections which may be raised even about human personal identity.” (Alc. 7.8)76
 We can also see that the Trinity is philosophically relevant in his view of 
substance, or what he calls “spirit”.  In the Principles, Berkeley suggests that a substance 
or spirit alone can cause ideas, “the cause of ideas is an incorporeal active substance or 
spirit” (PHK 26).  He then defines what he means by spirit.   
  It 
is not clear how Berkeley thinks that the Trinity resolves these puzzles, but for our 
purposes it is enough to show that Berkeley thinks that the Trinity is philosophically 
relevant to issues such as personal identity.    
A spirit is one simple, undivided, active being: as it perceives ideas, it is called the 
understanding, and as it produces or otherwise operates about them, it is called the 
will… If any man shall doubt of the truth of what is here delivered, let him but reflect 
and try if he can frame the idea of any power or being: and whatever he had ideas of 
two principal powers, marked by the names will and understanding, distinct from 
each other as well as from a third idea of substance or being in general, with a relative 
notion of its supporting or being the subject of the aforesaid powers, which is 
signified by the name soul or spirit.  (PHK, 27)  
 
He defines a spirit as holding three essential features:  being in general, understanding, 
and will.  This is a Trinitarian formulation.  We see that Berkeley defines substance or 
spirit according to the three features of the amplified analogy.77
                                                 
76 Daniel comments on this use of the Trinity by Malebranche.  Daniel, “Berkeley's Christian 
Neoplatonism, Archetypes, and Divine Ideas.” 
   
 
77 This is a good example of why I say that the doctrine of the Trinity is philosophically relevant for 
Berkeley.  I am not claiming that Berkeley’ theory of the Trinity directly influenced this account of 
substance.  I do not think that he is deliberately defining spirit in such a way that God, and humans to a 
lesser extent, can fill that role.  In other words, I do not think that initially held a theological conception of 
the Trinity and then defined spirit according to what that conception would allow.  Instead, I think he 
defines spirit or substance in such a way that is consistent with this view that God is a substance. 
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 Finally, Berkeley’s doctrine of the Trinity is philosophically relevant in his view 
of causation.  Like Malebranche, Berkeley holds an account of causation that relies on the 
will of God.  Berkeley thinks that the natural world holds no causal powers.  Therefore, 
causation only comes from a mental or spiritual realm.   
… I have a mind to have some notion or meaning in what I say; but I have no notion 
of any action distinct from volition, neither can I conceive volition to be any where 
but in a spirit: therefore when I speak of an active being, I am obliged to mean a 
spirit.  (DHP, 239) 
 
Not only must causation come from a spirit, but it is only the will of God that causes all 
things.    
But God, whom no external being can affect, who perceives nothing by sense as we 
do, whose will is absolute and independent, causing all things, and liable to be 
thwarted or resisted by nothing.  (DHP, 241) 
 
Given Berkeley’s acceptance of the amplified analogy of the Trinity, we know that he is 
referring to the third person of the Trinity when he speaks of the will of God.   
Berkeley holds that the only causally efficacious substance is that of the spirit or will.    
 In summary, Berkeley accepts the doctrine of the Trinity.  He embraces the 
Nicene formulation as well as Augustine’s differentiation of the persons of the Trinity.  
The amplified analogy where God is being, the son is wisdom or reason, and the Holy 
Spirit is the will of God is also found in Berkeley’s work.  This doctrine of the Trinity 
from Berkeley’s philosophical theology is relevant in his metaphysics.  He defines 
substance or spirit as being, understanding, and will.  Berkeley’s theory of causation 
relies on the third person of the Trinity, the will of God, which is the source of all 







3.4   
 
 While some commentators have noted, although in passing, the similarities 
between Malebranche and Berkeley on divine revelation, their similar acceptance of the 
Trinity has not been mentioned in the secondary literature.  A few studies have pointed 
out that either Malebranche or Berkeley accepts the doctrine of the Christian Trinity,78
 Commentators have pointed out that both Malebranche and Berkeley construct 
their entire philosophical systems around God.  Copleston comments that both 
“developed theocentric metaphysical systems”.
 
but it has not been noticed that both philosophers accept a similar version of this doctrine.  
Nor has it been mentioned that Malebranche and Berkeley’s shared acceptance of the 
Trinity is helpful for understanding some of their similar metaphysical positions.    
79  Jessop points out that both 
Malebranche and Berkeley structure their metaphysics around the claim that all life is 
grounded in God as is evidenced by the fact that both of them quote the same passages 
from the New Testament.80  Also, both McCracken and Jolley point out that both 
Malebranche and Berkeley are driven by a desire to remove natural causes and place God 
in the center of their metaphysical structure.81
                                                 
78 There has been more work done on Malebranche’s acceptance of the Trinity than on Berkeley.  For 
Malebranche see:  Reid, “Malebranche on Intelligible Extension.”, Reid, “The Trinitarian Metaphysics of 
Jonathan Edwards and Nicolas Malebranche.”  Pessin, “Malebranche's "Vision in God".”, Watson, “The 
External World and the Fall from Reason: Malebranche's Account of Our Knowledge of the Existence and 
Nature of Bodies”.  Pessin, “Malebranche's "Vision in God".”  For Berkeley see Daniel, “Berkeley's 
Christian Neoplatonism, Archetypes, and Divine Ideas.” 
  So, I am not the first to point out that there 
 
79 Frederick Charles Copleston, A History of Philosophy (Westminster, MD: Newman Bookshop, 1946), 
Vol 4, pg 203.Vol 4, 203 
 
80 To my knowledge, Jessop is the first to point out that both Malebranche and Berkeley quote most often 
Acts 17:28 “In Him we live and move and have our being.”  Other later commentators also recognize this 




are similarities concerning the role of God or religion in Malebranche and Berkeley.  Nor 
am I the first to point out similarities in the metaphysics of Malebranche and Berkeley.  
As we have seen, many commentators have noticed similarities between Malebranche 
and Berkeley on causation.  But, to my knowledge, I am the first to argue that they both 
accept a traditional, Nicene formulation of the Trinity that is relevant for their 
metaphysical doctrines.    
 Throughout this chapter, we have seen that there are many similarities between 
Malebranche and Berkeley concerning their acceptance of the Trinity and the 
philosophical relevance of that doctrine.  Both accept the Christian doctrine of the Trinity 
as formulated by the historic creeds like the Nicene Creed.  That is, both philosophers 
believe that God is one substance in three persons.  Augustine’s differentiation between 
the persons of the Trinity can also be found in the works of Malebranche and Berkeley.  
Both think that the three persons of the Trinity each play a different role in the creation of 
the world.  Another similarity between Malebranche and Berkeley’s theories of the 
Trinity is that they both accept the amplified analogy.  We saw through numerous 
passages that both philosophers connect each person of the Trinity with a certain work or 
attribute of God.  They use this analogy in the same way that Jonathan Edwards does:  
God the Father is connected with true being, God the Son is connected with Reason or 
the Word, and God the Holy Spirit is connected with the active will of God.   
  Malebranche and Berkeley also agree that the doctrine of the Trinity is 
philosophically relevant to their metaphysics.  Both Malebranche and Berkeley construct 
metaphysical positions that can be held consistently alongside the doctrine of the Trinity.  
                                                                                                                                                 
81 The first to point this out was McCracken, Malebranche and British Philosophy, 211.  And this was 




For example, both hold accounts of the divine substance that make room for their 
Trinitarian perspective.82
 These similarities in philosophical theology and metaphysics are so striking that it 
is easy to see why some scholars argue that Malebranche influenced Berkeley.  One way 
of explaining why Berkeley is similar to Malebranche on these matters is to suggest that 
Berkeley read Malebranche and adopted his views.  However, a better explanation of 
these similarities is that Malebranche and Berkeley shared common sources.  It is likely 
that many of these similar features of their theories of the Trinity are from Augustine.  
Augustine held the Nicene account of the Trinity and he also differentiated between the 
persons of the Trinity by their work in creation.  Malebranche and Berkeley’s shared 
acceptance of the amplified analogy, the one feature of their theories of the Trinity that 
goes beyond Augustine, can also be explained by a common source.  However, we do not 
know much about that common source, other than it was also available to Edwards.  It is 
possible that the amplified analogy was in vogue during the early modern period.  This 
would explain why Malebranche, Berkeley, and Edwards all hold the amplified analogy.        
  Malebranche and Berkeley’s Trinitarian metaphysical 
commitments can also be seen in their similar theories of causation.  Malebranche, the 
occasionalist, held that God’s will is the only source of causation.  Berkeley held a 
similar position that God’s will is responsible for all causation, but he added that human 
wills are also causal.   
 While I am not the first to mention that Malebranche and Berkeley each accept 
the doctrine of the Trinity, I am the first to argue this in detail.  As I pointed out, Reid 
                                                 
82 Hight argues that Malebranche and Berkeley hold a similar account of substance.  Marc A. Hight, Idea 
and Ontology: An Essay in Early Modern Metaphysics of Ideas (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania 




argues that Malebranche holds a Trinitarian view of metaphysics and Daniel does the 
same concerning Berkeley, but I advance their positions by providing stronger textual 
evidence for their claims.83
 While commentators have pointed out various metaphysical similarities between 
Malebranche and Berkeley, they have not mentioned how these metaphysical similarities 
can be explained by Malebranche and Berkeley’s similarities in philosophical theology.  
Ignoring the similar views of Malebranche and Berkeley concerning the Trinity has 
robbed commentators of a full understanding of their metaphysics.  In section 1.4, I 
introduced many different commentators who point out various similarities between the 
metaphysics of Malebranche and Berkeley.  Now that we have done a systematic study of 
the Trinity in these philosophers, we are in a position to see the philosophical relevance 
of this doctrine as it is applied to some of the issues brought up in this literature.  When 
we look at these similarities in metaphysics in light of Malebranche and Berkeley’s 
shared acceptance of the Trinity, there is a payoff: we gain a better understanding of the 
metaphysical similarities.   
  I am, however, the first to argue that Malebranche and 
Berkeley hold similar theories of the Trinity.  Commentators have ignored the similarities 
between Malebranche and Berkeley’s philosophical theology including their shared 
acceptance of the Trinity.     
 The most often mentioned metaphysical similarity between Malebranche and 
Berkeley concerns their similar theories of causation.  Immerwahr, McCracken, Jolley, 
                                                 
83 Reid argues that Malebranche accepts the Trinity.  Reid, “The Trinitarian Metaphysics of Jonathan 
Edwards and Nicolas Malebranche.”  Reid, “Malebranche on Intelligible Extension.”  And Daniel argues 
that Berkeley accepts the Trinity.  Daniel, “Berkeley's Christian Neoplatonism, Archetypes, and Divine 




and Downing all point out that these philosophers hold similar accounts of causation.84
 One way to answer the first question concerning their similarities, it is common to 
suggest that Malebranche influenced Berkeley.  But, this is not a satisfying explanation 
given Berkeley’s denial that he was influenced by Malebranche.  It would be more 
satisfying to find an explanation of their similar views on causation that allows Berkeley 
to be taken at his word.   
  
Malebranche is a full occasionalist and Berkeley has been called a near-occasionalist.  
After noticing this similarity, there are two questions that should be answered:  Why do 
Malebranche and Berkeley hold similar theories of causality to begin with?  Why does 
Berkeley abandon full occasionalism?   
 Malebranche and Berkeley’s shared acceptance of the doctrine of the Trinity can 
explain why they hold similar views of causation without claiming that Berkeley was 
influenced by Malebranche.  Both hold a common theory of causation that is consistent 
with their Trinitarian metaphysical structure.  Both Malebranche and Berkeley accept the 
amplified analogy where God’s causal power is connected to the third person of the 
Trinity, the Holy Spirit.  God creates the world through the Holy Spirit, or His will.  We 
saw the influence of the amplified analogy in both philosophers.  Malebranche holds that 
the will of God is necessary for all causation, while Berkeley thinks that the will of God 
is necessary for most causation.  That is, causation that is not generated by the will of 
humans.  One payoff of understanding Malebranche and Berkeley’s Trinitarian 
metaphysical picture is that we now have the apparatus to explain Malebranche and 
                                                 
84 John Immerwahr, “Berkeley's Causal Thesis,” New Scholasticism 68 (1974).  McCracken, Malebranche 
and British Philosophy.  Jolley, “Berkeley and Malebranche on Causality and Volition.”  Lisa Downing, 
“Occasionalism and Strict Mechanism: Malebranche, Berkeley, Fontenelle,” in Early Modern Philosophy: 
Mind, Matter, and Metaphysics, ed. Christia Mercer (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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Berkeley’s similar metaphysical doctrine of causation without charging that Berkeley is 
being disingenuous when he says that denies any influence from Malebranche.  
Malebranche and Berkeley both construct God-centered theories of causation that can be 
held consistently alongside their view that the will of God is the fundamental causal force 
in the world.    
   To answer the second question, we need to find an explanation of why Berkeley 
rejects full occasionalism for the position that humans hold causal powers as well as God.  
McCracken gives two reasons for Berkeley’s rejection of occasionalism.  He suggests 
that Berkeley thought that occasionalism denies the freewill of humans and he also 
thought that that occasionalism assumes matter.85  Jolley gives an entirely different 
account of Berkeley’s stopping short of full occasionalism.  He argues that Berkeley does 
not follow Malebranche on this point because of his commitment to the claim that man 
was made in the image of God, what Jolley calls the Genesis doctrine.86
 The Trinitarian metaphysics of Berkeley provides a more satisfying explanation 
for why Berkeley rejects full occasionalism.  I think that Jolley is correct when he says 
that Berkeley was committed to the Genesis doctrine and that had something to do with 
his rejection of occasionalism.  But Berkeley’s commitment to the Trinity can also help 
explain why he places so much weight on the Genesis doctrine.  According to the 
doctrine of the Trinity, God is a triad of being, wisdom, and will.  According to the 
Genesis doctrine, we are made in the image of God.  The two doctrines together imply 
that humans too are a triad of being, understanding, and will.  A Trinitarian commitment 
added to the Genesis doctrine leads to the view that we share these same three attributes 
   
                                                 
85 McCracken, Malebranche and British Philosophy. 245-247. 
 
86 Jolley, “Berkeley and Malebranche on Causality and Volition.” 238.    
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with God, although to a lesser extent.  If God has a will that is efficacious, man should 
also have an efficacious will.  Berkeley combined these two theological positions and 
thereby derived a doctrine where God and humans are both causally active.   
 An objection can be brought against this solution.  Malebranche held to the 
Trinity as well, so why would Berkeley’s Trinitarian metaphysics be able to explain his 
departure from Malebranche’s view of causation?  It seems that Malebranche’s 
commitment to the Trinity would have also led him to reject occasionalism.  In response, 
Berkeley recognized an application of his commitment to the Trinity that Malebranche 
either missed or did not think was relevant.  Berkeley realized that his belief in the 
Trinity alongside his acceptance of the Genesis doctrine showed that man should be able 
to cause as well as God.  This is not to say that Berkeley’s view is consistent with his 
acceptance of the Trinity and Malebranche’s occasionalism is inconsistent.  Both 
philosophers accept the doctrine of the Trinity which is philosophically relevant in their 
metaphysical doctrine of causation.  They both build theories of causation that they 
believe are consistent with the doctrine of the Trinity, it just so happens that they disagree 
concerning which account of causation is consistent with the Trinity.  
 An understanding of Malebranche and Berkeley’s shared acceptance of the 
Trinity is a desirable explanation of their similar views of causation as well as their 
differences.  Berkeley’s account of causation is similar to that of Malebranche because 
they both held theories of causation that could be held alongside their commitment to the 
Trinity.  And, Berkeley rejects full occasionalism because his commitment to the Trinity 
combined with the Genesis doctrine suggests that human are also casually efficacious.   
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CHAPTER 4 
An Example: Applying Malebranche’s theory of the Trinity 
  
 I have concluded the chief argument of this project in chapters 1 through 3.  I 
have shown that Malebranche and Berkeley hold similar philosophical theologies.  I have 
also shown that some of Malebranche and Berkeley’s philosophical similarities can be 
explained by their similar theories of philosophical theology.  Since this chapter does not 
add to that argument, it should be viewed as a supplement to the other three.    
 Rather than add to the argument from the first three chapters, in this final chapter 
I give one example of how a proper understanding of these theories of divine revelation 
and the Trinity can be applied to one of the philosophers in isolation; that is, not as they 
relate to each other.  Up until this point, I have only focused on these philosophers as 
they relate to each other, but there are also important implications of these doctrines of 
philosophical theology concerning the philosophers individually.  In other words, not 
only does an understanding of the philosophical theology of Malebranche and Berkeley 
help us understand where their philosophical systems are similar, it also helps us interpret 
the philosophers by themselves.   
 The doctrines of divine revelation and the Trinity shed light on interpretive 
difficulties that arise when interpreting Malebranche or Berkeley.  We saw in chapters 2 
and 3 that a proper appreciation of Malebranche and Berkeley’s acceptance of divine 
revelation and the Trinity helps explain why these philosophers hold similar theories of 
epistemology and metaphysics.  In this chapter, we will see that these doctrines also shed 
light on issues, puzzles, and disputes brought up in the secondary literature that concerns 
either philosopher.  In this final section, I give one example of how to apply the results I 
have drawn from the earlier chapters to this secondary literature.     
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 In earlier chapters, I pointed out two separate doctrines of philosophical theology 
that are held by both philosophers.  Since this is the case, there are four different ways 
one could apply these theories to the relevant secondary literature:     
[1] An application of Malebranche’s theory of the Trinity  
[2] An application of Malebranche’s theory of divine revelation 
[3] An application of Berkeley’s theory of the Trinity 
[4]  An application of Berkeley’s theory of divine revelation  
I will not attempt all four.  Rather, I will focus on [1].  I will take results of this study 
concerning Malebranche’s theory of the Trinity in the earlier chapters and apply those 
results to two different puzzles discussed in the current literature.  The hope and 
expectation is that my work in this chapter can be used as an example of how to do the 
same with the other three possibilities.   
 Applying Malebranche’s theory of the Trinity sheds light on two puzzles found in 
the secondary literature.  The first is a puzzle concerning the ontological status of ideas 
for Malebranche.  The second is a puzzle concerning Malebranche’s view of efficacious 
ideas.  I apply Malebranche’s theory of the Trinity to the first puzzle in section 4.1, and I 




 The first puzzle concerns the ontological status of Malebranche’s ideas.  This 
puzzle has been mentioned by Nadler and Jolley, and it has been presented at length by 
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Cook.1
 Nadler points out this puzzle:   
  Malebranche’s Trinitarian metaphysics, while it has not been considered in this 
debate, provides support for the proper interpretation of Malebranche’s ideas.   
… we are brought back to a fundamental problem in Malebranche’s theory of ideas.  
What is the ontological status or nature of ideas?  They are neither substances nor 
modifications of any substance.  Yet in the Cartesian schema these are the only 
alternatives: something is either a substance or a modification of a substance.  And 
Malebranche, however modified his Cartesianism, is at least explicit in accepting this 
ontological dualism.2
 
     
As Nadler points out, Malebranche accepts the Cartesian principle that everything is 
either a substance or a mode (Malebranche also refers to “substance” as “being”).3
It suffices to reflect that everything that exists reduces to being or to modes of being.  
(LO 639) 
   
 
I will call Malebranche’s principle that everything must be either a substance or a mode 
the “Substance/Mode Principle” [SMP].  The puzzle raises its head when we consider 
where Malebranche’s ideas fit in this disjunction.   
 Malebranche says ideas are not modes.  They cannot be modifications of either 
the human or divine mind.  According to Malebranche, ideas cannot be modifications of 
                                                 
1 Nadler only presents the puzzle:  Steven Nadler, Malebranche and Ideas (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), 96-97, 149.  Jolley presents the puzzle and suggests a solution for Malebranche, 
but admits that Malebranche does not use his solution.  Nicholas Jolley, The Light of the Soul: Theories of 
Ideas in Leibniz, Malebranche, and Descartes (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1990), 78-80.  Cook 
discusses it at length and gives a solution to the puzzle in Monte Cook, “The Ontological Status of 
Malebranchean Ideas,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 36, no. 4 (1998).  Other papers that mention 
this problem or are relevant in some way include:  Susan Peppers-Bates, “Does Malebranche Need 
Efficacious Ideas? The Cognitive Faculties, the Ontological Status of Ideas, and Human Attention,” 
Journal of the History of Philosophy 43 (2005).  Richard A. Watson, “Arnauld, Malebranche, and the 
Ontology of Ideas,” in The Great Arnauld and Some of His Philosophical Correspondents, ed. Elmar J. 
Kremer (Toronto, CA: University of Toronto Press, 1994).  Craig Walton, “Malebranche's Ontology,” 
Journal of the History of Philosophy 7 (1969).  
 
2 Nadler, Malebranche and Ideas, 96.  
 
3 A substance can be conceived by itself while a mode cannot: 
By being I mean what is absolute, or what can be conceived alone and without relation to anything 
else.  (LO 639-40) 
By modes I mean what is relative, or what cannot be conceived alone.  (LO 640)       
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human minds like the more orthodox Cartesians Régis and Arnauld since ideas are in 
God, rather than in human minds.  Ideas also cannot be modifications of God since God 
has no modifications according to Malebranche: “the Infinite Being is incapable of 
modifications” (LO 625).  So, ideas cannot be modes [I ~M].   
 If this were all Malebranche had to say, there would be no puzzle.  Ideas cannot 
fall into the category of mode, so they must fall into the category of substance.  But 
Malebranche says that ideas cannot be substances either:    
 “But if it be said that an idea is not a substance, I would agree—but it is still a 
spiritual thing, and as it is impossible to make a square out of a mind, though a square 
is not a substance, so a spiritual idea cannot be formed from a material substance, 
even though an idea is not a substance.”  (LO 223) 
 
Malebranche is clear; ideas cannot be substances [I ~S].     
 All the pieces of the puzzle are now in play.  Malebranche presents a principle 
that everything is either a mode or a substance, only to break that principle when he talks 
about ideas.  Malebranche denies both disjuncts.  Ideas can be neither modes nor 
substances.   
[SMP]  Everything is either a mode or a Substance 
[I ~M]  Ideas cannot be modes 
[I ~S]  Ideas cannot be substances 
 
It appears that Malebranche cannot hold all three commitments.        
 Nadler suggests that Malebranche has no solution to this puzzle: “As far as I can 
tell, Malebranche does not provide an answer to this question—and in the context of his 
Cartesianism, I do not see how he can.” 4
                                                 
4 Nadler, Malebranche and Ideas., 96-96.   
  Other commentators have presented solutions.  
Jolley advises Malebranche to get out of the puzzle by denying the Cartesian principle, 
[SMP].   
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In retrospect it is tempting to say that Malebranche could have made his philosophy 
more consistent by breaking openly with the framework of Cartesian ontology … 
Malebranche could have given up the Cartesian assumption that everything there is, is 
either a substance or mode.5
   
     
Had Malebranche taken Jolley’s advice and rejected [SMP], he could hold both [I ~M] 
and [I ~S] without any problem.  Ideas, then, are neither modes nor substances, but fall 
into a third realm of logical, abstract entities.6  While Jolley thinks that such a solution 
would have gotten Malebranche off the hook, he recognizes that Malebranche does not 
opt for this solution to the problem.7
                                                 
5 Jolley, The Light of the Soul: Theories of Ideas in Leibniz, Malebranche, and Descartes, 79.  
  According to Jolley, Malebranche’s commitment to 
Descartes’ dualistic metaphysics is too strong for this to be a plausible option.   
 
6 Peppers-Bates ascribes this solution to Jolley in Peppers-Bates, “Does Malebranche Need Efficacious 
Ideas? The Cognitive Faculties, the Ontological Status of Ideas, and Human Attention.”.  She cites as 
evidence both is his book, The Light of the Soul, as well as his article, Nicholas Jolley, “Intellect and 
Illumination in Malebranche,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 32 (1994).    
 But Peppers-Bates goes further.  On more than one occasion she claims that Jolley holds the 
position that Malebranche’s ideas are neither substances nor modes, but a third class:  “In a recent article, 
Jolley offers an account of the divine ideas that turns them into third-realm entities—and consequently 
“solves” the problem of their ontological status (although the latter concern does not figure into his 
argument)”  (87).  “Jolley explicates both the role of the divine ideas and the relation between God and 
human beings in perception by positing ideas as a special class of entity, that exists in God as neither 
substance nor mode, and acts upon the inert human mind” (87-88).   “So Jolley is wrong in trying to make 
ideas into some third class of things, ‘efficacious ideas’” (89).   
 But this treatment of Jolley’s view is misguided.  In The Light of the Soul, Jolley suggests that 
Malebranche could have broken with the Cartesian ontology and rejected that everything is either a 
substance or a mode.  Jolley even says that this is “tempting” and suggests that such a move would have 
aided Malebranche in his project.  However, Jolley explicitly states that Malebranche did not take this 
route, “he remained committed to the substantial dualism and to the framework of substance and mode” 
(79).  Peppers-Bates is correct when she says that Jolley does say that ideas belong to a third realm in 
“Intellect and Illumination in Malebranche.”  But is doubtful that Jolley means that this third realm should 
be contrasted with the substance/mode distinction.  Jolley has not even introduced the substance/mode 
distinction in this work since he is not concerned with the ontological status of ideas here.  Instead, when he 
says that ideas belong to a third realm, Jolley means simply to suggest that they should be regarded as 
logical, abstract objects.         
 
7 “Malebranche of course never made an open break with the fundamental tenets of Cartesian ontology: at 
least nominally, he remained committed to substantial dualism and to the framework of substance and 
mode.”  Jolley, The Light of the Soul: Theories of Ideas in Leibniz, Malebranche, and Descartes, 79. 
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 The most satisfying solution to this problem is that ideas are not different 
substances but they are identical with one substance, God.8
He escapes inconsistency by maintaining that although ideas fit into the category of  
  This is the solution presented 
by Cook.  Cook concludes that Malebranche consistently holds all three positions 
described above: [SMP], [I~M], and [I~S] without contradiction.  According to Cook:     
substance, they are not different substances.  Rather than being substances (plural), 
they are identical with one substance, God.9
 
  
Cook argues in detail for this position.  First he shows that the principle that everything is 
either a substance or a mode applies to everything for Malebranche, not just created 
things.  This principle applies to ideas as well.  He also shows that Malebranche does 
indeed say that ideas can be neither substances nor modes.  Then Cook argues that 
Malebranche can hold all three positions consistently due to the fact that ideas are God, 
insofar as God is understood in a certain way.10
God’s ideas of creatures are, as Saint Thomas says, only His essence, insofar as it is 
participable or imperfectly imitable, for God contains every creaturely perfection, 
through in a divine and infinite way; He is one and He is all.  (LO 625) 
  Malebranche does say that ideas are the 
essence of God.   
 
Malebranche also says the same thing about intelligible extension, which is one particular 
idea, in a way that makes it representative of all ideas. 
But intelligible extension is simply the substance of God insofar as it is representative 
of bodies and participable by them, with the limitations or imperfections which 
pertain to them and are represented by this same intelligible extension, which is their 
idea or archetype.  (DM 137)   
   
                                                 
8 Jolley makes the same point about ideas being identical with the substance of God.  Ibid., 79.   
 
9 Cook, “The Ontological Status of Malebranchean Ideas,” 526, 29.  Support from Malebranche comes 
from a letter to Dortous in 1714, “these are not different substances, for they are in God, and everything 
that is in God is wholly God”    
 
10 Ibid., 531.    
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 Cook states that these kinds of passages where Malebranche says that ideas are 
the substance of God insofar as they are participable by them are “puzzling” and 
“dark”.11  Cook notes that the “insofar” is doing a lot of work in these passages.  
“Insofar” is an important disclaimer for Malebranche.  In the passages where 
Malebranche says that ideas are the substance of God, he employs this terminology.12
Malebranche does not want to suggest that intelligible extension is something other 
than the substance of God, but he has reason to reject any crude identification of the 
two.  For one thing, he wants to deny that intelligible extension exhausts the nature of 
God.  The divine substance contains in its simplicity all perfections without 
limitations, whereas intelligible extension is the essence of God only ‘insofar as it 
contains, among all its realities and infinite perfections, that of extension’”.
  




Cook suggests that Malebranche uses the “insofar” language to allow a certain amount of 
flexibility concerning how ideas are the substance of God.  On the one hand, God’s 
nature is more than ideas.  But on the other hand, ideas truly are identical with the 
substance of God.  According to the solution proposed by Cook, there are two different 
conceptions of how ideas are substances.   
[I~S]1 Ideas cannot be individual substances 
[I~S]2 Ideas cannot share in the substance of God14
                                                 
11  “It is puzzling what Malebranche means by such dark sayings as ‘ideas are the substance itself of God, 
not according to his absolute being, but insofar as he is representative of creatures and participable by 
them.”  Ibid., 532.    
 
 
12 Malebranche often says that ideas are “in God”.  His catch phrase is that we see all things in God, where 
we do this by seeing ideas in God.  This talk of ideas being in God does indeed suggest that ideas are 
distince from God but in some way intimately related to him—that they are in God as modifications of him 
or as substances that are somehow parts of him or at least coeternal with him. 
 Nevertheless, in numerous passage, rather than saying that ideas are in God, Malebranche seems 
to say that they are God.  Rather than taking ideas to be different substances, he seems to say that ideas are 
one substance, God.  In these passages, he often cites St. Thomas, and he invariably explains that ideas are 
God only insofar as God is understood in a certain way.”  Ibid., 531.   
 
13 Ibid., 542.   
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When Malebranche says that ideas cannot be substances, he is saying that they cannot be 
individual substances.  Malebranche holds [I~S]1.  When he says that ideas are “simply 
the substance of God insofar as it is representative of bodies and participable by them” 
(LO 625), he is saying that ideas share in the substance of God.  Malebranche rejects 
[I~S]2.  Cook’s solution is that Malebranche holds all three commitments, if we 
understand his rejection of ideas as substances applies only to ideas as individual 
substances.   
 Cook suggests that there is an element of mystery in what Malebranche says 
about the relation of ideas to God’s substance.  We, as finite beings, cannot comprehend 
how God and ideas share in the same substance.  This is not a problem for Malebranche, 
the incomprehensibility of God is “part of his philosophical system”.15
 Even if the status of ideas cannot be fully intelligible to us, it cannot involve a 
contradiction of the sort standardly attributed to Malebranche.
  Cook concludes 
that while interpreters might find Malebranche’s solution to this puzzle confusing, some 




 Appreciating Malebranche’s Trinitarian metaphysics enables us to explain more 
of Malebranche’s position before retreating into mystery.  Malebranche’s theory of the 
Trinity helps explain how he can hold that ideas share in the substance of God.  As we 
have seen, Malebranche thinks that there is room for distinctions within the substance of 
God.  There is room for three persons within God’s substance: the Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit.  By extension, it should not be surprising that Malebranche also holds further 
                                                                                                                                                 
14 This wording “ideas share in the substance of God” is my wording, not Cook’s.    
 
15 Cook, “The Ontological Status of Malebranchean Ideas,” 530. 
 
16 Ibid., 531.    
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distinctions within the substance of God.  If the substance of God can be participated in 
by three different persons, it seems that it could also be participated in by ideas.  
 While this interpretation may prove helpful for the philosophical puzzle 
concerning the ontological status of ideas, it seems to create a theological problem for 
Malebranche.  If ideas are the substance of God in the same way as the Father, Son and 
Holy Spirit, it seems that the Trinity has been replaced by a Quad-rinity.  Ideas become a 
fourth person added to the Trinity.  This creates a problem for my interpretation of 
Malebranche’s philosophical theology since I have argued that Malebranche held a 
traditional, Nicene account of the Trinity, not a Quad-rinity.    
   Malebranche does not propose that ideas constitute a fourth person of the Trinity.  
Instead, he argues that the second person of the Trinity is, in some way, the idea of God.  
In a similar move Edwards suggests that the Son of God is generated by God’s idea of 
himself, when introducing the notion of the eternal generation of the Son.   
 Therefore as God with perfect clearness, fullness and strength understands himself, 
views his own essence (in which there is no distinction of substance and act, but it is 
wholly substance and wholly act), that idea which God hath of himself is absolutely 
himself.  This representation of the divine nature and essence is the divine nature and 
essence again.  So that by God’s thinking of the Deity, [the Deity] must certainly be 
generated.  Hereby there is another person begotten; there is another infinite, eternal, 
almighty, and most holy and the same God, the very same divine nature.  And this 
person is the second person of the Trinity, the only begotten and dearly beloved Son 
of God.  He is eternal, necessary, perfect, substantial and personal idea which God 
hath of himself.17
 
    
Edwards’ point is that when God the Father considers his own essence, the Father has an 
idea of himself.  The idea God the Father has of himself must share the same essence, so 
God’s idea is the second person of the Trinity.   
                                                 
17 Jonathan Edwards, Works, ed. Various Editors (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1957-), Vol 21, 
pg 116-17. (Discourse on the Trinity).  Edwards makes the same argument in the Vol 13, pg 258-259 (The 
‘Miscellanies’, no.94). 
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 If Malebranche adopted a line similar to Edwards he could be saying that God’s 
ideas are identical to the second person of the Trinity.  In this sense, Malebranche could 
be saying that ideas are the substance of God but do not exhaust the nature of God in the 
same way that the Son is God but does not exhaust the full nature of God. 
 There is evidence that Malebranche does make the same move that we see in 
Edwards.  Malebranche states that there is a connection between ideas and the Son or 
Word of God.  After introducing the vision of God doctrine in the Search, Malebranche 
sums up the theory as a union that minds have with the Word. 
We believe, finally, that all minds see eternal laws, as well as other things, in God, 
but with a certain difference.  They know order and eternal truths, and even the 
beings that God has made according to these truths or according to order, through the 
union these minds necessarily have with the Word, or the wisdom of God, which 
enlightens them, as has just been explained.  (LO 234) 
      
And the same claim is found in the Dialogues.   
 
You know, Aristes, that the divine Word, as universal Reason, contains in its 
substance the primordial ideas of all beings, created and possible.  You know that all 
intellects, which are united to that sovereign Reason, discover some of these ideas in 
it, inasmuch as God wishes to reveal these ideas to them.  (DM 32)18
 
 
Malebranche’s way out of the Quad-rinity problem is that ideas are contained within the 
Son.  God the father has an idea of himself.  This idea is God the Son, who shares the 
same substance with God the father.  Contained within the Son are the ideas of all created 
things.  So, ideas are within God the Son, and thereby share in the substance of God by 
means of being identical with the Son.   
 While the Trinitarian metaphysics of Malebranche sheds light on this discussion 
concerning the ontological status of ideas, it has not been mentioned in the secondary 
                                                 
18 Reid translates another passage that makes the same point: “this idea will be God Himself.  For there is 
no other idea of God at all but His Word.  The Son of God is the perfect expression and resemblance of His 
Father.  Translated by Reid.  Jasper Reid, “Malebranche on Intelligible Extension,” British Journal for the 
History of Philosophy 11 (2003): 588, footnote 33. 
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literature.  Cook, Nadler, and Jolley do not mention Malebranche’s views on the Trinity 
and how it might impact his views on substance in general.   
 It is clear that Malebranche’s Trinitarian metaphysics is relevant to this discussion 
of the ontological status of ideas.  Understanding Malebranche’s metaphysical 
commitment to the Trinity aids in understanding how ideas could be the same substance 




 The second puzzle concerns Malebranche’s efficacious ideas.  Malebranche says 
that ideas are efficacious since they act upon the mind.  He argues that some ideas are 
efficacious in the section of the Search where he is defending the vision in God.   
Here is an argument that may prove demonstrative for those accustomed to abstract 
reasoning.  It is certain that certain ideas are efficacious, since they act upon the mind 
and enlighten it, and since they make it happy or unhappy through the pleasant or 
unpleasant perceptions by which they affect it.  (LO 232) 
 
Malebranche also says that ideas alone enlighten or causally act upon the mind or soul:    
We would see that the soul is essentially a substance that thinks or perceives 
everything that affects it, that it is an intelligence that nonetheless is actually made 
intelligent only through the efficacy of divine ideas, which alone can act on it, affect 
it, modify it, enlighten it, as I have explained elsewhere.  (LO 560) 
 
There are many such passages where Malebranche attributes causal powers to ideas.19
                                                 
19 There are many passages where Malebranche says that ideas enlighten, affect, or act upon the soul:   
   
“Nor it is clear that the soul’s modes are changeable but ideas are immutable; that its modes are 
particular, but ideas are universal and general to all intelligences; … that these ideas are indeed 
efficacious because they act in the mind, they enlighten it and make it happy or unhappy, which is 
evident by the pain that the idea of the hand causes in those who have had an arm cut off.”  (LO 323)  
 “It is therefore necessary to distinguish the ideas that enlighten us, that affect us, and that represent 
these beings, from the modes of our soul, i.e., from our perceptions of them.”  (LO 319) 
 “All these ideas have some reality while I think them…  For they enlighten the mind or make 
themselves  known to it; some even strike it and make themselves sensed by it, and this is in a 
thousand different ways.”  (DM 10) 
 “I believe that there are essential differences between knowing and sensing, between the ideas which 
enlighten the mind and the sensations which affect it.”  (DM 35) 
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This doctrine has its own history of interpretation.20  The general line is that Malebranche 
originally held that ideas were not efficacious, or at least did not emphasize the 
efficacious nature of ideas in his earlier editions of the Search.  Then, later in his 
philosophy when pressed by Régis to explain the union between human minds and God, 
Malebranche introduced the notion that ideas hold causal powers.  Some interpreters 
suggest that Malebranche shifted his view from a vision in God to a theory of a vision by 
God.21  In short this interpretation holds that Malebranche moved to a position where 
God’s ideas act on and modify the soul or mind.22
                                                                                                                                                 
“… I am delighted to point out that this resolution depends, like all other truths, on the great principle 
that  universal Reason contains the ideas which enlighten us, and that as God’s works have been 
formed on the basis of these ideas, we can do no better than contemplate them, in order to discover the 
nature and properties of created beings.”  (DM 39) 
    
 “We would see that the soul is essentially a substance that thinks or perceives everything that affects 
it, that it is an intelligence that nonetheless is actually made intelligent only through the efficacy of 
divine ideas, which  alone can act on it, affect it, modify it, enlighten it, as I have explained 
elsewhere.”  (LO 560) 
“There is then one and only one idea of our hand which affects us in different ways, which acts on our 
soul and modifies it by color, heat, pain, etc.  … It is, then, the idea or archetype of bodies which 
affects us in different ways.  I mean, it is the intelligible substance of Reason which acts in our mind 
through its all-powerful efficacy and which touches and modifies it with color, taste, pain, by what 
there is within it representing bodies.”  (DM 77) 
 
20 This theory by Malebranche has produced scrutiny in the literature in the past 5 years.  Some support 
Malebranche’s move toward efficacious ideas in his mature thought.  Jolley, “Intellect and Illumination in 
Malebranche.”  Nicholas Jolley, “Berkeley, Malebranche, and Vision in God,” Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 34 (1996).  Ferdinand Alquié, Le Cartésianisme De Malebranche (Paris, FR: J. Vrin, 1974).  
Andrè Robinet, Système Et Existence Dans L'oeuvre De Malebranche (Paris, FR: J. Vrin, 1965).  And other 
think that efficacious ideas are unnecessary for Malebranche’s system.  Peppers-Bates, “Does Malebranche 
Need Efficacious Ideas? The Cognitive Faculties, the Ontological Status of Ideas, and Human Attention.”   
 
21 This is how Ferdinand Alquié and Tad Schmaltz represent this shift.  Alquié, Le Cartésianisme De 
Malebranche.  Tad M. Schmaltz, “Malebranche on Ideas and the Vision in God,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Malebranche, ed. Steven Nadler (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2000).  
Jolley refers to the same shift as Malebranche abandoning a view of pure intellect for a view where the 
mind is “intrinsically devoid of all properties except sentiments”.  Jolley, “Intellect and Illumination in 
Malebranche.” 
 
22  The two earliest proponents of this historical shift in Malebranche are Alquié, Le Cartésianisme De 
Malebranche. and Robinet, Système Et Existence Dans L'oeuvre De Malebranche.  Other sources that 
accept this kind of a historical shift in Malebranche’s system include.  Jolley, The Light of the Soul: 
Theories of Ideas in Leibniz, Malebranche, and Descartes.  Peppers-Bates, “Does Malebranche Need 
Efficacious Ideas? The Cognitive Faculties, the Ontological Status of Ideas, and Human Attention.”  Tad 
M. Schmaltz, Malebranche's Theory of the Soul: A Cartesian Interpretation (New York, NY: Oxford 
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 Malebranche’s theory of efficacious ideas creates a puzzle in light of his 
occasionalism: how can ideas be causally active if God is the only true cause?23
 Susan Peppers-Bates discusses this puzzle in her paper “Does Malebranche Need 
Efficacious Ideas?  The Cognitive Faculties, the Ontological Status of Ideas, and Human 
Attention”.
  
Malebranche seems committed to both occasionalism which denies that ideas can be 
causally active and a theory of efficacious ideas which suggests that ideas are indeed 
causally active.    
24  She concludes that whatever Malebranche means by efficacious ideas, he 
must not take them to be true causal agents.  One of her primary reasons for this 
conclusion is that understanding ideas as true causal agents would violate Malebranche’s 
occasionalism.25
                                                                                                                                                 
University Press, 1996).  I will not take a position in this debate concerning the shift, all I am interested for 
the purposes of this paper is that Malebranche was committed to the view that ideas were causally active.  
It does not matter to my position if this was a later development or not.   
 
 
23 The fact that there is a puzzle between these two claims has also been pointed out in the literature by 
Peppers-Bates, “Does Malebranche Need Efficacious Ideas? The Cognitive Faculties, the Ontological 
Status of Ideas, and Human Attention.” and Alquié, Le Cartésianisme De Malebranche, 210-122.  and in a 
less direct way by Jolley, “Intellect and Illumination in Malebranche.”  However, only Peppers-Bates gives 
a detailed solution to this puzzle.    
 
24 Peppers-Bates, “Does Malebranche Need Efficacious Ideas? The Cognitive Faculties, the Ontological 
Status of Ideas, and Human Attention.” 
 
25 “Making ideas qua ideas casually active violates both the strictures of Malebranche’s occasionalist 
metaphysics and his substance-mode ontology”.  Ibid., 85.  The second reason Peppers-Bates rejects 
efficacious ideas is that such an interpretation nullifies the role of human faculties that Malebranche holds.   
“Additionally, denying Malebranche’s commitment to the soul’s cognitive and volitional capacities 
makes it impossible to understand the belief in human intellectual and moral agency that motivated 
much of Malebranche’s work.  Indeed, denying Malebranche’s commitment to the real use of the 
intellect effectively places him outside of the rationalist tradition.”  Peppers-Bates, “Does Malebranche 
Need Efficacious Ideas? The Cognitive Faculties, the Ontological Status of Ideas, and Human 
Attention.”  Ibid., 85.   
I am not arguing the role of human faculties in this paper, but I do suggest that this passage contains a 
puzzling claim.  Peppers-Bates claims in the opening paragraph of her paper that replacing the deliverances 
of the senses with the deliverances of the intellect for knowledge acquisition is the key to rationalism.  
Then in this passage she suggests that one reason to think that Malebranche did not hold a strong 
interpretation of efficacious ides is because it would place him outside of the rationalist camp.   
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 Peppers-Bates summarizes her argument toward the beginning of her paper.   
In this paper, I argue that a strong interpretation of efficacious ideas, whereby they 
appear to become true causal agents, must be rejected because it pushes us into an 
incorrect reading of Malebranche’s theory of the divine and human faculties… 
Making ideas qua ideas causally active violates both the strictures of Malebranche’s 
occasionalist metaphysics and his substance-mode ontology.26
 
   
Before I examine her argument, I need to explain what Peppers-Bates is rejecting.  She is 
rejecting that ideas could be true casual agents in Malebranche’s philosophy.  Peppers-
Bates cites Jolley as a representative of such a view of efficacious ideas and summarizes 
his view in the following manner: 
On Jolley’s account, Malebranche explains the union between the human intellect and 
God’s Reason needed in both intellectual and sensory perception in terms of efficacious 
divine ideas acting upon our minds.  God’s ideas, not God himself, become true causes 
on this schema.27
   
    
She says that the theory of efficacious ideas makes “ideas qua ideas causally active”28 
and holds that ideas are agents with efficacy independent of the divine will.29  In short, 
she is rejecting that ideas are causally active of themselves or on their own accord.30
                                                                                                                                                 
 This is puzzling because Malebranche would not have accepted or rejected interpretations based 
on where those interpretations would place him on the philosophical map.  While Malebranche did consider 
himself following in the tradition of Descartes, we have no reason to think that he was committed to a 
system of rationalism as has been since defined by historians.  Therefore his accepting of a view that places 
him outside of the rationalist tradition should be no reason to think that he would not hold such a view.  
Afterall, the rationalist and empiricist names and distinction is nothing more than our attempt to classify 
philosophers into schools that they were not concerned about.  This is particularly evident when current 
literature has been re-examining this distinction and attempting to re-classify some philosophers.  So, 
suggesting that a strong interpretation of efficacious ideas would place Malebranche outside of the 
rationalist camp should not be taken as any kind of evidence that he couldn’t have held such a position. 
   
 
26 Peppers-Bates, “Does Malebranche Need Efficacious Ideas? The Cognitive Faculties, the Ontological 
Status of Ideas, and Human Attention,” 85.   
 
27 Ibid., 87. 
 
28 Ibid., 85. 
 
29 “However, I believe that it fits with the account I am developing, by rejecting the view of ideas as agents 
with efficacy independent of the divine will.”  Ibid., 89, footnote 34. 
 
30 Ibid., 90, 91, 93, and 95.   
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 Peppers-Bates presents two reasons that the theory of efficacious ideas contradicts 
Malebranche’s occasionalism.  First, ideas cannot act in Malebranche’s philosophical 
system due to their ontological status.  Ideas are not the kinds of things that could be 
casually active.  Second, ideas cannot be true causes due to their relationship with God’s 
Word rather than God’s Will.  Only God’s will is causally active and ideas are related to 
God’s Word which is not causally active.   
  In developing her first reason for rejecting efficacious ideas she begins by 
explaining the ontological status of ideas for Malebranche.  She says that such a 
discussion will explain what it means for God to “contain” ideas and must be properly 
understood before we can understand the causal relations between God and humans.31  
Peppers-Bates concludes two things from this discussion of ontology.  The first is that 
ideas are not the kinds of things that could hold causal powers.32  “In sum, ideas—
interpreted either as abstract logical items or as partially revealed aspects of the divine 
substance—do not themselves possess causal properties.”33  This is because ideas do not 
possess a will or an intellect.34
                                                 
31 Ibid., 86.   
  Only God possesses causal powers from his being a 
substance.  Only God himself can be said to be a true cause.  Peppers-Bates recognizes 
that Malebranche often speaks as if ideas act upon our mind.  But she qualifies this by 
 
32 It is hard to know exactly where Peppers-Bates comes down in this debate.  At times she seems to accept 
the solution presented above.  “Ideas cannot be a bridge between human beings and God because ideas are 
the substance of God, the perfections that are his essence” (95).  At other times she seems to present a 
different solution, “ideas are, strictly speaking, limited aspects of God’s essence with which he affects us” 
(89).  Ibid.  
 
33 Ibid., 93.  Jolley makes the same point about ideas not being the kinds of entities that can posses causal 
powers.  Jolley, “Intellect and Illumination in Malebranche,” 200.  
 
34 “Indeed, ideas are not the kinds of entity that could initiate causal sequences—they do not posses a will, 
they do not individually posses an intellect, although in their totality they are identified with divine 
Reason.”  Peppers-Bates, “Does Malebranche Need Efficacious Ideas? The Cognitive Faculties, the 
Ontological Status of Ideas, and Human Attention,” 91.  
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pointing out that when Malebranche is most precise these kinds of statements are 
followed by reminders that God is the only true cause.  This language where 
Malebranche says that ideas are efficacious is misleading.35  Malebranche’s 
occasionalism clearly shows that ideas cannot be efficacious.36
 The second reason Peppers-Bates rejects that ideas are efficacious concerns a 
division she introduces from Malebranche between the Word and will of God.  She 
makes a distinction between God qua Word and God qua will.
  Given Malebranche’s 
occasionalism and the ontological status he gives to ideas, Peppers-Bates concludes, 
ideas are not the kinds of things that could be efficacious.   
37  She points out that 
Malebranche connects causation to the will of God since God’s will is necessarily 
efficacious.38
A true cause as I understand it is one such that the mind perceives a necessary 
connection between it and its effect.  Now the mind perceives a necessary connection 
only between the will of an infinitely perfect being and its effects.  Therefore, it is 
only God who is the true cause and who truly has the power to move bodies…  God 
needs no instrument to act; it suffices that He wills in order that a thing be, because it 
is a contradiction that He should will and that what He wills should not happen.  
Therefore, His power is His will, and to communicate His power is to communicate 
the efficacy of His will.  (LO 450).    
  She quotes the following passage from the Search as support that 
Malebranche holds such a distinction.   
 
For something to hold causal powers, it must be related or connected in some way to the 
will of God.  But, Peppers-Bates points out, ideas are contained in the Word of God 
                                                 
35 Ibid., 90.  Also pointing out the confusing nature of this language is Nadler, Malebranche and Ideas, 6.  
 
36 “Malebranche’s point is that nothing besides God can act on human minds.  This is just his 
occasionalism.  Ideas cannot, strictly speaking, be efficacious.”  Peppers-Bates, “Does Malebranche Need 
Efficacious Ideas? The Cognitive Faculties, the Ontological Status of Ideas, and Human Attention,” 95. 
 
37 She uses this terminology only at one point, but she alludes to it at other places throughout this part of 
her argument.  Ibid., 92-95.     
 
38 Malebranche highlights this same idea throughout Book 6, Part 2, Chapter 3 of the Search (LO 446-452).   
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according to Malebranche’s vision in God.39  Peppers-Bates concludes that the Word of 
God is passive and inert.  Ideas are contained in the passive Word of God and not in the 
efficacious will of God.  Therefore, they cannot be true causes.40
 In summary, Peppers-Bates argues that efficacious ideas should be rejected as a 
theory held by Malebranche since it is impossible for ideas to hold causal powers due to 
their ontological structure and their containment in God’s Word rather than in God’s will. 
   
 It is now possible to show how Malebranche’s Trinitarian metaphysics enables us 
to present a different, and more satisfying solution to the puzzle.  The doctrine of the 
Trinity explains how Malebranche can hold that ideas are casually efficacious without 
contradicting his occasionalism.  Peppers-Bates argues that Malebranche’s occasionalism 
is inconsistent with this theory of efficacious ideas.  She solves the problem by rejecting 
efficacious ideas: that is by denying that they are true causal agents.  I argue that 
Malebranche’s occasionalism is not inconsistent with his theory of efficacious ideas and 
that it his Trinitarian metaphysics allows him to hold both consistently.   
 Given what I have shown above concerning the ontological status of ideas, it is 
possible to extend what Malebranche says about the Trinity to show that ideas can be true 
causal agents.   Peppers-Bates agrees with my position in section 4.1 that ideas are 
identical with the substance of God, but we disagree concerning the application of this 
conclusion to the puzzle at hand.  While she agrees that ideas are the substance of God, 
she still continues to say that ideas are not true causes.  I say that this conclusion leaves 
room for ideas to become true causes.  As we saw from section 3.2, Malebranche holds 
                                                 
39 This is the same point that I just made concerning ideas being connected to the Word of God.    
 
40 Peppers-Bates, “Does Malebranche Need Efficacious Ideas? The Cognitive Faculties, the Ontological 
Status of Ideas, and Human Attention,” 93.  
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that the Son shares the same substance with the Father.  These two persons of the Trinity 
are the same substance and therefore they share certain properties.  In the same way, 
Malebranche holds that ideas share the same substance with God and thereby share 
certain properties.  The property that God shares with ideas is the property of being 
causally efficacious.   
 Peppers-Bates argues that Malebranche rejects that ideas hold the property of 
being causally efficacious.  She is aware of the many passages where Malebranche says 
that ideas are in fact true causal agents:   
It is therefore necessary to distinguish the ideas that enlighten us, that affect us, and 
that represent these beings, from the modes of our soul, i.e., from our perceptions of 
them.  (LO 319) 
 
For it is clear that the soul’s modes are changeable but ideas are immutable; that its 
modes are particular, but ideas are universal and general to all intelligences; … that 
these ideas are indeed efficacious because they act in the mind, they enlighten it and 
make it happy or unhappy, which is evident by the pain that the idea of the hand 
causes in those who have had an arm cut off.  (LO 323)  
 
Peppers-Bates believes that passages such as these are misleading.  On her interpretation 
Malebranche may say that ideas are true causes, but he really means that God is the only 
true cause.  As I mentioned earlier, she adds that Malebranche, when he is being the most 
careful, points out in the context of these kinds of passages that it is really God who is the 
true cause.41
Certainly then the hand that touches them, and affects them with a sensation of pain, 
is not the one that was cut off.  Thus it can only be the idea of the hand, in 
consequence of the disturbances in the brain, similar to those we have when someone 
hurts our hand.  Indeed, the matter of which our body is composed cannot act on our 
  Peppers-Bates gives the following example from Dialogues between a 
Christian and a Chinese Philosopher.  
                                                 
41 “He often speaks of ideas as acting on our mind.  At his most precise, however, he does qualify these 
kinds of statements with remainders that God is the only causal agent that God operates on us by revealing 
the ideas he encloses.”  Ibid., 90.   
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soul; only he who is superior to it and has created it can do so, by the idea of the 
body, that is to say, by his very essence insofar as it represents extension.42
 
    
Peppers-Bates intends this passage to serve as an example that when he is being the most 
careful, Malebranche dismisses any claim that ideas cause with the additional statement 
that only God causes.  “Malebranche first talks of the idea of a hand acting on and 
causing amputees’ pain, then notes that only God acts on the mind in this way.”43
 Peppers-Bates interprets these kinds of statements as a retraction of the claim that 
ideas are causes.  According to Peppers-Bates, when Malebranche adds a line similar to 
“only he who is superior to it and has created it can do so”—that is act on the body—he 
is retracting the claim concerning the causal efficacy of ideas.  In other words, 
Malebranche recognizes his loose and confusing language and takes it back by restating 
his assertion in a more precise way.
 
44
 There are a few things to point out about this passage and Peppers- Bates claim.  
First, Malebranche does sometimes follow his statement that ideas cause with the 
qualifier that only God causes, but Malebranche does not add this further explanatory 
note in every instance.
   
45
                                                 
42 OC XV 9, the emphasis is by Peppers-Bates when she quotes the passage at Ibid., 90 – 91.   
  In fact, such additional claims are the exception rather than the 
 
43 Ibid., 90.   
 
44 Peppers-Bates makes the claim that when Malebranche is being the most careful he follows passages that 
seem to support efficacious ideas with statements such as these, but she does not catalogue such passages.    
 
45 Peppers-Bates is aware of this, which is why she suggests that he gives the qualification when he is the 
most precise.  Peppers-Bates, “Does Malebranche Need Efficacious Ideas? The Cognitive Faculties, the 
Ontological Status of Ideas, and Human Attention,” 90.  Here is a list of some passages where ideas are 
said to act that have no additional comment that only God acts:   
“… these ideas are indeed efficacious because they act in the mind, they enlighten it and make it happy 
or  unhappy…”  (LO 323)  
“It is therefore necessary to distinguish the ideas that enlighten us, that affect us, and that represent 
these beings, from the modes of our soul, i.e., from our perceptions of them.”  (LO 319) 
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rule.  Of course, frequency does not determine truthfulness.  Just because Malebranche 
adds this additional statement infrequently does not mean that his intention was not to 
imply it everywhere else.   
 But even where Malebranche does add the additional qualifier that only God 
causes, we have reason to think that this is not a retraction of the claim that ideas are 
causally efficacious.  I interpret these kinds of additional statements not as a retraction 
but as a reinforcement.  In the passage quoted above, Malebranche first says that the idea 
of the hand affects the soul.  Then he adds that only God acts on the soul.  This addition 
does not read as if Malebranche is retracting the claim that the idea has affected the soul.  
It reads like Malebranche is reinforcing, explaining, or simply restating the claim already 
made.  This particular example supports my interpretation Peppers-Bates.  When 
Malebranche follows statements that ideas are causally active with the additional claim 
that only God is a true cause, he is applying the ontological status of ideas.  To say that 
ideas act upon the soul is the same thing as saying that God acts upon the soul.  These 
passages support my claim that ideas share the property of being a true cause with God.   
 In the passage from Dialogues between a Christian and a Chinese Philosopher 
that Peppers-Bates argues that Malebranche also equates ideas with God.   
                                                                                                                                                 
“… that it (the soul) is an intelligence that nonetheless is actually made intelligent only through the 
efficacy of divine ideas, which alone can act on it, affect it, modify it, enlighten it, as I have explained 
elsewhere.”   (LO 560) 
“… I am delighted to point out that this resolution depends, like all other truths, on the great principle 
that  universal Reason contains the ideas which enlighten us…”  (DM 39) 
“I believe that there are essential differences between knowing and sensing, between the ideas which 
enlighten the mind and the sensations which affect it.”  (DM 35) 
“Never, Aristes, take your own sensations for our ideas, the modifications which affect your soul for 
the ideas which enlighten all minds.”  (DM 31) 
“All these ideas have some reality while I think them…  For they enlighten the mind or make 
themselves known to it; some even strike it and make themselves sensed by it, and this is in a thousand 
different ways.”  (DM 10)  
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Certainly then the hand that touches them, and affects them with a sensation of pain, 
is not the one that was cut off.  Thus it can only be the idea of the hand, in 
consequence of the disturbances in the brain, similar to those we have when someone 
hurts our hand.  Indeed, the matter of which our body is composed cannot act on our 
soul; only he who is superior to it and has created it can do so, by the idea of the body, 
that is to say, by his very essence insofar as it represents extension.46
 
    
Malebranche is not retracting his claim that the idea acts upon the body.  He is 
reinforcing that ideas are God.  This passage supports my claim that the ideas share in the 
substance of God, or in this passage, ideas are “his very essence”.  The idea, which is the 
very essence of God, is causally efficacious.     
 There also passages where Pepper-Bates’ interpretation does not work.  In a 
passage that sounds a bit like his occasionalism, Malebranche says that ideas alone can 
act on or enlighten the mind.   
We would see that the soul is essentially a substance that thinks or perceives 
everything that affects it, that it is an intelligence that nonetheless is actually made 
intelligent only through the efficacy of divine ideas, which alone can act on it, affect 
it, modify it, enlighten it, as I have explained elsewhere.  (LO 560)47
 
 
In this passage, Malebranche not only says that ideas are causally active; he says that they 
alone are casually active.  If Malebranche followed this claim with the suggestion that 
only God is causally active (which he does not), such a retraction would make no sense.  
However, this additional statement fits the logic of the passage perfectly according to my 
reinforcement interpretation.  Malebranche says that only ideas are efficacious, and by 
that he means to say that only God is efficacious.     
                                                 
46 OC XV 9.  This time the emphasis is mine, highlighting  that Malebranche says that the idea is the very 
essence of God.   
 
47 This passage highlights the puzzle between Malebranche’s occasionalism and his theory of efficacious 
ideas.  Malebranche, due to his occasionalism, holds that God is the only cause and therefore the only 
substance that can act on the soul.  However, in this passage he says that ideas alone can act on, affect, 
modify, or enlighten the soul.  This passage gives support to the claim that Malebranche thinks that ideas 
share this divine property of being efficacious.   
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 So far I have argued that ideas and God both share the divine attribute of being 
true causes.  What is needed is an account of how Malebranche could hold that ideas and 
God are both true causes without inconsistency.  Another way of saying this is that 
Malebranche needs to give us reason to think that he is entitled to hold that both ideas 
and God can share the property of being a true cause.   
 One available move at this point is to suggest that Malebranche evokes the 
mysteries of God.  Malebranche is not shy about claiming that some truth is beyond 
human understanding and is therefore imbedded in the mystery of God.  But in this 
situation, we can do more than evoke the mysteries of God because Malebranche’s 
commitment to a Trinitarian metaphysical explains how he can hold that both ideas and 
God are true causes.      
 As I pointed out in chapter 3, Malebranche holds that all three persons of the 
Trinity are casually efficacious.  The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are all involved 
in the process of enlightening.  He can say this because each of these persons of the 
Trinity is consubstantial or one substance with God.  To say that the Word enlightens is 
the same as saying God enlightens.  To say that the will of God enlightens, is the same as 
saying that God enlightens.  Malebranche holds that each of these is a distinct person, yet 
shares the property of enlightening due to the fact that they are all identical with God.    
 This Trinitarian metaphysical structure is very closely related to the problem at 
hand concerning efficacious ideas and occasionalism.  We have already seen that 
Malebranche thinks that ideas are one substance with God, which is another way of 
saying that they are consubstantial with God.  God alone can enlighten and ideas alone 
can enlighten since they are the same substance.  Just like the Word alone and God alone 
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can enlighten.  According to Malebranche, to say that ideas act on the soul is the same as 
saying that God acts on the soul since they are the same substance.   
 This responds to Peppers-Bates’ first reason for suggesting that efficacious ideas 
are incompatible with his occasionalism: that ideas do not hold the ontological status 
necessary to be true causes.  Instead, we have seen that the ontological status of ideas is 
exactly why they can be causally efficacious.  Ideas share the same substance with God.    
 This Trinitarian structure also holds implications for the second reason Peppers-
Bates suggest that efficacious ideas are incompatible with occasionalism.  Recall that she 
concluded that ideas cannot be efficacious because they are contained in God qua Word 
rather than God qua will.  Peppers-Bates concluded that God’s causal power is found in 
God qua will alone, not in God qua Word.  Since ideas are not contained in the part of 
God that is necessarily efficacious, ideas cannot be efficacious.   
 According to Malebranche’s Trinitarian metaphysical picture, God qua will is the 
third person of the Trinity while God qua Word is the second person of the Trinity.  
Peppers-Bates is correct to point out that Malebranche holds that God’s efficacious nature 
is found in his will, the Holy Spirit.  But, as we have seen in section 3.2, Malebranche 
also suggests that causal power is located in other persons of the Trinity as well.  
Malebranche explicitly says that the second person of the Trinity, rather than being inert, 
enlightens and acts on human minds in a causal manner.     
They know order and eternal truths, and even the beings that God has made according 
to these truths or according to order, through the union these minds necessarily have 
with the Word, or wisdom of God, which enlightens them, as has just been explained.  
(LO 234) 
 
… It is, then, the idea or archetype of bodies which affects us in different ways.  I 
mean, it is the intelligible substance of Reason which acts in our mind through its all-
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powerful efficacy and which touches and modifies it with color, taste, pain, by what 
there is within it representing bodies.  (DM 77) 
 
These passages would be confusing apart from Malebranche’s Trinitarian picture.  The 
will of God holds casual properties and the Word or Reason also holds causal properties 
since they both share the same substance of God.   
 Therefore, God qua will cannot be contrasted with God qua Word in the sense 
that the former is efficacious while the latter is inert.  Peppers-Bates is mistaken to 
conclude that ideas are not efficacious because they are contained in God qua Word 
rather than God qua will.  The placement of ideas within the Word does not show that 
they cannot be efficacious.   
 Once we appreciate Malebranche’s Trinitarian metaphysics we see that there is no 
problem in Malebranche’s claim that both ideas and God are casually efficacious.  Both 
can be true causes since they are the same substance.  While the doctrine of the Trinity is 
philosophically relevant in this discussion, Peppers-Bates nowhere mentions that 
Malebranche holds this position.  Failing to appreciate Malebranche’s Trinitarian picture 
leads Peppers-Bates astray.  Malebranche’s Trinitarian metaphysics shows how both her 
reasons that efficacious ideas are inconsistent with occasionalism are misled.  A correct 
understanding of the ontological status of ideas shows that ideas can indeed be true 
causes.  Malebranche’s Trinitarian metaphysics also will not allow Pepper-Bates to apply 
the God qua Word and God qua will distinction as she does.  Since the Word and will are 
both the substance of God, it cannot be said that only the will is efficacious.     
 I have shown that Malebranche can consistently hold both occasionalism and 
efficacious ideas because of his Trinitarian metaphysics.  God and ideas are both true 
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causes since they are the same substance, thereby sharing the property of being a true 
cause.48
“It is certain that certain ideas are efficacious, since they act upon the mind and 
enlighten it, and since they make it happy or unhappy through the pleasant or 
unpleasant perceptions by which they affect it.  Now nothing can act immediately 
upon the mind unless it is superior to it—nothing but God alone; for only the Author 
of our being can change its modifications.  All our ideas, therefore, must be located in 
the efficacious substance of the Divinity, which alone is intelligible or capable of 
enlightening us, because it alone can affect intelligences.  (LO 232) 
  I think that one final passage from Malebranche makes this point.   
 
 While a proper appreciation of Malebranche’s Trinitarian metaphysics helps us 
understand his theories better, this is not to say that we have removed the element of 
mystery entirely from Malebranche.  There are still numerous “dark statements” in 
Malebranche including the notion that ideas and God share the same substance.  
Malebranche considered the Trinity itself is a mystery beyond comprehension.   
We believe the mystery of the Trinity, for example, although the human mind cannot 
conceive it; and yet we do not give up our belief that two things now differing from a 
third are not different from each other, although this proposition seems to overthrow 
it.  (LO 245) 
 
There are other mysteries concerning the nature of God that are at play in these 
discussions.  Malebranche holds that God is simple.    
But it should be carefully noted that we cannot conclude from their seeing all things 
in God in this way that our minds see the essence of God… Yet what we see is but 
one or more particular beings, and we do not understand this perfect simplicity of 
God, which includes all beings. (LO 231)  
 
God’s simplicity seems to conflict with Malebranche’s commitment to the Trinity, which 
is not simple but complex.  There will always be mysteries in some aspects of 
                                                 
48 I want to very quickly consider what was perhaps Peppers-Bates’ main problem with the strong 
interpretation of efficacious ideas, that ideas are a cause themselves or a cause apart from the will of God.  
One the one hand I suggest that ideas are a true cause themselves.  It is the ideas that cause, but they cause 
because they are one substance with God.  On the other hand, I do not think that ideas cause apart from the 
will of God, since they are one substance with the will of God.     
“But although something must be in order to be perceived, everything that is, is not thereby perceptible 
in itself; for in order to be so, it must be able to act immediately on the soul, it must be able of itself to 
enlighten, affect, or modify minds”.  (LO 320)   
 213 
Malebranche’s philosophy, but his Trinitarian metaphysics helps us understand a little 
more of his overall philosophical system than before.  In other words, we have pushed 
back the hedge of mystery a little further.     
  As we have seen, Malebranche’s philosophical theology is not only helpful for 
understanding his philosophical similarities with Berkeley; it is also helpful to understand 
Malebranche as he stands alone.  His acceptance of the doctrine of the Trinity sheds light 



















 I have shown that Malebranche and Berkeley have remarkably similar views both 
of divine revelation and of the Trinity.  I have also shown that these neglected similarities 
prove useful in understanding some of the philosophical similarities between these two 
philosophers.  For years commentators have pointed out that Malebranche and Berkeley 
hold certain metaphysical and epistemological similarities and I have shown that some of 
these similarities can be explained by Malebranche and Berkeley’s similar theories of 
divine revelation and the Trinity.  This is due to the fact that both philosophers construct 
systems where their theological and philosophical doctrines are held consistently 
alongside each other.   
 I conclude by summarizing the accomplishments of this project as well as the 
contributions it makes.  First, steps have been taken to restore Malebranche and 
Berkeley’s commitment to philosophical theology to its proper place.  By showing that 
their doctrines of the Trinity and divine revelation are philosophically relevant, I have 
shown that philosophical theology is an important part of the overall project of both 
philosophers.  The doctrines of divine revelation and the Trinity held by both 
philosophers make up an important component of their thought.   
 Another accomplishment is that the overall philosophical relationship between 
Malebranche and Berkeley is made clearer.  This is because a correct understanding of 
their philosophical theology has helped us see why these philosophers hold similar 
positions at times and disagree at others.  For example, Berkeley’s theory of causation is 
in some ways similar to Malebranche’s occasionalism.  I have shown that the best way to 
explain this similarity is through their shared acceptance of the doctrine of the Trinity.  
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But, there are important differences between their theories of causation.  Most notably, 
Berkeley rejects full occasionalism since he accepts that humans are also true causal 
agents.  Berkeley’s commitments to philosophical theology also explain why he rejects 
full occasionalism.  His commitment to the Genesis doctrine alongside the Trinity led 
him to hold that humans must also have wills that are efficacious in a way that is similar 
to God.  While, these similarities and disagreements have been mentioned, I have given a 
cohesive explanation that up until this point has been lacking.   
 These accomplishments make various contributions both to the work done 
concerning the relationship between Malebranche and Berkeley as well as work done on 
each philosopher individually.  I have pointed out a philosophical similarity between 
Malebranche and Berkeley that has not been mentioned: their similar philosophical 
theology.  While many similarities have been pointed out between these philosophers in 
the secondary literature, it has not been pointed out that both accept the doctrines of 
divine revelation and the Trinity and then apply those doctrines to their philosophical 
systems in similar ways.  I have shown in detail that they hold theories of philosophical 
theology that are remarkably similar.    
 Malebranche and Berkeley’s theories of divine revelation agree on many points.  
They both accept a causal theory of divine revelation that serve as historical examples of 
George Mavrodes’ causation theory of divine revelation where God directly affects 
psychological states in humans.  Even though they do not use the terminology in the same 
way, both philosophers accept the distinction between general and special revelation from 
Christian theology.  They both apply the doctrine of special revelation to their 
philosophical systems in ways that are typical of their day.  They accept the Christian 
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scriptures as God’s special revelation and they quote from these scriptures to support 
their philosophical positions.  However, the way that they apply the doctrine of general 
revelation is unusual.  Both construct theories of perception around their commitment to 
general revelation.  Malebranche’s vision in God is his theory of general revelation and 
the same is true for Berkeley’s language of vision.  Both connect these theories with the 
natural law and use the same passage from Acts 17 to support them.  Both philosophers 
hold that the vast majority of human knowledge comes through God’s general revelation 
through ideas.  Both hold very robust views of natural revelation which are relevant to 
their overall epistemological systems.   
 Malebranche and Berkeley also accept the doctrine of the Trinity from traditional 
Christian theology.  Both accept a Nicene formulation of the Trinity that God is one 
substance and three persons: God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit.  
Augustine’s influence on their theories of the Trinity is evident.  Malebranche and 
Berkeley differentiate between the persons of the Trinity in the same way as Augustine.  
They also follow Augustine’s analogy of the Trinity as being, mind, and will.  This 
Augustinian influence on Malebranche and Berkeley can be seen in their accounts of 
creation.  God creates the world through the Son and the Holy Spirit.  The amplified 
analogy of the Trinity can be found in the works of both philosophers.  Both connect 
being with God the Father, reason or knowledge with the Son, and the will with the Holy 
Spirit.   
 The most important contribution of this project is that I show how Malebranche 
and Berkeley’s acceptance of these doctrines is philosophically relevant in their systems 
of metaphysics and epistemology.  It might be merely interesting if it were only the case 
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that they held similar philosophical theologies, but the fact that a correct understanding of 
these philosophers’ theological commitments sheds light on their philosophical doctrines 
shows that the philosophical theology of both thinkers cannot be ignored.   
    We see the philosophical relevance of Malebranche and Berkeley’s theories of 
divine revelation through their epistemological positions.  Malebranche’s vision in God 
and Berkeley’s language of vision are both theories of general revelation.  While they 
accept both special and general revelation, Malebranche and Berkeley place the emphasis 
on general revelation.  We also see the philosophical relevance of the doctrine of divine 
revelation through their similar claim that human knowledge is derived from divine 
revelation.  Malebranche thinks that all knowledge is revealed from God while Berkeley 
thinks that the vast amount of knowledge we have is derived from divine revelation.  
 We see the philosophical relevance of their shared acceptance of the doctrine of 
the Trinity through their similar theories of causation.  Both philosophers construct 
theories of causation and divine substance that are consistent with their acceptance of the 
Trinity.  Since these are relevant in this way, we can explain why Malebranche and 
Berkeley’s theories of causation are similar.  They both accept, due to their shared 
acceptance of the amplified analogy, that causation is connected to the will of God or the 
third person of the Trinity.  Also, the Trinity can explain why Berkeley rejects full 
occasionalism.  Berkeley merges his theory of the Trinity with a commitment to the 
Genesis Doctrine and thereby concludes that humans also must be composed of a triad of 
being, knowledge, and will.  This means that the will of humans must also be efficacious, 
although to a lesser degree.     
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 Commentators often explain the similarities between Malebranche and Berkeley’s 
theories of causation and perception by suggesting that Berkeley was influenced by 
Malebranche.  As I have pointed out, this is not a desirable explanation since Berkeley 
stresses that his philosophy is not at all similar to that of Malebranche.  With an 
understanding of these similarities in philosophical theology, we can explain these 
similarities while at the same time taking Berkeley’s claims seriously.  We need not 
suggest that Berkeley was influenced by Malebranche.  Berkeley’s theories look like 
Malebranche’s because both hold similar theories of divine revelation and the Trinity and 
construct theories of causation and perception that are consistent with these theological 
doctrines.   
 That concludes the accomplishments of my chief argument concerning the 
philosophical similarities between Malebranche and Berkeley.  There are also additional 
benefits that arise in the philosophers in isolation.  Concerning Berkeley, we can 
understand the cohesive nature of his works over the course of his career.  The language 
of vision, Berkeley’s theory of general revelation, is present throughout his works from 
the earliest to the latest Siris.  We also see how Berkeley, through the language of vision, 
can say that the world is a text that requires interpretation.  Also, understanding the 
philosophical relevance of the Trinity in Berkeley helps us understand the puzzling book 
Siris.   
 In chapter 4 I introduced two more ways that the findings of this project could be 
applied to Berkeley.   
 [3]  An application of Berkeley’s theory of the Trinity 
 [4]  An application of Berkeley’s theory of divine revelation 
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While I did not attempt to do either, I think that both [3] and [4] are areas where the 
literature on Berkeley could be improved with a correct understanding of his 
philosophical theology.  For example, there is a dispute concerning the role of divine 
ideas in Berkeley.1
 We saw that Malebranche’s commitment to the Trinity helps us understand 
passages that would otherwise be confusing.  And, since we used Malebranche’s theory 
of the Trinity as our example in chapter 4, we see some other implications of this theory.  
Given this doctrine, we can explain the ontological status of ideas in Malebranche.  He 
holds that ideas share in the substance of God.  While Cook does not mention 
Malebranche’s doctrine of the Trinity, this doctrine supports his conclusion that ideas are 
identical with the substance of God.  We also see that Malebranche can hold 
occasionalism alongside his theory of efficacious ideas without any inconsistency.  Had 
Peppers-Bates been aware of Malebranche’s commitment to the Trinity, she would not 
have been so quick to conclude that his occasionalism does not allow for ideas to be 
efficacious.   
  I think that both [3] and [4] provide important insights into this 
dispute that have been up until this point been neglected.  In particular I think that a 
correct understanding of these doctrines in Berkeley’s philosophical theology supports 
the interpretation of Berkeley’s divine ideas presented by Marc Hight. 
 While the contributions are not as direct as the ones just pointed out, this project 
also contributes to some of the other movements mentioned in section 1.4.  While I have 
                                                 
1  Marc A. Hight, Idea and Ontology: An Essay in Early Modern Metaphysics of Ideas (University Park, 
PA: The Pennsylvania State University, 2008).  Marc A. Hight, “Defending Berkeley's Divine Ideas,” 
Philosophia 33 (2005).  Stephen H. Daniel, “Berkeley's Christian Neoplatonism, Archetypes, and Divine 
Ideas,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 39 (2001).  Michael Ayers, “Divine Ideas and Berkeley's 
Proofs of God's Existence,” in Essays on the Philosophy of George Berkeley, ed. Ernest Sosa (Boston, MA: 
D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1987). Leopold Stubenberg, “Divine Ideas: The Cure-All for Berkeley's 
Immaterialsim?,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 28 (1990).   
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not directly argued for the position that Malebranche should not be considered a 
Rationalist or that Berkeley should not be considered an Empiricist, I have shown that 
these philosophers hold remarkably similar theories of philosophical theology which 
could be expanded to support such a claim.  In a similar vein, this project would be of 
interest to the current movement that is seeking to understand the theological 
commitments of the philosophers from the early modern period.    
 Finally, from this study of the philosophical theology of Malebranche and 
Berkeley, we gain important insight into some of the motivations of both of these 
philosophers.  Both wanted to show that God is near and that everything we do is 
centered in God.  This can be seen in the fact that both produce systems of metaphysics 
and epistemology that highlight the role of God.  For both philosophers, God is of great 
importance to our existence and to our knowledge.  This is why both philosophers find 
Paul’s sermon in Acts compelling enough to cite multiple times.  They agree with Paul 
that God is not far from each one of us.  Indeed, according to the philosophical theology 
of both Malebranche and Berkeley we live and move and have our being in God.    
Then Paul stood in front of the Areopagus and said, "Athenians, I see how extremely 
religious you are in every way.  For as I went through the city and looked carefully at 
the objects of your worship, I found among them an altar with the inscription, 'To an 
unknown god.' What therefore you worship as unknown, this I proclaim to you.  
The God who made the world and everything in it, he who is Lord of heaven and 
earth, does not live in shrines made by human hands, nor is he served by human 
hands, as though he needed anything, since he himself gives to all mortals life and 
breath and all things.  From one ancestor he made all nations to inhabit the whole 
earth, and he allotted the times of their existence and the boundaries of the places 
where they would live, so that they would search for God and perhaps grope for him 
and find him-- though indeed he is not far from each one of us.  For 'In him we live 
and move and have our being'; as even some of your own poets have said, 'For we too 
are his offspring.'  Acts 17:22-28 
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